Whitney v. Taylor’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 federal appellate · 6 district · 37 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 118 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Although these cases are none of them exactly like the one before us, yet, the principle to be deduced from them is that when, on the records of the local land office, there is an existing claim on the part of an individaul under the homestead or pre-emption law which has been recognized by the officers of the government, and has not been canceled or set aside, the tract in respect, to which that' claim is existing is excepted from the operation of a railroad land grant containing the ordinary excepting clause, and this notwithstanding such claim mar not he enforceable by the claimant, and is subject, to cancellation by the government at its own suggestion, or upon the application of other parties. * * * In this respect notice may also he taken of the rule prevailing in the Rand Department where the filing of the declaratory statement, is recognized as the assertion of a pre-emption claim which excepts a tract fro-m the scope of a railroad grant like this.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. · Union Pacific Railroad v. Harris

2. ““So long as it remains a subsisting entry of record, whose legality has been passed upon by the land authorities, and tbeir action remains unreversed, it is such an appropriation of the tract as segregates it from the public domain, and therefore precludes it from subsequent grants.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Southern Pac. R. v. United States · United States v. Bagnell Timber Co.

3. ““Counsel urges that, inasmuch as the latter fa declaratory statement] need not be verified, one might file under assumed names declaratory statements on every tract within the limits of a railroad grant prior to the time of the filing of the map of definite location, and thus prevent the railroad company from receiving any lands. This danger is more imaginary than real. In the first place, for each application fees must be paid, and it is not to be supposed that any one would throw away money for the mere sake of preventing a railroad grant from having any operation. In the second place, such declaratory statements under assumed names would be purely fictitious and could be set aside as absolutely void. Indeed, good faith is presumed to underlie all such applications. The acceptance -of the declaratory statement by the local land officers is prima l’acie evidence that they have approved it as a bona fide application, and if, in any particular Instance, it is shown to be purely fictitious, doubtless there is an adequate remedy by proper proceedings in the land office. There is in the case before us no pretense that the transaction, was a fictitious one, or carried on otherwise than in perfect good faith on the part of the applicant. At any rate, Congress has seen fit not to require an affidavit to a declaratory statement, and has provided for the filing of such unsworn statement as the proper means for an assertion on record of a claim under the preemption law, and that is all”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Trodick v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. · Weiser v. Union Pacific Railroad