157 Ohio App. 3d 261 - State v. Tarbay’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

38 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he importuning statute does not prohibit an adult and child from communicating about sex, nor does it prevent two people, regardless of their age, from talking about sexual activity between a child and an adult. [Former] R.C. 2907.07 (E)(2) [now 2907.07(D)(2)] criminalizes only the solicitation of a minor, or someone the offender believes to be a minor, to engage in illegal sexual activity with an adult. [The defendant-appellant in this case] was not convicted of importuning because he was thinking about having sex with a minor; he was convicted for his intent to solicit a person he believed to be a minor to engage in sex acts with him. `[T]he harm is in the asking,' [footnote omitted] not the discussion of it. In sum, we reiterate that there is simply `[no] First Amendment right to attempt to persuade minors to engage in illegal sex acts. ' [Footnote omitted.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Worst, Unpublished Decision (12-12-2005) · State v. Cearley, Unpublished Decision (9-13-2004)

2. “(A) No person who is eighteen years of age or older shall engage in sexual conduct with another, who is not the spouse of the offender, when the offender knows the other person is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age, or the offender is reckless in that regard.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Cearley, Unpublished Decision (9-13-2004) · State v. Chance, Unpublished Decision (7-17-2006)

3. “Tarbay also seems to argue that the importuning statute is not narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest, because it applies only to an adult offender who is four years older than the age assumed by the officer posing as a minor. We believe that it is reasonable for the state to find that the impact of a direct solicitation for sex on an adolescent from a much older adult is more damaging than such a solicitation from a person closer in age. [Footnote omitted.] The older adult is more likely to be more sophisticated and better able to coerce or overcome the resistance of a minor. {¶ 55} "Because [former] R.C. 2907.07 (E)(2) [now 2907.07(D)(2)] is narrowly tailored to serve the government's compelling interest, we hold that it is constitutional on its face and as applied to Tarbay. We note that our holding is in line with United States Supreme Court precedent [ Giboney v. Empire Storage (1949), 336 U.S. 490 , 498 , 69 S.Ct. 684 ], which has rejected the contention that the First Amendment extends to speech that is incidental to or part of a course of criminal conduct, i.e., soliciting a minor child for sex.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Worst, Unpublished Decision (12-12-2005)