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159 Ala. 524

Duncan v. Guy

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided April 22, 1909

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1909-04-22

<p> Bill for Bale of Lands for Division. </p> <p>1. Landlord and Tenant; Title of Landlord; Tenant Estopped to Deny. — The general rule is that a tenant entering into possession of land under a lease must surrender the possession to the landlord before he can assail or question the title under which he enters; the exception to this rule is that the tenant may show the terminatioá of the landlord’s title or that he has acquired the same since the creation of the tenancy, but this execption does not permit the tenant to assert an outstanding title which he may purchase or permit him to attorn to the person having an outstanding title hostile to that of the landlord.</p> <p>2. Same; Waiver of Surrender.- — The evidence in this ease stated and examined and held not to show a waiver of a surrender of possession by the landlord so as to permit the tenant to set up an outstanding title acquired by him hostile to the landlord.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently April 1918

1 federal appellate ·

Relies on Davis v. Williams · Hammond v. Blue · Barlow & Co. v. Dahm

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1909-04-22

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ANDERSON, J.

¶1It is an elementary principle that, when a tenant enters into possession of land under a lease, he must surrender the possession to the landlord before he can assail or question the title under which he enters. — McAdam on Landlord & Tenant, 1341; Davis v. Williams, 130 Ala. 530, 30 South. 488, 54 L. R. A. 749, 89 Am. St. Rep. 55; Barlow v. Daham, 97 Ala. 414, 12 South. 293, 38 Am. St. Rep. 192. There is an exception to the general rule to the extent of permitting the tenant to show the termination of the landlord’s title, or that he has acquired same since the creation of the tenancy. Hammond v. Blue, 132 Ala. 337, 31 South. 357. “But while his relation of tenant, and possession as such, continues, he cannot avail himself of an outstanding title (which he may purchase) to dispute the title of his landlord, nor can he then effectively attorn to the person having an outstanding title in hostility to that of his landlord. He must first surrender the premises to his *528landlord before assuming an attitude of hostility to the title or claim of title of the latter.” The complainant, in the case at bar, was the tenant of the respondent Johnson when he purchased the one-fifth interest of Mrs. Sanford, which was but an outstanding claim or title of a third person, and falls within the influence of the case, of Barlow v. Daham, supra; and, hot having restored the possession, he is estopped from disputing the title of his landlord.

¶2It is insisted by appellant’s counsel that .the restoration of the possession was, in effect, waived by the landlord, because of the fact that he accepted but four-fifths of the rent, and thereby acquiesced in the claim of complainant to a one-fifth interest in the land. Conceding that a restoration of the possession can be .waived, Ave do not think that a mere failure to collect and demand, each year, all of the rent, operated as a severance .of the relation or a restoration of the status in quo. The complainant testified that- he retained one-fifth of the rent because of having bought.the Sanford interest, hut does not set out enough to sIioav that Johnson Avaiv.ed a surrender of the premises or consented to.a..termination of the tenancy pro tanto- as. tp the-one-fifth interest of the-land. On-the other hand, Johnson testified:' “He has never surrendered the possession, of the land to me. I never, told Ur.. Duncan that I was satisfied AAdien he didn’t, pay me the. $50 rent, and 'only paid me $40. I didn’t , tell him that that Avas. satisfactory..” Nor does Duncan testify that Johnson consented to a termination and waived the restoration as to the one-fifth.interest. He merely. stated: . “It was perfectly satisfactory, so far, as I know.” . ■.

¶3The decree of the chancery court is affirmed.

Doavdell, C„ J., and McClellan and Sayre, JJ., concur.
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