Gibson v. Bodley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 district · 43 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Where a person while driving Iris automobile on his own and proper north side of a highway is struck by an automobile traveling in the oppisite direction and plaintiff’s car is thrown partly across the highway and the other car is thrown onto the south side of the highway, and while plaintiff’s car is in such position but before plaintiff is able to remove himself therefrom, and without the occurrence of any new and independent force or intervening efficient cause to break the connection between the original wrong and injury, plaintiff’s car is struck by a second automobile, so that both negligent acts concurred to produce tile final and complete result, it does not constitute misjoinder of causes of action for plaintiff to proceed against both tortfeasors in the same action.” (Syl ¶[ 4).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Woodward v. Blythe · Reed v. Mai

2. ““The doctrine of the last clear chance, as set forth in the authorities cited, may be said to be made up of the following elements: (1) Plaintiff, by his negligence, placed himself in a position of danger; (2) that his negligence had ceased; (3) that defendant seeing plaintiff in a position of danger, or by the exercise of due care should have seen him in such position, by exercising due care on his part had a clear chance to avoid injuring plaintiff; (4) that defendant failed to exercise such due care, and (5) as a result of such failure plaintiff was injured.” (p. 512.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Frogge v. Kansas City Public Service Co.

3. ““ ‘Concurrent, as distinguished from joint negligence, arises where the injury is proximately caused by the concurent wrongful acts or omissions of two or more persons acting independently. That the negligence of another person than the defendant contributes, concurs or co-operates to produce the injury is of no consequence. Both are ordinarily liable. And unless the damage caused by each is clearly separable, permitting the distinct assignment of responsibility to each, each is liable for the entire. damage. The degree of culpability is immaterial’ ” (p. 367).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Polzin v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n