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157 Tex. 193

300 S.W.2d 943

Hutson v. Chambless

Texas Supreme Court

Decided April 3, 1957

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1957-04-03

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““I concur in the decision reached in this particular case as it seems that assuming the contract has not been substantially performed, the recovery permitted under the facts pleaded by Chambless would be measured by the difference between the value of the building as actually constructed and its value had it been constructed in accordance with the plans and specifications of the contract. This rule, however, if it can be properly called a general rule, is subject to numerous exceptions. This difference in values is not necessarily the measure of damages when the default of the contractor is wilful or intentional. * * * Nor should it be the exclusive measure where it is shown that the owner of property desiring construction thereon is dependent upon a loan commitment which is based upon completion of the work in accordance with plans and specifications, nor where an essential element of the contract from the owner’s standpoint is the ‘gratification of his taste’ for which he has contracted and agreed to pay money * * (Emphasis added)”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Turner, Collie & Braden, Inc. v. Brookhollow, Inc., Precision Homes, Inc. v. Cooper

Relies on Chamberlain v. . Parker · Marsh v. Richards · Groves v. John Wunder Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1957-04-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 64 later decisions — most recently April 2012 · most notably Turner, Collie & Braden, Inc. v. Brookhollow, Inc. (1982), Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Castillo (1981)

61 state decisions

2601957196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Mr. Justice Norvell, joined by Justice Smith,

¶1concurring.

¶2I concur in the decision reached in this particular case as it seems that assuming the contract has not been substantially performed, the recovery permitted under the facts pleaded by Chambless would be measured by the difference between the value of the building as actually constructed and its value had it been constructed in accordance with the plans and specifications of the contract. This rule, however, if it can be properly called a general rule, is subject to numerous exceptions. This difference in values is not necessarily the measure of damages when the default of the contractor is wilful or intentional. Groves v. John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235, 123 A.L.R. 502. Nor should it be the exclusive measure where it is shown that the owner of property desiring construction thereon is dependent upon a loan commitment which is based upon completion of the work in accordance with plans and specifications, nor where an essential element of the contract from the owner’s standpoint is the “gratification of his taste” for which he has contracted and agreed to pay money. Marsh v. Richards, 29 Mo. 99, Ann. 23 A.L.R. 1442. Chamberlain v. Parker, 45 N.Y. 569, lc. 572. Other instances may be given to illustrate that the rule is by no means exclusive. I concur in the present judgment because no facts are pleaded which would render a measure of damages other than the differences in values properly applicable to the case.

¶3Opinion delivered April 3, 1957.

¶4Rehearing overruled May 8, 1957.

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