157 Md. App. 363 - Stanley v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Restrictions on possession—In general.—A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: "(1) Has been convicted of: "(i) A crime of violence; "(ii) Any violation classified as a felony in this State; "(iii) Any violation classified as a misdemeanor in this State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years; or “(iv) Any violation classified as a common law offense where the person received a term of imprisonment of more than 2 years.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 159 Md. App. 253 - Alston v. State · Stanley v. State

2. ““Interpreting the statute as appellant suggests would require us to render a portion of the statute superfluous and would produce an illogical result. Section 449(e) applies to ‘a person who was previously convicted of a crime of violence as defined in § 441(e)’ or of a violation of Article 27 § 286 or § 286A. Article 27 §§ 286 and 286A prohibit various drug crimes. None of the offenses prohibited by those statutes is a ‘crime of violence as defined in § 441(e).’ It would be illogical for the legislature specifically to have listed §§ 286 and 286A in § 449(e) if it intended that the section apply only to persons who have previously been convicted of both a felony and a crime of violence. In addition, § 445(d)(1) does not prohibit possession of any firearm, but of a ‘regulated firearm.’ Reading § 449(e) together with § 445(d)(1) indicates that the phrase, ‘who is in possession of a firearm as defined in § 445(d)(l)(i) and (ii) of this article,’ refers to a person who is in possession of a regulated firearm and that the legislature used the word ‘and’ because the definition of ‘regulated firearm’ is the same in § 445(d)(l)(i) as it is in § 445(d)(l)(ii). As seen above, section 445(d)(1) lists subsections (i) and (ii) in the disjunctive.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stanley v. State

3. ““before judges may look to other sources for interpretation, first there must exist an ambiguity within the statute, i.e., two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. See Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429 , 701 A.2d 419, 421 (1997). Where the statutory language is free from such ambiguity, courts will neither look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent nor add to or delete words from the statute, see Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 219, 222 , 804 A.2d 426, 427 (2002). Only when faced with ambiguity will courts consider both the literal or usual meaning of the words as well as their meaning in light of the objectives and purposes of the enactment. As our predecessors noted, ‘We cannot assume authority to read into the Act what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out. Judicial construction should only be resorted to when an ambiguity exists.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stanley v. State