158 Md. App. 402 - Freeman v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"We are persuaded by the reasoning of the court in State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997), which distinguishes between an ambiguous response to an initial Miranda advisement and an equivocal post-waiver invocation. The Supreme Court of Utah declined to apply Davis to an ambiguous pre-waiver response, concluding that Davis was limited to a post-waiver ambiguous invocation of rights. Id. at 745. According to the Utah court, that scenario is an `entirely separate' issue from an ambiguous pre-waiver invocation. Id. "Noting that Davis did not `address' or `extend to prewaiver scenarios . . . .', the Utah court said that ` Davis made clear that its holding applied only to a suspect's attempt to reinvoke his Miranda rights " after a knowing and voluntary waiver" of the same.' Id. (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 ). Therefore, the Utah court concluded that an officer faced with an ambiguous response to an initial advisement of Miranda , rights, i.e., at the pre-waiver stage, is limited to posing questions designed to clarify the suspect's ambiguous response. Id. Accord State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (adopting Leyva and concluding that `[t]he Davis holding obviously applies to instances where suspects attempt to invoke Miranda rights after a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights. Davis , in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.'). "We agree with the Utah court that a careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Collins

2. “§ 10-912. Failure to take defendant before judicial officer after arrest (a) Confession not rendered inadmissible. — A confession may not be excluded from evidence solely because the defendant was not taken before a judicial officer after arrest within any time period specified by Title 4 of the Maryland Rules. (b) Effect of failure to comply strictly with Title 4 of the Maryland Rules. — Failure to strictly comply with the provisions of Title 4 of the Maryland Rules pertaining to taking a defendant before a judicial officer after arrest is only one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 194 Md. App. 327 - Moore v. State

3. “We are persuaded by the reasoning of the court in State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997), which distinguishes between an ambiguous response to an initial Miranda advisement and an equivocal post-waiver invocation. The Supreme Court of Utah declined to apply Davis to an ambiguous pre-waiver response, concluding that Davis was limited to a post-waiver ambiguous invocation of rights. Id. at 745. According to the Utah court, that scenario is an `entirely separate' issue from an ambiguous pre-waiver invocation. Id.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Collins