Murray v. McDonald

¶5PER CURIAM:

¶6Craig Murray and Charmaine Adams appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (William K. Sessions III, Judge), dismissing their action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341.1 Appellants had sought a declaratory judgment from the district court, invalidating a Vermont tax refund statute, Act of June 20, 1994, No. 223, 1994 Vt. Acts & Resolves, reprinted in Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 8911 (historical notation) (“Act 223”), insofar as that statute authorized the refund of certain taxes paid, without any refund of interest accrued. Appellants contended that the statute violated the Just Compensation Clause, see U.S. Const, amend. 5, and the Due Process Clauses, see U.S. Const, amend. 5 & 14, of the United States Constitution. We affirm the dismissal of appellants’ action for substantially the reasons stated by the district court. See Murray v. McDonald, 988 F.Supp. 420 (D.Vt.1997).

¶7We write only to highlight our agreement with the district court’s observation that the decision of the Vermont Supreme Court in In re Williams, 166 Vt. 21, 686 A.2d 964 (Vt. 1996), cert. denied, —— U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2432, 138 L.Ed.2d 193 (1997), has mooted a concern we previously expressed in Barringer v. Griffes, 964 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir.1992). In Barringer, as in the instant case, we were faced with a constitutional challenge to aspects of Vermont’s motor vehicle purchase and use tax regime. The plaintiffs in Bar-ringer, like the plaintiffs in the case before us, argued that state court procedures would not afford “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy,” 28 U.S.C. § 1341, for the constitutional *148violations they asserted, and that the Tax Injunction Act would thus not operate to preclude the federal court action. In both cases, state procedures required aggrieved taxpayers to present an appeal initially to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. Though it was not entirely clear at the time of Barringrer in 1992 that the statute at issue there allowed any appeal to a state court, see Bar-ringer, 964 F.2d at 1283, the state procedural statute that now would govern an administrative action by the instant appellants explicitly provides for an appeal to the small claims court, see Act 223, § 4; in addition, the state has represented to us that an appeal as of right will lie from the small claims court to the superior court, pursuant to Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5538.

¶8It was clear in 1992, as it is now, that state administrative agencies in Vermont are generally not empowered to consider constitutional challenges to state statutes. See Williams v. Vermont, 156 Vt. 42, 589 A.2d 840, 847 (Vt.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 821, 112 S.Ct. 81, 116 L.Ed.2d 54 (1991); Alexander v. Town of Barton, 152 Vt. 148, 565 A2d 1294, 1296 (Vt.1989). We expressed concern in Barringer that state courts reviewing determinations of such agencies would similarly be precluded from reaching constitutional challenges. See Barringer, 964 F.2d at 1283-84. Largely on the basis of this concern, we declined to find the remedy under Vermont law to be “plain, speedy and efficient,” under the terms of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341.

¶9In the meantime, the Vermont Supreme Court, in In re Williams, has considered the merits of a constitutional challenge raised by other taxpayers to the same taxation regime at issue in this case. We are now satisfied that the courts of Vermont are empowered to decide constitutional questions, even when reviewing determinations made by administrative agencies that lack such power.2

¶10Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.