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157 Misc. 568

Humphreys v. Heller

New York Supreme Court

Decided December 9, 1935

New York Supreme Court · decided 1935-12-09

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The court is not concluded by the form of the action or the allegations of the complaint; resort may be had to the entire record to determine the essential character of the act.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Peerson v. Mitchell

“implicit in the cause of action asserted”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Jaco v. Baker

Relies on Tinker v. Colwell · McIntyre v. Kavanaugh · Muller v. . McKesson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1935-12-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently November 2005

4 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

8019351940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Hofstadter, J.

¶1The plaintiffs have obtained a judgment in an action brought to recover for personal injuries sustained from *569the bite of a dog owned and harbored by the defendant Heller. The defendant has obtained a discharge in bankruptcy and now seeks to stay further proceedings in the action. The question presented is whether the debt created by the judgment is excepted from discharge by the provisions of section 35 of title 11 of the United States Code, as a liability “ for willful and malicious injuries to the person of another.”

¶2The complaint alleges that the defendant “ wrongfully kept a dog, well knowing him to be of a ferocious and mischievous disposition and accustomed to attack and bite mankind.” It is clear that the cause of action asserted is within the category of a malicious and willful injury as that term is employed in the Bankruptcy Act. (See Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473; Kavanaugh v. McIntyre, 210 N. Y. 175; affd., 242 U. S. 138; Bank of Williamsville v. Amherst Motor Sales, Inc., 234 App. Div. 261, 263.)

¶3Negligence in the ordinary sense is not the gravamen of the action (Carlisle v. Cassasa, 234 App Div. 112, 116; Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195; McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 id. 340, 349); the action is predicated upon a willful and intentional act, namely, the keeping of a ferocious animal with knowledge of its viciousness. In this aspect as a matter of law the willful and malicious character of the act is implicit in the cause of action asserted. It is immaterial that the complaint does not allege that the act was willful and malicious. (Cf. Matter of Dutkiewicz, 27 F. [2d] 334.) The court is not concluded by the form of the action or the allegations of the complaint; resort may be had to the entire record to determine the essential character of the act. (Bank of Williamsville v. Amherst Motor Sales, Inc., supra.)

¶4The case of Matter of Lorde (144 Fed. 320) does not indicate a contrary conclusion; indeed, it is an assumption of the court that the debt would not be dischargeable as against the owner of the dog.

¶5Accordingly the motion for a stay of proceedings is denied.

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