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The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Carter.
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The history and facts of this case are fully set forth in the report of the Master, upon whose report the cause was heard by his Honor, Judge C. C. Featherstone. The Master and the Circuit Judge having decided the issues adversely to the defendants, they have appealed to this Court. In our opinion the conclusion of the Circuit Judge is well supported by the record in the case.'
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The exceptions are therefore overruled, and the judgment of the lower Court affirmed.
Mr. Chiee Justice Watts and ' Messrs. Justices Cothran, Brease and Stabrer concur.
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Case posture Posture Before FEATHERSTONE, J., Greenwood, April, 1929. Affirmed.Suit by Mrs. John T. Parker, heir at law of Miss Fannie L. Stuckey, deceased, in her own right and in behalf of all other heirs at law of Miss Fannie L. Stuckey, against Mrs. Gertrude M. Bowen and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
The Master's report and the decree of Judge Featherstone were as follows:
MASTER'S REPORT
This matter having been referred to me by a previous order of the Court to take the testimony and report to the Court on all issues of law and fact, I beg leave to report as follows:
This is an action brought by Mrs. John T. Parker, heir at law of Miss Fannie L. Stuckey, deceased, in her own right and in behalf of all other heirs at law of the said Fannie L. Stuckey against R.B. Bowen and Gertrude M. Bowen. It appears from the records before me that counsel for the defense demurred to the complaint on the grounds that the defendant, R.B. Bowen, husband of the defendant, Gertrude B. Bowen, was not a proper party to this action. The demurrer was sustained by the presiding Judge of this circuit.
I find as a matter of fact that Miss Fannie L. Stuckey, a maiden, departed this life intestate on or about the 30th day of October, 1927, and leaving surviving her, the plaintiff, Mrs. John T. Parker, a daughter of the intestate's sister,
and therefore a blood niece and heir at law of the said intestate. The said Fannie L. Stuckey was also survived by many other heirs at law. This action is brought by the plaintiff in behalf of those interested in common with her. I find that the defendant herein, Gertrude M. Bowen, is the wife of R.B. Bowen, who was a blood nephew of the said Fannie L. Stuckey.
I find as a matter of fact that the said Fannie L. Stuckey resided for many years prior to her death on a tract of land containing approximately One Hundred Fifteen (115) acres situate in Abbeville County, State of South Carolina. Miss Stuckey was the owner and in the possession of this tract of land for quite a number of years, the same having been conveyed to her by her late father. Mr. T.M. Nelson and his wife lived with Miss Stuckey, Mrs. Nelson being her sister. I next find that Miss Stuckey was in feeble health for several years prior to her death and that Mr. and Mrs. Nelson carried on the work around the place, Mr. Nelson looking after the farm, renting the same and doing chores around the house. It appears that Mrs. Nelson did the house work such as cooking, etc., and waiting upon and looking after Miss Stuckey. This relation continued between Miss Stuckey and the Nelsons up until around the first of May, 1927, at which time Mrs. Nelson died. The uncontradicted testimony shows that Miss Stuckey was in very feeble health about that time and was unable to wait upon herself. On or about the 6th day of May, 1927, directly after the death of the said Mrs. Nelson it was decided that it would be for the best interest that the said Miss Stuckey make her home with her nephew, R.B. Bowen, and his wife, Gertrude M. Bowen, the defendants herein. It appears from the testimony that Miss Stuckey was removed to the home of the Bowens on or about the 7th day of May, 1927, and the relation that had existed between the said Miss Fannie L. Stuckey and the said Mr. and Mrs. T.M. Nelson ceased on or about that time.
The records show and I find as a matter of fact that on the 13th day of January, 1926, that R.B. Bowen, husband of the defendant, Gertrude M. Bowen, filed the following petition with the Judge of Probate for Abbeville County, South Carolina: (Here the Master quotes verbatim the petition for the appointment of Robert Bowen as Committee or Guardian for the said Fannie L. Stuckey.)
As a result of the foregoing petition the following order was signed by W.A. Stevenson, Judge of Probate for Abbeville County, South Carolina: (Here the Master quotes verbatim the order appointing Robert B. Bowen as Guardian for the said Fannie L. Stuckey.)
