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← 156 F.1d 660 - Kobusch v. Hand

Kobusch v. Hand’s Empirical Analysis

156 F. 660 · 1907

Citation profile

21
cited by 21 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
March 1984
most recently cited

10 federal appellate · 6 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 21 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 1984

10 federal appellate · 6 district ·

100190719101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Swarts v. Siegel · Bartholow v. Bean · Landry v. Andrews

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““An indorser, an accommodation maker, or a surety on the obligation of a bankrupt is a creditor under the act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (U. S. Oomp. St. 1901, p. 3418), and a payment on such an obligation by the principal debtor, while insolvent, to the innocent holder of the contract within four months before the filing of the petition for adjudication in bankruptcy, will constitute a preference which will debar the indorser, accommodation maker, or surety from the allowance of any claim in his favor against the estate of the bankrupt, unless the amount so paid is first returned to that estate.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““If a bankrupt shall * * * have made a transfer of any of his property, and if, at the time of transfer * * * and being within four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy * * * the bankrupt being insolvent and the * * * transfer then operate as a preference, and the person receiving it or to be benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall then have reasonable cause to believe that the enforcement of such * * * transfer would effect a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee, and he may recover the property or its value from such person.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.