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← 154 F.3d 82 - Larsen v. Senate of Pennsylvania

Larsen v. Senate of Pennsylvania’s Empirical Analysis

154 F.3d 82 · 1998

Citation profile

58
cited by 58 later decisions
2
states following
March 2016
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 11 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 58 later decisions — most recently March 2016 · most notably Darryl Leon Rouse v. William Plantier Acting Superintendent of Adtc (1999), Small v. Horn (1998)

11 federal appellate · 11 district · 2 state decisions

320199820002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth · Anderson v. Creighton · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[A defendant’s assertion of the qualified immunity defense] requires the court to apply the objective reasonableness standards of the qualified immunity doctrine to the subjective element of a First Amendment retaliation claim, and thus calls for the somewhat illogical inquiry into whether a person reasonably could have thought that he in fact thought something. The qualified immunity analysis requires a determination as to whether reasonable officials could believe that their conduct was not unlawful even if it was in fact unlawful. In the context of a First Amendment retaliation claim, that determination turns on an inquiry into whether officials reasonably could believe that their motivations were proper even when their motivation were in fact retaliatory. Even assuming that this could be demonstrated under a certain set of facts, it is an inquiry that cannot be conducted without factual determinations as to the officials’ subjective beliefs and motivations, and thus cannot properly be resolved on the face of the pleadings, but rather can be resolved only after the plaintiff has had an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of the allegations that the true motive for the conduct was retaliation rather than the legitimate reason proffered by the defendants.... [A]t this juncture we must accept [the plaintiffs] allegations that [the defendants’] true reasons were retaliatory, allegations which state a claim for violation of clearly established rights under the First Amend”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “A right is “clearly established” ... if “the contours of the right” are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Thus, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if “reasonable officials in [their] position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of what was in the decided case law, that their conduct would be lawful.” Even where officials “clearly should have been aware of the governing legal principles, they are nevertheless entitled to immunity if based on the information available to them they could have believed their conduct would be consistent with those principles.” However, for reasonable officials to be on notice that their conduct would be unlawful, there need not be “a previous precedent directly on point.” Rather, there need only be “some but not precise factual correspondence between relevant precedents and the conduct at issue,” so that “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [would be] apparent.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.