I next find as a matter of fact that on the 14th day of May, 1927, the said Miss Fannie L. Stuckey, while living and residing at the home of her nephew, R.B. Bowen, and his wife, Gertrude M. Bowen, the defendant herein, she executed a deed wherein and whereby she conveyed or attempted to convey to the defendant, Gertrude M. Bowen, the premises hereinbelow referred to as containing one hundred fifteen (115) acres of land. The deed in question was executed by Miss Stuckey making her mark and it appears that said deed was executed in proper form. It appears and I find that all of the facts hereinabove set forth are true and correct and the same are uncontradicted.
The question now before me is to decide whether or not Miss Fannie L. Stuckey was capable or competent under the law to execute a deed of conveyance on the 14th day of May, 1927. This question has received my most careful consideration. It is as I understand the law, incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove her case by the preponderance of the evidence and I will now briefly cite parts of the testimony relating to the mental condition of the said Miss Fannie L. Stuckey, all of which said testimony is contradicted.
Now, the defendant called Dr. J.A. Anderson to testify in her behalf. Dr. Anderson testified that he called upon Miss Stuckey between May and October of 1927. Part of his
testimony is as follows: (Here the Master quotes verbatim a portion of the testimony of the defendant's witness, Dr. J.A. Anderson.)
Now, the plaintiff as well as the defendant have, as seen by the foregoing testimony, put up practicing physicians, and both of them qualified as experts, so if we take the testimony, word for word, of these two physicians, we find that there is a difference of opinion as to the mental condition of Miss Stuckey, and in order to further clarify the matter we will go partly into the testimony of other witnesses of both plaintiff and defendant.
By going over the testimony of Mr. Nelson who lived in the same house with Miss Stuckey for a number of years prior to her removal to the home of R.B. Bowen, it appears that I should come to the conclusion that Miss Stuckey was mentally incapable of executing the deed referred to in the complaint, however, we have the testimony of W.J. Cann, a witness called for in behalf of the defendant. His testimony, if taken word for word, shows that Miss Stuckey was perfectly all right from a mental standpoint, part of which testimony is as follows: (Here the Master quotes verbatim a portion of the testimony of the defendant's witness, W.J. Cann.)
After going over the testimony offered by the plaintiff and defendant relative to the mental condition of Miss Fannie L. Stuckey I find that there is a wide diversity of opinion. Plaintiff's witnesses testify that she was a woman of very low mentality and incapable of entering into or making a contract, while the witnesses for defendant testify that she was a woman of normal intelligence, so I find that it is necessary to go further in the record, to disclose the true mental condition of Miss Stuckey, and I, therefore, refer to the petition filed by R.B. Bowen, the husband of the defendant herein, with the Judge of Probate for Abbeville County, South Carolina, the prayer of which is as follows: Wherefore your petitioner prays to the Court to appoint
himself as such committeeman or guardian and he has made clear to the Court that it is necessary for the more careful protection to both the person and property that the Court do appoint the committeeman for the said Miss Fannie L. Stuckey.
The uncontradicted testimony shows that the foregoing petition was filed with the Judge of Probate for Abbeville County, on January 13th, 1926, and that R.B. Bowen, husband of the defendant herein, was duly appointed committeeman and guardian on the same date; that Miss Stuckey moved to the home of the said R.B. Bowen and his wife on May 7, 1927; that the purported deed was executed by Miss Stuckey on the 14th day of May, 1927, and that the same Miss Stuckey died on or about the 30th day of October, 1927.
Why did Mr. Bowen have himself appointed as committeeman and guardian of the person and property of the said Miss Fannie L. Stuckey? The petition in itself as well as the testimony now before me shows that Mr. Bowen was fully justified in filing such a petition and obtaining such an order, as there was, or should have been, more than reasonable doubt in the mind of Mr. Bowen as to the sanity of the said Miss Fannie L. Stuckey, however, notwithstanding the fact that a fiduciary relation existed between Mr. Bowen and his ward, Miss Fannie L. Stuckey, and notwithstanding the fact that more than reasonable doubt existed as to the mental capacity of the said Miss Fannie L. Stuckey, he allowed, or acquiesced therein, her to convey one hundred fifteen (115) acres of land to his wife in less than eight days after Mr. Bowen had moved his ward, the said Miss Fannie L. Stuckey, into his home.
The defendant herein, who is the wife of the said R.B. Bowen, certainly must have had knowledge that her husband was such committeeman and guardian and she is estopped from denying the same, and then again the Court looks
with an eye of suspicion upon transactions of this nature wherein husband and wife were so closely affiliated.
