State v. Crowder’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

91 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 91 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he trial court should apply the legal principles stated in this opinion to determine whether the extended record shows defendant had knowledge of the amount of restitution. If not, the court must then determine whether such lack of knowledge was relevant and material to the making of the plea agreement. If the court finds from all the evidence that the approximate amount of restitution was unknown to defendant and was a relevant and material factor in defendant's decision to plead, then the trial court should apply Lukens and Phillips and vacate the entire plea.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Wideman · State v. Hernandez

2. “Thus, this defendant and his counsel should have expected conviction and likely imposition of the death penalty. If death were not imposed, the best that could be hoped for on the first degree murder charge was imprisonment for life without possibility of parole for twenty-five calendar years {see A.R.S. § 13 — 703(A)) and likely consecutive aggravated sentences for the sexual assault and other charges. Given this evaluation of the case, one must conclude that defendant could not refuse any reasonable plea bargain. The deal he made enabled him to avoid the death penalty and resulted, also, in dismissal of the assault charges. Seen in this context, the question of restitution for financial loss seems quite inconsequential to the decision-making process. Nevertheless, because A.R.S. § 13-603(C) requires that restitution be ordered, provision was made for it in the plea agreement, as defendant was well aware. The only thing he did not know, because it had not yet been computed, was the amount of restitution he would have to pay for funeral bills, medical bills, and loss of property. Given the possible fate that awaited defendant, and the advantageous plea offered, it seems very unlikely that the precise amount of restitution would have been a relevant consideration on defendant’s side of the equation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Grijalba

3. “A defendant is to be informed of “any special conditions regarding sen-tence____” Rule 17.2(b). One can say with relative equanimity that the amount of restitution in Lukens and Phillips was a relevant circumstance to the decision of the respective defendants to waive jury trial and enter a plea. While we do not confine Phillips and Lukens to their facts, we believe that only in such unusual cases is the precise amount of restitution relevant to the decision to enter a plea. Clearly, Lukens and Phillips do not stand for the proposition that every plea is to be vacated if the defendant lacked any bit of information.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Grijalba