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← 156 Tex. 97 - Scott v. Graham

Scott v. Graham’s Empirical Analysis

1956

Citation profile

99
cited by 99 later decisions
1
states following
July 2016
most recently cited

99 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 99 later decisions — most recently July 2016 · most notably Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc. v. Tyra (1966), City of Fort Worth v. Groves (1988)

99 state decisions

3001956196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Cobb v. Harrington · Veal v. Thomason · Haverbekken v. Hale, County Judge · Cotton v. Rhea · Hoffman v. Davis

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 99 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “An order of the Commissioners Court acting judicially on a matter within its discretion is the judgment of a court of record which is not subject to collateral attack and which may be reviewed only on appeal or in a direct action for that purpose. And a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment of a court other than the one in which the action is brought is generally regarded as a collateral attack on the judgment.... [[Image here]] It is well settled that a direct equitable proceeding in district court, the purpose and effect of which is to review or set aside an order of the Commissioners Court, comes within the power granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions above referred to, and has the effect of a direct attack upon the order, at least where the Legislature has not prescribed the procedure for appealing from such order. The present suit invokes the equity powers of the district court to prevent by injunction the payment of county funds for a purpose alleged to be illegal. It is our opinion that the same should be treated as a direct, rather than a collateral, attack upon the order of the Commissioners Court authorizing such payment to be made.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““ . . . Whether a person is a necessary party is determined by his interest in the subject matter and outcome of the suit. As stated in Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341 , 159 S.W.2d 472 , all persons who have or claim a direct interest in the object and subject matter of the suit and whose interests will necessarily be affected by any judgment that may be rendered therein, are not only proper parties, but are necessary and indispensable parties.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““It is our opinion that the county is clearly a necessary and indispensable party to this suit. Although petitioner sues in his own right as a taxpayer, the county has an even more direct interest in the subject matter and the outcome of the case. Its presence before the court in its corporate name is required not only because of its interest, but also to enable the court finally to dispose of the controversy in the one proceeding. Without a judgment against the county, there will be nothing to prevent its future officials from making the payment which petitioner now seeks to enjoin.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.