155 Md. App. 353 - Conboy v. State’s Empirical Analysis
2004
Citation profile
39 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently March 2020 · most notably 158 Md. App. 194 - Allen v. State (2004), 186 Md. App. 498 - Smith v. State (2009)
39 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Terry v. Ohio · Mapp v. Ohio · Brinegar v. United States · Coolidge v. New Hampshire
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[A] police officer with probable cause to believe that a suspect has or is committing a crime may arrest the suspect without a warrant. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 , 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).... Once lawfully arrested, police may search "the person of the arrestee" as well as "the area within the control of the arrestee" to remove any weapons or evidence that could be concealed or destroyed. United States v. Robinson , 414 U.S. 218 , 224, 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“In the present case, the question, then, is whether there was a formal amst or restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest in the situation before us. The State contends Rucker was not in custody, and in support of that contention, argues that Rucker was detained pursuant to a routine Terry stop, and that the stop, contrary to the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, did not develop into a “defacto ” arrest.... For the reasons discussed hereinafter, we conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the stop of Rucker was a brief investigatory stop and had remained so when Rucker told the police that he had cocaine. Rucker was not in custody for purposes of Miranda because he was not restrained to a degree associated with a formal an'est. Accordingly, Miranda warnings were not required before the police asked Rucker whether he had anything illegal.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“[W]e now turn to the question of whether that statement was “the product” of interrogation, either “express questioning or its functional equivalent.” While appellant sat on the ground as instructed, the trooper walked over to the van and placed the key in the ignition. When the key proved to be the van’s ignition key, the trooper walked back, stating “it’s funny, the key fits.” That statement was merely an observation made without inviting a response.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.