State v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis
1987
Citation profile
14 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently March 2013
14 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Anders v. California · Chapman v. State of California · Rose v. Clark · Wainwright v. Greenfield · Pope v. Illinois
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"In [ Romero ], the court of appeals stated: 'A person is "armed" with a deadly weapon when such weapon is within his immediate control and available for use in the crime.' The defendant in Romero stole a pistol and holster during the burglary of a residence and apparently stuck it inside his belt. When police arrived on the scene, Romero pulled the gun, still in its holster, and pointed it at an officer. The court held that 'a person can become armed with a deadly weapon even if the weapon is one taken during the course of a burglary.' It would appear that the court considered the use to which the gun was put after its theft and properly held that the defendant was armed during the burglary. "We examined what constitutes being 'armed' with a weapon stolen during a *Page 492 burglary in [ Befford ] . . . In Befford , the defendant burgled a residence and was observed by the police leaving through a window. When the police entered the residence, they found several items of value placed near the front door, including the victim's unloaded 12-gauge shotgun in a zippered case. We found that under these facts, the defendant was not 'armed' with a deadly weapon, stating: 'In order to be "armed" within our burglary statute, a defendant must possess the item considered a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument in such a manner as to indicate his willingness or present ability to use it as a "weapon".' Again, the use to which the burglar put the stolen gun was critical. " (Emphasis adde”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“In Williams , we noted the following: [T]he erroneous jury instruction precluded the jury from even considering the defendant’s willingness or present ability to use the stolen knife as a “weapon.” Even though it might be said that the defendant was “armed” when he followed the husband back into the house while holding the butcher knife, under the instruction given the jury did not have to reach that question. The instruction allowed the jury to find that the defendant was “armed” as soon as he picked up the knife, regardless of the reason for which the knife was taken. The result is the same as if the trial court had directed a verdict on that element of the offense, which is impermissible.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Rendon“Where the effect of the incorrect instruction lessens the state’s burden of proof, the error is harmful. See State v. Walker, 138 Ariz. 491 , 675 P.2d 1310 (1984) (arson); State v. Noriega, 144 Ariz. 258 , 697 P.2d 341 (App.1985) (trafficking in stolen property); State v. O’Brien, 123 Ariz. 578 , 601 P.2d 341 (App.1979) (conspiracy); State v. Cappe, 122 Ariz. 249 , 594 P.2d 115 (App.1979) (assault with a deadly weapon); State v. Goodman, 22 Ariz.App. 275 , 526 P.2d 1073 (1974) (grand theft by false pretenses).”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Rendon
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.