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153 S.C. 459

151 S.E 87

Robertson v. Wise

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Decided December 17, 1929

Supreme Court of South Carolina · decided 1929-12-17

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently May 1955

1 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1929-12-17

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¶1 The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Ci-iiEE Justice Watts.

¶2 The appeals in these five cases were heard together by this Court. It appears that upon circuit the Robertson case was tried separately from the others, and although it is not distinctly so stated in the transcript, we assume that the Parker, Ployd, Smith and Phillips cases were tried together on circuit.

¶3 The questions that arose in the Robertson case were:

¶4 (1) Whether he came under the terms of Section 5703, Vol. 3 (Civ. Code), Code of 1922, which provides for a lien in favor of all employees of certain industrial enterprises; and (2) whether the compensation alleged to have been promised to him at the end of the employment year was such wages or salary as came within the purview of that section.

¶5 The same questions arose in the Parker case.

¶6 In the other three cases the first qüestion did not arise, the second did.

¶7 The cases were tried before his Honor, Judge Johnson, and a jury; he ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on both of the questions stated, and a verdict was rendered in each case in favor of the plaintiffs, which was confirmed by an order of his Honor directing the receiver to pay the amounts so ascertained out of the assets of the estate in his hands.

¶8 *462 The rulings of his Honor are set forth in his order, dated August 13, 1928, which will be incorporated in the report of the case.

¶9 For the reasons stated therein the judgment in favor of each of the plaintiffs is affirmed.

Messrs. Justices Brease, Stabrer and Carter concur.

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Case posture

Posture: Before JOHNSON, J., Jasper, August, 1928. Affirmed.Separate actions by S.W. Robertson, by C.C. Parker, by P.L. Floyd, by C.L. Smith, and by R.S. Phillips against John P. Wise, receiver. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. The order of the trial Judge directed to be reported was as follows: This is an action under Section No. 5703 of Volume 3 of the Code of 1922, for wages or salary. No attachment was brought for the reason that the Chelsea Lumber Company was at the time of the brining of this action in the hands of a receiver. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff in this cause for the sum of $724.92. It is admitted that there is sufficient lumber to pay all taxes and claims for wages or salary. I think said section includes all employees of the corporation, for, whatever may have been the original `Title' of the Act now embraced in section 5703, and the original purposes of the legislation in question, it is quite clear that, as re-enacted in the Code of 1922, the protection by way of lien is not limited to `laborers' as that term is generally understood, and it is doubtful if the General Assembly ever intended that such protection should be so limited. By the express language of the statute `All employees, * * * either by the day or month,' are protected in their `wages and salary.' Ordinarily, `laborers' are regarded as those who work by the day , and their compensation is usually referred to as `wages.' The fact that the words `all employees,' `month,' and `salary,' are used in the section under consideration, in addition to the words `day' `wages,' convinces me that the protection afforded is not limited to `laborers,' and that the word `employees' is comprehensive enough to include those performing the class of labor rendered by the plaintiff. I am also of the opinion, under the evidence in this case, that the `bonus' the plaintiff was to receive was not an additional compensation in the sense that the word `bonus' is commonly used and understood. The plaintiff, as established by the evidence and the finding of the jury, was not to receive this additional compensation out of extra profits, but was to receive a definite, fixed, additional compensation, wage, or salary in the event he remained in the employ of the lumber company for a definite period. In other words, he was to receive extra `wages' and `salary,' if he rendered satisfactory service for a fixed period, and such additional compensation, earned by plaintiff in the cause at bar, was not a mere `bonus,' but `wages' or `salary.' It is, therefore, ordered that John P. Wise, as receiver of the Chelsea Lumber Company, be and is hereby required to pay said amount, including the costs, to plaintiff's attorney from the proceeds of the sale of said lumber.

Source: CourtListener

Court

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Parallel citations

151 S.E 87