Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 155 KAN 556 - Bush v. Bush

Bush v. Bush’s Empirical Analysis

1942

Citation profile

12
cited by 12 later decisions
1
states following
April 1992
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently April 1992

2 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

60194219501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Hyland v. Hogue · Little v. Ennis · Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Siedhoff · Kragnes v. Kragnes · Appeal of Sarbach v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “`In its strict technical sense, an advancement is a perfect and irrevocable gift, not required by law, made by a parent, during his lifetime, to his child, with the intention on the part of the donor that such gift shall represent a part or the whole of the portion of the donor's estate that the donee would be entitled to upon the death of the donor, intestate.'”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““. . . It may be argued that the testator could have changed his will at any time, and that not having done so after making the later advances, it is to be presumed that in the absence of provision indicating otherwise he intends his will to wipe out all advances no matter when made. The argument commands respect. However, we find the argument on the other side more persuasive. The general theory upon which advances made prior to execution of the will are held to be wiped out is largely based upon a presumption that when the testator made his will he had the prior advances in mind and in the light of such advances made such disposition of his property as he desired. It would be stretching this presumption to make it include subsequent advances which he could not then have had in mind. Moreover, if a testator intends that advances which may be made after the will is executed are to be wiped out, what point is there in treating them, when they are subsequently made, as ‘advances’ at all? Why provide that they are to be charged against the recipient’s share, when no such result is to follow? Why are they not made as outright gifts and the result sought by the testator thus simply accomplished? Advances, subsequent to execution of the will, seem to fall more logically into the same class with true ‘advancements’ which obtain in cases of intestacy and are charged against the recipient’s share of the estate. It may be said further that this view is in line with the general doctrine”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.