Public-domain · open source

154 Cal. 545

98 P 537

De Merritt v. Weldon

California Supreme Court

Decided November 20, 1908

California Supreme Court · decided 1908-11-20

<p>Municipal Corporations — Salary op Marshal — Power op City Trustees to Fix — Inadequacy op Compensation.- — Under the provisions of section 855 of the General Municipal Corporation Act, the board of trustees of Ukiah City, a municipal corporation of the sixth class, has the absolute right to fix the compensation of the marshal at any sum it deems proper, free from supervision or review on the part of the eourts, subject to the limitation that it may not effectually provide that there shall be no compensation at all, nor practically destroy the office by fixing the compensation at so low a figure that no one would discharge the duties of the office for the compensation fixed. Such a provision by the trustees would conflict with the act of the legislature, and therefore would be void.</p> <p>Id. — Reasonableness of Compensation — Review by Court — Motives, of Legislative Body. — Where a statute of the state requires a municipal legislative body to fix the compensation of a municipal officer, the question what is a reasonable compensation is addressed solely to it, and not to the courts, and however much a court may disagree with the conclusion of the legislative body that a designated sum is reasonable, it may not interfere, in the absence of fraud or bad faith. The courts refuse to consider legislative motives exeept as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts or are inferable from their operation and effeet, considered in the light of those matters of which judicial notiee may be taken.</p> <p>Id. — Marshal of Ukiah City-Monthly Salary of Ten Dollars.— Dor the performance of only such duties as are imposed upon the marshal by section 880 of the General Municipal Corporation Act,, a compensation of ten dollars a month, fixed by ordinance of the board of trustees of Ukiah City, a town of about 1800 inhabitants, cannot be held by the courts to be so inadequate as to be tantamount to the destruction of the office of marshal, in that no competent person would perform the duties for such an amount.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1908-11-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently June 1989

12 state decisions

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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BEATTY, C. J.,

¶1 dissenting. — The denial of a rehearing of this cause furnishes a proper occasion for a brief statement of *554 the grounds of my dissent from the judgment. The charter of Ulriah is a general law of the state by which the city marshal is made an elective officer, and by which varied and important duties are devolved upon him. The adoption of the two ordinances of February 15, 1904, was a transparent device by ¡which the board of trustees — the creature of the statute— attempted to subvert the law of the state by devolving the duties of the elected marshal upon an appointee of their own; an attempt in which, with the sanction of this court, they have achieved a partial success. The resulting difficulties do not seem to have been considered. Can the board of trustees relieve the marshal of his statutory duties? Can they, for instance, confer authority upon their executive officer to receive and receipt for license and property taxes? And, if as seems not improbable, it proves difficult to find a fit person willing to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of tax and license collector, chief of police, custodian of prisoners, etc., for fifteen dollars a month, how are those duties to be performed without usurpation of authority by such agent of the board of trustees as may attempt their performance ?

¶2 I think the ordinance reducing the salary of the marshal was void as part — an essential part — of a scheme to override the statute, and that it should have been so declared.