In re Eppstein’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 10 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Wo do not menu that i>roperty in the course of administration under the Bankruptcy Act is exempt from taxation, or freed from tax liens or claims theretofore fastened upon it (Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441 , 24 Sup. Ct. 695 , 48 L. Ed. 1060 , and cases supra), but that it is in custodia legis, and that any act interfering with the court’s possession, dr with its power of control and disposal, and done without its sanction, is void. The general rule is praetically conceded; but it is said that the procurement of the tax deed was not such an interference, because it merely perfected an incipient title, and did not disturb the possession. The distinction does not impress us. The issuance of the deed was the principal act connected with the sale. If effective, it extinguished the right of redemption, which was still alive, transferred to the vendee the title and right of possession, became prima facie evidence of the validity of the sale and the proceedings anterior to it, and started the statute of limitations to running against any claim to the contrary. The attempt to thus strip the court of all hut the naked possession was plainly an interference with its power of control and disposal, and consequently was of no effect without its sanction, although the possession was not then disturbed. Such is the effect of the ruling in Wiswall v. Sampson [ 14 How. 52 , 14 L. Ed. 322 ] and Barton v. Barbour [ 104 U. S. 126 , 26 L. Ed. 672 ], The cases of Rice v. Jerome, 97 Fed. 719 ,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Stanard v. Dayton

2. ““A court of bankruptcy may by summary process require those who assqrt title to, or an interest in, property which has rightfully come into its possession and control as part of the bankrupt’s estate, to present their claims to that court, and, the notice being reasonable, may proceed to adjudicate the merits of such claims.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Dialogue