157 Md. App. 247 - Stoddard v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “At the most basic level, under both the common law and the new Federal and Maryland Rules, a hearsay statement consisted routinely of the speaking of a declarative sentence in the indicative mood, which sentence stated the very fact which the proponent of the statement sought to prove by its use. Early on, however, it was recognized that a hearsay statement could be a writing of an assertion as well as a speaking of it. It was also universally recognized, virtually ab origine, that a hearsay statement could consist of a nonverbal action if the action were intended by the actor to be an assertion. The pointing of a finger at Suspect # 4 is just as assertive as are the words, “The man who robbed me is Suspect #4.” Just as surely assertive, in response to a question, is a vertical shaking of the head (“Yes”), a horizontal shaking of the head (“No”), or a shrug of the shoulders (“I don’t know”).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 183 Md. App. 122 - Garner v. State · 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 319 - Commonwealth v. Vasquez

2. “[njonverbal conduct.. . may be offered as evidence that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the existence of the condition sought to be proved, from which belief the existence of the condition may be inferred. This sequence is, arguably, in effect an assertion of the existence of the condition and hence properly includable within the hearsay concept. Admittedly, evidence of this character is untested with respect to the perception, memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor, but the Advisoiy Committee is of the view that these dangers are minimal in the absence of an intent to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds. No class of evidence is free of the possibility of fabrication, but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with assertive verbal conduct. The situations giving rise to the nonverbal conduct are such as virtually to eliminate questions of sincerity. Motivation, the nature of the conduct, and the presence or absence of reliance will bear heavily upon the weight to be given the evidence. Similar considerations govern nonassertive verbal conduct and verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted, also excluded from the definition of hearsay by the language of subdivision (c).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 319 - Commonwealth v. Vasquez

3. “the form of a question, a command, a bit of sarcasm, a statement of something else, [t]he implied assertion may be just as assertive as is a direct assertion. Only the communicative style or rhetorical flourish is different. The thing directly inferred from the words spoken, the thing the declarant intended to communicate, is, by definition, the implied assertion. Now comes the modem distinction: If the proposition, for which the utterance is offered as proof, is the same as the immediate or direct inference itself, to wit, a first generation implied assertion, the utterance is covered, as it always was, by the hearsay mle. The implied assertion that 1) is itself the probative end product and 2) results from a simple one-step inferential process is (sic) covered by the hearsay mle. The limitation on hearsay coverage introduced by the new mies, a limitation that was not part of the doxology according to Wright v. Tatham, is on the application of the attenuated or multi-step inferential process. If the first generation inference is not the thing ultimately to be proved but is only the predicate for yet another inference one step further removed, the hearsay bar no longer stretches that far.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 319 - Commonwealth v. Vasquez