Bell v. Dennis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Since the action of forcible entry and detainer is a special statutory proceeding, summary in its nature, and in derogation of the common law, it is a rule of universal application in such actions that the statute conferring jurisdiction must be strictly pursued in the method of procedure prescribed by it, or the jurisdiction will fail to attach, and the proceeding be coram, non judice and void. Even if the action is tried in a court of record, the latter does not proceed therein by virtue of its power as a court of general jurisdiction, but derives its authority wholly from the statute, and in such proceeding is, therefore, to be treated as a court of special and limited jurisdiction.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Harris v. Christy · Goodin v. King

2. ““A cause of action must exist and be complete before an action can be commenced; suits commenced before the cause of action stated in the pleadings arises will generally be dismissed when proper objection is taken; if a plaintiff has no valid and subsisting title or right to the subject of his action at the time of its commencement, he may not by the subsequent acquisition or perfection of such right or title remedy the defect so as to succeed in the action. The subsequent occurrence of the conditions or facts necessary to make the cause of action complete will not avail the plaintiff in maintaining his suit. The rights and liabilities of the parties — that is, their rights to an action or to judgment or relief- — depend upon the facts as they existed at the time of the commencement of the action, and not at the time of trial. And it has been said that the nonexistence of a cause of action when the suit was begun cannot be cured by an amendment to the complaint or declaration to cover the subsequently accruing right.” 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Actions § 87, p. 616. (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 17 Kan. App. 2d 598 - Miner v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., Inc.

3. ““Under our statute, G. S. 1935, 61-1304, one of the conditions precedent to the institution and maintenance of a forcible detainer action is the service on the adverse party of a notice to quit, which notice must be served at least three days before the commencement of such action, unless it is brought for the purpose of ejecting a tenant for the nonpayment of rent, in which event, no notice is required if a statement is included in the notice terminating the tenancy that unless the tenant shall vacate in the time provided therein suit will be brought to eject him. So in a case where a party seeks to terminate a tenacy for nonpayment of rent, the notice to quit — in the instant case a three-day notice in writing as required by G. S. 1935, 67-508 — must be given, and service of such notice as required is a condition precedent to the institution of a forcible detainer action. Such was the effect of our decision in Stuller v. Sparks, surpa.” (pp. 37, 38.) (Emphasis supplied.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Goodin v. King