majority"> AlleN, J.

Tbe evidence offered on tbe part of tbe State tended to show that tbe defendant was guilty of murder in tbe second degree, at least, while tbe evidence of tbe defendant and of tbe witnesses introduced to corroborate Mm, if believed by tbe jury, would have justified a verdict of not guilty.

It is evident that tbe juiy did not accept, in its entirety, tbe evidence of tbe State or of tbe defendant, and that tbe verdict, guilty of manslaughter, was rendered upon tbe theory that tbe defendant and tbe deceased fought willingly, of which there was ample evidence.

The only exceptions appearing in tbe record are to parts of tbe charge of tbe judge presiding, as follows:

“Now, gentlemen, did be do it in-self-defense? Tbe burden is upon him to satisfy you of tbe facts and circumstances constituting self-defense. Now, tbe defendant contends that be bad great fear of Ms life when be shot tbe deceased; that be did not intend to shoot Mm, nor did be willingly shoot him, but that it was only through dire necessity — that' is, only through tbe fear that be would lose bis own life or have serious bodily barm inflicted upon him if be did not shoot. Tbe defendant contends that be said to tbe deceased man: ‘If you draw that gun on me, *454 I will sboot you’; and tbe defendant contends further that he calculated that when he did tell him, Not to point your gun at me; I will shoot you,’ that by that expression the deceased man should have understood that if he did not point his gun at him he would not shoot; the defendant contends that on that occasion he was not at fault; that there was no reasonably safe way for him to escape; that he was afraid if he turned his back and went towards his home he would be shot in the back; that he was afraid of his life, and that it was through dire necessity that he shot him.” Defendant excepts.

“Now, gentlemen, if you should find from the evidence that McGuire and Yates each held malice towards the other, and they each armed themselves with a gun for the purpose of fighting it out when they met, and they met accidentally and a quarrel ensued in which both engaged, and Yates killed McGuire, it was at least murder in the second degree, and it makes no difference whether Yates was on his own land or not, it appearing in this case that the land upon which the difficulty took place was in dispute,” Defendant excepts.

“If you shall find from the evidence that McGuire sent word to Yates or told Mrs. Yates, who communicated it to her husband, that he was going to kill Yates, and Yates for the purpose of defending himself and not for the purpose of venting his malice and satisfying his revenge upon McGuire, armed himself with a gun and met McGuire accidentally, and engaged in a dispute with McGuire, but not with unfriendliness upon his part, and McGuire attempted to shoot Yates, or acted in such manner with his gun as to cause Yates to have reasonably grounded fear that unless he shot McGuire, McGuire would shoot him, and, acting under this apparent necessity, Yates shot McGuire, Yates would not be guilty, unless at some time before the fatal moment and after Yates had seen the danger of continuing the dispute with McGuire, and had observed McGuire’s evil disposition to engage in a gun fight, Yates could hare, with reasonable safety, abandoned the difficulty and avoided the necessity of shooting McGuire. For if, after the two entered into the dispute, both having deadly weapons in their hands, Yates perceived that McGuire was going to shoot if he did not *455 desist from the dispute, and Yates did not desist, but preferred to continue the dispute, and kept his gun in a position on equal terms with McGuire in order to get the drop on him when the dispute had getten to such fever heat that McGuire would attempt to shoot him, then the defendant Yates would be guilty, at least, of manslaughter, he not being allowed, under the law in such case, to plead self-defense.” Defendant excepts.

“If you shall find from the evidence that, when on meeting up with McGuire, the defendant Yates willingly entered into a dispute with McGuire; and if you shall further find that the defendant Yates willingly stood his ground and engaged in the quarrel with McGuire, both having deadly weapons in their hands; and if you shall further find that Yates, willing to stand his ground and willing to engage in the fight, raised his weapon every time McGuire raised his, in order that he might not let McGuire get the drop on him, and that in such fight the defendant killed McGuire, Yates would not be allowed to interpose the plea of self-defense, but would be guilty of manslaughter.” Defendant excepts.

“If you shall find from the evidence that. the defendant Yates met up with McGuire by accident, and shall find also that he did not have his deadly weapon with him for an unlawful purpose, and also find that said Yates endeavored to make peace with McGuire, but should further find that during the conversation defendant Yates got mad with McGuire, and in the heat of an ungovernable temper decided he would shoot it out with McGuire, and did shoot and kill McGuire in this heat of passion, the defendant Yates would be guilty of manslaughter, and you should so find, and would be so even though McGuire was in the act of drawing his own weapon upon him.” Defendant excepts.

None of these exceptions can be sustained.

His Honor properly instructed the jury that the burden of proof was on the defendant to satisfy them of the facts and circumstances constituting self-defense, and the remaining part of the charge covered by the first exception consists of a statement of the contention of the defendant.

- If not as full as the defendant desired, it was his duty to *456 ask for specific instructions, and if tbe judge inadvertently stated a contention incorrectly, it ought to have been called to his attention. Simmons v. Davenport, 140 N. C., 411; Davis v. Keen, 142 N. C., 502.

It is not necessary to consider the second exception, as the charge excepted to relates to murder in the second degree, and the defendant was convicted of manslaughter.

The third and fourth exceptions are to parts of the charge which embody well-settled principles.

It is the duty of one who1 is assaulted to abandon the difficulty and to avoid the necessity of killing, if he can do so with reasonable safety; and one who enters into a fight willingly and does not abandon it, but prefers to stand his ground and continue in the fight, is guilty of manslaughter, at least, if he kills.

The charge is set out in full in the record, and it shows that all phases of the evidence favorable to the defendant were presented to the jury.

No error.

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