Boyle v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “" ' "In a capital case, a prospective juror may not be excluded for cause unless the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath." Drew v. Collins , 964 F.2d 411 , 416 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 925 , 113 S.Ct. 3044 , 125 L.Ed.2d 730 (1993) (quotations omitted). "[T]his standard likewise does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism." [ Wainwright v.] Witt , 469 U.S. [412,] 425-26, 105 S.Ct. [844,] 852-53 [ (1985) ].' "”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Townes v. State · Bohannon v. State

2. “'Courts assign different weight to different reasons for delay. Deliberate delay is "weighted heavily”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Scheuing v. State · 265 So. 3d 387 - Gaston v. State

3. ““Boyle specifically argues that the circuit court’s instruction that ‘you act intentionally with respect to a result or conduct when you have the purpose to cause that result or to engage in that conduct’ allowed the jury to convict without finding the specific intent to kill. This portion of the court’s instruction is identical to the statutory definition of ‘intentional’ contained in § 13A-2-2, Ala.Code 1975. Section 13A-2-2(1), Ala.Code 1975, states: ‘A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, when his purpose is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct.’ “The Alabama Supreme Court, in addressing a circuit court’s use of a jury charge in a capital-murder case that contained the exact definition of ‘intentional’ contained in § 13A-2-2(1), stated: “ ‘The trial court, in defining mental culpability, read Code 1975, § 13A-2-2, to the jury verbatim, thereby defining each mental state along the spectrum from “intentional” to “criminal negligence.” Each definition was relevant to the various verdict options except “criminal negligence.” The definition of “intentionally” was relevant to the court’s instructions on the “intent to kill” element of the capital offense.’ “Ex parte Kennedy, 472 So.2d 1106, 1111 (Ala.1985). “This Court may find plain error in a jury instruction only if ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in an improper manner.’ Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 12”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lockhart v. State