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← 154 SW3D 48 - State v. Faulkner

State v. Faulkner’s Empirical Analysis

2005

Citation profile

30
cited by 30 later decisions
1
states following
November 2017
most recently cited

30 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Sullivan v. Louisiana · Payne v. Tennessee · Negron v. United States · Pope v. Illinois · Griffith v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[W]e emphasize that the psychiatric testimony must demonstrate that the defendant’s inability to form the requisite culpable mental state was the product of a mental disease or defect, not just a particular emotional state or mental condition. It is the showing of a lack of capacity to form the requisite culpable mental intent that is central to evaluating the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony on the issue.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The verdict form incorporated the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 — 13—204(g)(1)(B) (1997), which provides: “We, the jury, unanimously find the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances The statutory form also omits the burden of proof for establishing aggravating circumstances. Regardless of waiver, a similar issue was rejected by this Court recently in State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 619-20 (Tenn.2003). We concluded that such an error can be distinguished from the reversible error in the verdict form in State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 152 (Tenn.1999). See Davidson, 121 S.W.3d at 620 . In Carter, the wrong form was used, and the form was not merely silent as to the burden or proof but conflicted with the trial court’s instructions regarding the burden. Like Davidson , the language used in the verdict form in the present case was statutorily mandated, and the trial court repeatedly and clearly instructed the jury that it must find any statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude, therefore, that the failure of the verdict form to recite that the jury found the aggravating circumstance “beyond a reasonable doubt” did not render the verdict invalid.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “In conducting a comparative proportionality review, we begin with the presumption that the sentence of death is proportional with the crime of first degree murder. A sentence of death may be found disproportionate if the case being reviewed “is plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in similar cases in which the death penalty has previously been imposed.” A sentence of death is not disproportionate merely because the circumstances of the offense are similar to those of another offense for which a defendant has received a life sentence. Our inquiry, therefore, does not require a finding that a sentence “less than death was never imposed in a case with similar characteristics.” Our duty “is to assure that no aberrant death sentence is affirmed.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.