158 N.C. App. 79 - State v. Sines’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A defendant is guilty of a Class B1 felony if the defendant engages in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with another person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old and the defendant is at least six years older than the person, except when the defendant is lawfully married to the person.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 180 N.C. App. 86 - State v. Smith · 177 N.C. App. 487 - State v. Browning

2. “In order to prove an attempt of any crime, the State must show: “(1) the intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) an overt act done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation, but (8) falls short of the completed offense.” [ 4 ] State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 667 , 477 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1996) (citing State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54 , 431 S.E.2d 188 (1993)). An act must be done with specific intent to commit the underlying crime before a defendant may be convicted of an attempted crime. See State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448 , 527 S.E.2d 45 (2000). Here, the evidence in the light most favorable to the State shows that defendant committed an overt act that would have aided in the commission of statutory sexual offense. Defendant’s placement of his penis in front of victim’s face, coupled with his demand for oral sex, comprise an overt act sufficient to satisfy the second element of attempt.... The remaining element is the intent to commit the substantive offense. Defendant argues that it is logically impossible to have the specific intent to commit a strict liability crime which does not require a specific intent.... Defendant argues that since our State does not recognize attempted general intent crimes, it cannot logically recognize attempted strict liability or non-intentional crimes. We disagree. We find the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Chhom persuasive in this case. See State v. Chhom, 128 Wash.2d 739 , 911 P.2d 1014 (1996). The Revised Co”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 168 Md. App. 1 - Maxwell v. State

3. “[s]tatutory sexual offense and statutory rape are categorized as strict liability crimes. This categorization indicates that an individual may commit the crime of statutory sexual offense regardless of the defendant's mistake or lack of knowledge of the child's age. It also means that consent is not a defense to the crime of statutory sexual offense.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Melgar-Argueta