Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

153 S.W. 180

Brasfield v. Young

Court of Appeals of Texas

Decided January 8, 1913

Court of Appeals of Texas · decided 1913-01-08

<p>1. Pleading •(§ 205*) — Vendor’s Lien Note-Foreclosure — Pleading.</p> <p>A petition, in an action to foreclose a vendor’s lien, which stated that defendants M. delivered to plaintiff a note of defendant B., secured by a vendor’s lien on certain land, as collateral security for other notes previously executed and delivered to plaintiffs by M., that all the notes were past due and unpaid, that the vendor’s lien note was one of a series of four notes, the other three of which had been paid, and was the first and only lien on all the land, was sufficient as against a general demurrer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 491-510'; Dec. Dig. § 205.*]</p> <p>2. Vendor and Ponchaseis (§ 275*) — Vendor’s Lien Note — Foreclosure—Parties.</p> <p>Persons to whom a vendor’s lien note was transferred as collateral security for other notes had a right to sue thereon in their own names, and to foreclose the vendor’s lien.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 772; Dec. Dig. § 275.*]</p> <p>3. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 266*) — Vendor’s Lien Note — Assignment.</p> <p>The vendors, after delivering a vendor’s lien note to another as collateral security, held the legal title in the land in trust for the transferee, and could not so dispose of such title as to impair the lien of the note transferred, though the transferees had no recorded assignment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 687, 713-750; Dec. Dig. § 266.*]</p> <p>4. Appeal and Error (§ 964*) — Discretionary Ruling — Consolidation of Causes.</p> <p>Under Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 1454, the matter of consolidating causes of action being discretionary with the trial court, a refusal to consolidate causes could not be reviewed, in the absence of an abuse of discretion.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3834; Dec. Dig. § 964.*]</p> <p>5. Appeal and Error (§ 742*) — Assignment of Error — Proposition—Statement.</p> <p>An assignment of error not followed by any proposition or statement, as required by the rules, will not he considered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3000; Dec. Dig. § 742.*]</p> <p>6. Appeal and Error (§ 742*) — Assignment op Error — Proposition—Statement.</p> <p>An assignment of error, followed merely by an alleged proposition stating that the court erred because there was nothing in the record to show certain facts, and not followed byjamy statement except an invitation to search the record, will not be reviewed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3000; Dec. Dig. § 742.*] .</p> <p>7. Appeal and Error (§ 499*) — Assignment • op Error — Admission op Evidence — Objections — Bill op Exceptions.</p> <p>An assignment complaining of the admission of evidence will not be reviewed where the record did not show that objections were made at the time, or contain any bill of exceptions covering the points.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent Dig. §§ 2295-2299; Dec. Dig. § 499.*]</p> <p>8. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 266*) — Vendor’s Lien Note — Agreement After Transfer by Vendor.</p> <p>The rights of the bona fide holders of a vendor’s lien note transferred to them by the vendors as collateral security were not affected by an agreement between the vendors and third parties who loaned them money to pay part of a debt against the land that the lien of the note should be second to the lien given to secure the loan, though such third parties believed that the note was in the possession of the vendors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Gent. Dig. §§ 687, 713-750; Dec. Dig. § 266.*]</p> <p>9. Appeal and Error {§ 742*) — Assignment of Error — Sufficiency.</p> <p>Assignments of error which are unsupported by propositions or statements, and cannot be considered unless the court search the record to find the error complained of, will not be reviewed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Elrror, Cent. Dig. § 3000; Dec. Dig. § 742.*]</p> <p>10. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 294*) — Vendor’s Lien Note — Foreclosure—Attorney Fees.</p> <p>In an action to foreclose a vendor’s lien note providing for an attorney’s fee, the plaintiff need not allege and prove the reasonableness of such fee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 830; Dec. Dig. § 294.*]</p> <p>11. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 285*) — Vendor’s Lien Note — Pleading—Judgment.</p> <p>Under a prayer for equitable relief in an action on a vendor’s lien note, the court was empowered to adjust the equities between the parties, and to dispose of all matters involved in the cause.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent Dig. §§ 800-807; Dec. Dig. § 285.*]</p> <p>On Motion for Rehearing.</p> <p>12. Evidence ■(§ 175*) — Best Evidence-Judgment.</p> <p>In an action on a vendor’s lien note transferred to plaintiffs as collateral security for other notes, the judgments which plaintiffs recovered on the other notes, being the best evidence of the amount due, were properly admitted in evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence. Cent. Dig. §§ 561, 565, 568, 569; Dec. Dig. § 175.*]</p> <p>13. Attorney and Client (§ 70*) — Power to Sue — Presumption.</p> <p>In the absence of a motion provided for by Rev. St. 1895, art. 272, authorizing a defendant, by motion, to question the authority of the plaintiff’s attorney to begin the suit, an attorney who has possession of a note and files a suit thereon in the name of the holder, and prosecutes the same in a regular and lawful manner, will be presumed to have authority to do so.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. § 95; Dee. Dig. § 70.*]</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently January 1921

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed, and motion for rehearing overruled · Decided 1913-01-08

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1On Motion for Rehearing.

¶2[12] In our original opinion we refused to pass upon appellants’ ninth assignment of error, which objected to the action of the court in admitting in evidence the decrees in causes 3135 and 3136, because no bill of exception is in the record covering the point in the assignment. Appellants call óur attention to the fact that exception to this evidence was saved at the trial and appears properly in the statement of facts. That being the ease, this court should have considered the said assignment, and will now do so. Causes 3,135 and 3,136 were instituted in the same court in which this suit was pending; one was by Mary Goshorn against G. M. & J. W. Magill and the other by Sadie A. Young against the Magills. These suits were filed to recover upon the original notes of the Magills, payable to the appellees, described in our opinion, and as security for which the $3,625 note was given. The suits had been prosecuted to judgment, and therefore the judgments, instead of the notes, were the best evidence of the amount due by the Magills to Mrs. Goshorn and Mrs. Young. Tt was necessary, in the proper disposition of this cause, for the court to know the amounts due by the Magills to those parties, and therefore the judgments were properly adfhitted in evidence.

¶3*184Appellants contend that assignments of error Nos. 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, and 20 were sufficiently in compliance with the rules of this court to require their consideration. Through deference to appellants’ request, we have very carefully considered those assignments. They do not present any error, and they are overruled.

¶4[13] Appellants further contend that there was error in our ruling upon their twenty-first assignment, because they say there was no evidence that the attorney who filed this suit had authority for filing the same. Just how appellants reach this conclusion is not apparent. It is not disputed that the note was delivered to the appellees herein as collateral security, and that it was past due when suit was filed. Nor is it disputed that the two principal notes were past due and unpaid. The collateral note was in the hands of the attorney who brought the suits upon the two principal notes and prosecuted the same to judgment without objection from the owners thereof. This suit was filed upon the collateral note, and it is in evidence that it was transmitted by Young, the agent of appellees, to the attorney, with the two principal notes, by letter which instructed him to file suit if the principal notes were not paid or extended with additional collateral as security. Appellants for many months had been dealing with Young as agent for the appellees, and never did they at any time question his authority as such agent until they denied his right to authorize this suit to be brought. A statute has been provided in Texas by which an attorney’s right to bring a suit can be tested. Article 272, R. S. 1895. In the absence of a motion as provided by this statute, an attorney who has possession of a note and files suit thereon in the name of the payee or holder and prosecutes the same in a regular and lawful manner will be presumed to have the authority he appears to possess.

¶5The motion for rehearing is overruled.

/153/sw/180 · .json · Public domain