State v. Simtob

Decided December 12, 1969

Montana Supreme Court · decided 1969-12-12

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The presumption with which we are here dealing is a kind of indirect evidence. Section 93-1301-1, R.C.M.1947. It is ‘a deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts.’ Section 93-1301-3, R.C.M.1947. The presumption here is a disputable presumption which may be controverted by other evidence, but unless so contradicted the presumption controls. Section 93-1301-7, R.C.M.1947. Our inquiry then is whether the record here discloses any facts to overcome the statutory presumption contained in the Dangerous Drug Act that defendant is entitled to a deferred imposition of sentence. *= * ■# >>”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Campus v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1969-12-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 49 later decisions — most recently October 2017 · most notably State v. Coleman (1979), State v. McKenzie (1980)

49 state decisions

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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MB. CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES T. HABBISON,

¶1(specially concurring).

¶2The result reached in the foregoing opinion is correct under the law and I concur in it. However, I do most seriously question the wisdom of the legislature in establishing a statutory presumption for those 21 and under who are guilty of possession or sale of dangerous drugs, as discussed in the opinion. Whether or not one is entitled to a deferred imposition of sentence I feel is better left to the sound discretion of the judge and he should not be held accountable for the exercise of his discretion. The broad provisions with reference to liberal construction, presentence investigations, sentence and judgment contained in Chapter 22 of Title 95, Montana Code of Criminal Procedure, are amply sufficient to take care of any and all problems that may arise. I see no reason for the legislature to attempt to constrict the powers of the judge granted therein.