There is no question in my mind but that Miss Stuckey was a woman of low mentality and of weak understanding, and on account of such mental condition was thereby easily influenced. It is further an established principle of equity, well founded in right reason, that the acts and contracts of persons who are of weak understanding and who are thereby liable to imposition, and also all contracts or gifts between persons standing in confidential relations towards each other, will be closely scrutinized by the Courts to discover whether or not any undue influence was exerted or any confidence was betrayed to the prejudice of the weaker party or of the one reposing such trust and confidence. DuBose v. Kell , 90 S.C. at page 215, 71 S.E., 371 , 378.
The premises conveyed by Miss Stuckey to the defendant, in my opinion, is worth approximately Twelve Hundred ($1200.00) Dollars. Miss Stuckey lived in the home of the defendant for just a little over six months and I therefore find that the consideration for said premises was wholly insufficient. However, in many instances it has been held that Love and Affection was a valuable consideration; consideration as this would not apply in the present case, because Miss Stuckey was of such a weak understanding that she could be easily induced to shower her affections upon most any of her relatives. In the case of Banker v. Hendricks , 24 S.C. at page 13, the Court quoted with approval the following:
The doctrine, therefore, may be laid down as generally true that the acts and contracts of persons who are of weak understandings, and who are thereby liable to imposition, will be held void in Courts of equity if the nature of the act or contract justified the conclusion that the party has not exercised a deliberate judgment, but that he has been imposed upon, circumvented, or overcome by cunning, artifice, or undue influence. Proceeding further in the same
opinion the Court said: The fact, therefore, that the plaintiff in this case has not been found to be absolutely noncompos mentis is not sufficient to deprive her of the relief which she demands. There can be no doubt but that, from her advanced age and from disease, that she was extremely weak, both mentally and physically, and not in a condition to look after her own interests properly, and that the consideration for which she conveyed away her entire property * * * was grossly inadequate * * * and that, under all the circumstances, the transaction was not such an one as can receive the sanction of a Court of Equity.
I have given this matter my careful consideration, and have viewed the same from every angle, and I can come to but one conclusion, and that is that Miss Fannie L. Stuckey was mentally incapacitated to execute the purported deed wherein she attempted to convey one hundred fifteen (115) acres of land to the defendant herein, and I recommend that the Court declare the same to be null and void and of no effect.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
DECREE
The facts in the case are clearly stated in the report of the Master and it would serve no useful purpose to restate them.
I agree with the Master as to his findings of fact, but I do not agree with him as to his holding that the burden of proof is wholly on plaintiff.
I think it is clear that when the plaintiff showed that the husband of the grantee was acting as committee of the grantor; that she was eighty-seven years of age and partially blind; that she was living under his roof, and a member of his family; that by reason of these facts, the law cast the burden upon the defendant to show that the transaction was fair and that the grantor fully understood what
she was doing. And this is true notwithstanding the deed was made to the wife of the committee.
I am not inclined to give to the deed the construction contended for by plaintiff's counsel, i. e. , that the only source of support was to be the land and what it yielded and, therefore, there was no consideration for the conveyance.
Reading the deed as a whole and giving it a liberal construction, it is clear that the grantee undertook to care for and support the old lady the balance of her life, and this was a valuable consideration.
Nor am I able to agree with plaintiff's counsel in his contention that on account of the appointment of a committee for the grantor there arose a conclusive presumption of her inability to execute the deed. Such is not the holding of our Court.
The proceeding in the Probate Court was competent evidence to show what Bowen, the husband, thought of the mental condition of the grantor, and to show the fiduciary relationship between the parties, but, because of such appointment a year or so before the execution of the deed, there did not arise any conclusive presumption of incompetency as of the date of the deed. See Fielder Brown v. Jennings , 131 S.C. 26 , 126 S.E., 448 .
The Master was right in concluding that the sole question for decision was the competency of the grantor at the time of the signing of the paper.
I have read very carefully the testimony and am not able to get the consent of my mind to believe that the defendant has met the test and shown that fairness and mental capacity that a Court of equity ought to require in the circumstances.
The grantor was eighty-seven years old and aged and infirm, not only physically but mentally, as shown by the testimony.
She was in the home of the grantee's husband, who was her committee, and I cannot help but feel that she was not acting of her own will when the paper was executed.
The exceptions to the report of the Master are overruled and his report is confirmed. Source: CourtListener
