Hodge v. Ellis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 118 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 123 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In Kearse v. Kearse, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 690 , where the transaction was between the wife and her daughter, the consideration being all in the form of notes signed by the former only, the court, in ruling against the wife’s claim of separate property, emphasized the fact of non-participation of the husband as distinguishing cases like Goldberg v. Zellner [Tex.Com.App., 235 S.W. 870 ] and Kahn v. Kahn [ 94 Tex. 114 , 58 S.W. 825 ]. The Kearse case and our decision in Van v. Webb, 147 Tex. 299 ,. 215 S.W.2d 151 , also point up the difference, from the standpoint of presuming a gift between situations where the husband is a party and those where he is not. As suggested by Professors McCormick and Ray (Texas Law of Evidence, p. 956, especially Note 26), in connection with the parol evidence rule, a third party grantor,, not interested in the community one way or another, has no standing” whereby to impose a particular character on the estate conveyed; so the-recital in his deed may be regarded, merely as one of an existing fact,, which may properly be disputed by evidence, as distinguished from an op erative portion of the deed, which it probably is where the husband is a party and which ought not to be contradicted by parol. Lindsay v. Clayman, supra [ 151 Tex. 593 , 254 S.W.2d 777 ], clearly recognizes the inapplicability of the parol evidence rule to situations in which the husband, claiming the property to be community, was not a party to the purchase. “(4) Thus in the la”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Holcemback v. Holcemback · Blanchard v. Blanchard

2. “The presumption concerning separate property status of bank accounts established by art. 4622, Vernon's Tex.Civ.Stats.Ann., does not apply where the contest is between the spouses themselves or their successors. It was so held by our Courts of Civil Appeals in Rippy v. Rippy, [Tex.Civ. App.] 49 S.W.2d 494, and Callaway v. Clark, [Tex.Civ.App.] 200 S.W.2d 447, 448, and in each instance we `refused' a writ of error. As before indicated, the general practice of the wife of putting erstwhile community funds into a bank account in her own name, even where the husband in effect concurs with the practice `for business reasons', can hardly be considered a gift from him of all such funds as a matter of law, without thereby validating agreements as to the status of future acquired property. We may add that the fact of intermingling the two types of funds beyond ability to resegregate them does not of itself cause the aggregate to be separate but rather the contrary. Rippy v. Rippy, supra.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. H. A. Phillips, Trustee v. Betty Vitemb and E. L. Hillman

3. ““In their pleadings in the trial court, the petitioners — defendants affirmatively conceded to him the full homestead rights, which his pleadings asserted, and did not repudiate that judicial admission until the appeal. The change of position came too late and cannot now be validated, so the judgments below in this respect must remain undisturbed.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Alexander v. Alexander