Byrne v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The decree below directs tbe master to make an Immediate sale of the land in Arkansas and to bring tbe money into court, and the inference is that be Is to make tliis sale before tbe respective rights and interests of the parties can be adjudicated by the decision upon tbe exceptions, if any, to tbe master's report of the accounting. A court of chancery has tbe power to direct a sale of property before the accounting in cases which require both, and it is customary to do so in winding up insolvent (¡states and in other cases where tbe claimants to tbe proceeds are numerous, or for other reasons ail early sale is especially desirable. “A court of chancery has plenary power to affect the title to real estate beyond its jurisdiction by a sale and conveyance thereof by its master or otherwise by its decree in suits to execute trusts, to undo frauds, and to enforce contracts regarding such real estate, whenever it lias acquired jurisdiction of tbe persons of tbe parties interested therein, for tbe reason that equity acts through tbe person. * * * “That agreement vested in the trustee, Byrne, tbe power to sell and convey tbe Texas land, and to apply the proceeds according to its terms, and when Byrne became faithless the court, below bad plenary power to substitute Us muster for him as trustee and to direct him to exercise all the powers originally vested in Byrne. Byrne is within the jurisdiction of that court, and it may lawfully require him to make the sale and conveyance as tr”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Clark v. Iowa Fruit Co.

2. ““ * * * The law peremptorily forbids every one who, in a fiduciary relation, has acquired information concerning or interest in the business or property of his correlate from using that knowledge or interest to prevent the latter from •accomplishing the purpose of the relation. If one ignores or violates this prohibition, the law charges the interest or the property which he acquires in this way with a trust for the benefit of the other party to the relation, at the option of the latter, while it denies to the former all commission or compensation for his services. This inexorable principle of the law is not based upon, nor conditioned by, the respective interests or powers of the parties to the relation, the times, when that relation commences or terminates, or the injury or damage which the betrayal of the confidence given entails. It rests upon a broader foundation, upon that sagacious public policy which, for the purpose of removing all temptation, removes all possibility that a trustee may de-; rive profit from the subject-matter of his trust, so that one whose confidence has been betrayed may enforce the trust which arises under this rule of law although he has sustained no damage, although the confidential relation has terminated before the trust was betrayed, although he had no legal or equitable interest in the property, and although his correlate who acquired it had no joint interest in or discretionary power over it. The only indispensable elements of a good cause ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Johnson v. Umsted