159 Ill. 2d 533 - Schrock v. Shoemaker’s Empirical Analysis
1994
Citation profile
51 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 55 later decisions — most recently September 2021 · most notably 181 Ill. 2d 460 - Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason (1998), 166 Ill. 2d 204 - Bright v. Dicke (1995)
51 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 20 Ill. 2d 406 - Dini v. Naiditch · 101 Ill. 2d 1 - Doyle v. Rhodes · 8 Ill. 2d 293 - Belfield v. Coop · 97 Ill. 2d 195 - Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp. · 133 Ill. 2d 295 - Healy v. Vaupel
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[i]f this court allows a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 315(a), the scope of our review is not limited to determining whether the appellate court answered the certified questions correctly. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5), this court may 'enter any judgment and make any order that ought to have been given or made, and make any other and further orders and grant any relief *** that the case may require.' [Citation.]”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"We conclude that the most efficient way to preclude the double-recovery problem, without undermining Kotecki, was proposed and adopted by this court in Brown v. Metzger (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 30, 35 . Brown held that a loss of consortium action must be joined, whenever possible, with the injured or deceased spouse’s cause of action. (Brown, 104 Ill. 2d at 35 .) The court concluded that joinder of these related claims would not only preclude double-recovery problems, but would also reduce litigation expenses for the parties, conserve judicial time and resources and reduce court congestion. (Brown, 104 Ill. 2d at 35 .) Under the rule adopted in Brown, unless the spouse bringing the loss of consortium action can prove facts demonstrating why joinder with the injured or deceased spouse is not possible, the loss of consortium action must be dismissed. Here, the plaintiff could have joined her Structural Work Act claim with a claim under the Wrongful Death Act for the decedent’s injuries. (735 ILCS 5/2 — 614 (West 1992); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 693, Comment b (1977).) Joinder of these related claims would be particularly appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Joinder would enable the plaintiff to obtain full compensation, not only for her own injuries in the structural work action, but also for the decedent’s injuries in the wrongful death action. [(Emphasis in original.)] Joinder of these related claims, however, would prevent the plaintiff from obtaining”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“"In the ordinary case, when an employee sustains injuries in the course of employment, the employer pays workers’ compensation benefits to the employee regardless of fault. If the employee thereafter successfully sues a third-party tortfeasor for his injuries, the employer has the right to recover workers’ compensation payments it made to the employee from the award the employee receives from the third-party tortfeasor. If the third party brings a contribution action against the employer, the amount of contribution the employer must pay is limited to 'an amount no greater than’ its workers’ compensation liability. (Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp. (1991), 146 Ill. 2d 155, 157 .) Ultimately, a negligent employer pays out no more than the amount it is obligated to pay under the workers’ compensation statute. In the instant action, however, the employer has paid workers’ compensation benefits to the plaintiff, but has no lien upon any recovery the plaintiff may receive in her third-party action against the defendants.” Schrock, 159 Ill. 2d at 542-43 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.