154 Md. App. 312 - Slick v. Reinecker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The more significant stream of restitution derived from the writ of assumpsit.... Assumpsit was the common law form of action by which contract claims were redressed. Sometimes the contract would be express, sometimes implied by the parties’ actions, but in either event a genuine contract. However, the assumpsit action also came to be used when the parties had no contract at all, so long as the plaintiff could convince the court that he ought to recover something from the defendant as a matter of justice or good conscience. Courts explained liability in assumpsit by saying that the defendant was liable on an implied contract. Because the term, “implied contract” might be confused with the idea of an implied in fact contract, judges sometimes use the term “implied in law contract” instead, tacitly recognizing that this kind of claim had nothing to do with a genuine contract. Another term, for the implied in law contract is quasi-contract. So restitutionary claims of the kind involved in the second stream is still often referred to as claims for assumpsit, or claims based on implied in law or quasi-contracts.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 155 Md. App. 415 - Alternatives Unlimited, Inc. v. New Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners

2. “' refers to that class of obligations which arises from mutual agreement and intent to promise , when the agreement and promise have simply not been expressed in words. Despite the fact that no words of promise or agreement have been used, such transactions are nevertheless true contracts , and may properly be called inferred contracts or contracts implied in fact.' " Mohiuddin , 196 Md. App. at 448 , 9 A.3d at 865 (quoting Williston on Contracts § 1.5 (1990) ) (emphasis in Mohiuddin ); see also Dashiell , 358 Md. at 94 , 747 A.2d at 606 ("An implied contract is an agreement which legitimately can be inferred from intention of the parties as evidenced by the circumstances and the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kantsevoy v. Lumenr LLC

3. “An express contract has been defined as “an actual agreement of the parties, the terms of which are openly uttered or declared at the time of making it, being stated in distinct and explicit language, either orally or in writing.” “An implied contract is an agreement which legitimately can be inferred from intention of the parties as evidenced by the circumstances and ‘the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men.’ ” [S]ee Klebe v. United States, 263 U.S. 188, 192 , 44 S.Ct. 58, 59 , 68 L.Ed. 244 (1923) (“A contract implied in fact is one inferred from the circumstances or acts of the parties; but an express contract speaks for itself and leaves no place for implications.”).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 155 Md. App. 415 - Alternatives Unlimited, Inc. v. New Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners