Runkle v. Burnham’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

150 federal appellate · 18 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 252 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The contention is advanced that, as each party below requested the court to Instruct tho jury to return a verdict in his favor, this was equivalent to a stipulation waiving a jury and submitting tho case to decision of the court. From this premise two conclusions are deduced: First, that there being no written stipulation, the decision below cannot be reviewed upon writ of error ; second, that, even if the request in open court, made by both parties, be treated as a written stipulation, the correctness of the decision below cannot be examined, because it is in the form of a general finding on the whole case, and findings of the court upon the evidence are reviewable only when they are special. The request, made to the court by each party to instruct the jury to render a verdict in his favor, was not equivalent to a submission of the case to the court, without the intervention of a jury, within the intendment of Rev. Shat. §§ 649, 700 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 525. 570], As, however, both parties asked the court to instruct a verdict, both affirmed that there was no disputed question of fact which could operate to deflect or control the question of law. This was necessarily a request that the court find the facts, and the parties are, therefore, concluded by the finding made by the court, upon which the resulting instruction of law was given. The facts having been thus submitted to tbe court, we are limited in reviewing its action to tbe consideration of tho correctness of t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lawton v. Carpenter

2. “* * * That Runkle was the general assignee of Maddison & Co. and considered himself as not only entitled to their rights, but also as the representative of their obligations in connection with the loan and water works contract, results from the terms of a power of attorney, in which he authorizes the agent not only to acquire Maddison & Co’s rights, but to stipulate for the discharge of their obligation. In other words, the contract, read in connection with the terms of the power of attorney, leaves no doubt that Runkle was dealing and treating in the capacity of a person who was not only entitled to the rights, but also was subject to the liabilities of all the original parties to the loan and water works contract. This view is strengthened by the fact that, although Runkle testified on the trial, the assignment from Maddison & Co. to him was not offered in evidence, nor even referred to. The failure to produce it, or to testify in reference to it, when its contents were peculiarly within the knowledge of Run-kle, justifies the presumption that its provisions would have been unfavorable to Runkle’s position. * * *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Depew v. Hanover Insurance

3. ““The question of the sufficiency of the evidence for the plaintiff to support his action cannot he' considered by this court It has repeatedly been de cided Hint a request for a ruling that, upon tlie evidence introduced, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, cannot be made by the defendant, as a matter of right, unless at the close of the -whole evidence; and that if the defendant, at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, and without resting his own case, requests and is refused such a ruling, the refusal cannot be assigned for error.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Thorn