¶1I respectfully dissent.
¶2I
¶3The majority concludes that, “as presently phrased, the CALJIC instructions on entrapment do not accurately reflect the actual holding of [People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675 (153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947)] on which they are based,’’ and proceeds to state “[w]hat obviously was intended by our high court” in that decision.
¶4By so holding, the majority validates appellant’s challenges both to the CALJIC instructions, which are taken verbatim from Barraza, and the language of Barrazaitself.
¶5There is little indication in Barrazathat the court did not intend its “normally law-abiding person” language to be incorporated into jury instructions. To the contrary, that standard was used more than once in the opinion and was, in fact, emphasized by the court. While it may be true, as appellant protests, that “a court opinion is not an instruction to a jury” (Hansford v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1962) 303 F.2d 219, 222), CALJIC Nos. 460, 4.61, 4.61.5, given by the trial court, faithfully adhere to the Barrazatest. I would accordingly hold that the CALJIC instruction on entrapment given by the trial court did not misstate the law of entrapment as enunciated in Barraza. (See People v. Allison (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 264, 276 [174 Cal.Rptr. 481], where the court held that CALJIC No. 4.61 properly stated that “the conduct of the law enforcement agent must be judged by the effect which it would have on a normally law-abiding person ‘situated in the circumstances of the case at hand.’ ”)
¶6Neither does it appear that the Barrazastandard is flawed by its reference to the “normally law-abiding person.” And, subsequent cases have faithfully and consistently followed Barrazain proclaiming that the proper test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was “likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense.” (See People v. McIntire (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742, 745 [153 Cal.Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527]; People v. Bottger (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 974, 984 [191 Cal.Rptr. 408]; Douglass v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 645, 655 [190 Cal.Rptr. 506]; People v. Allison, supra,120 Cal.App.3d 264, 272.)
¶7Moreover, the majority creates uncertainty as to whether it is holding the subject instructions inappropriate in all cases or inappropriate only in cases in which the defendant, as in this case, “was no such person as described *672in the instruction.” Either way, what guide are trial courts now to follow in formulating their instructions? The majority provides no clear indication.
¶8n
¶9I concur with the majority that the “presence of motive” instruction embodied in CALJIC No. 2.51 was unnecessarily given. I consider the effect of that instruction, however, to be comparable to that in People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109 [141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771]. In Rollo, the court declared that “such an error is usually harmless, having little or no effect ‘other than to add to the bulk of the charge.’ [Citation.] There is ground for concern only when an abstract or irrelevant instruction creates a substantial risk of misleading the jury to the defendant’s prejudice.” {Id., at p. 123, quoting from People v. Sanchez (1947) 30 Cal.2d 560, 572 [184 P.2d 673].)
¶10I do not believe the presence of motive instruction in the case before us was prejudicially misleading. The jury was instructed to apply the instructions as a whole, and presumably did so. The giving of CALJIC No. 4.61 clearly dissociated law enforcement action or conduct from any conclusion that presence of motive under CALJIC No. 2.51 established guilt.
¶11Moreover, no objection at trial was made to the instruction, nor was any clarifying instruction requested.
¶12I consider the substantive effect of the error to be harmless.
¶13I would affirm the judgment.
¶14A petition for a rehearing was denied July 25, 1984. Holmdahl, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.