159 Ind. App. 311 - Fenwick v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The general rule in Indiana is that evidence of conduct which shows or tends to show that the defendant committed a crime separate and distinct from the crime for which he is charged is irrelevant and inadmissible. However, several well-established exceptions have been recognized. Evidence showing such separate crimes is admissible if the purpose for its introduction is to show intent, motive, identity, guilty knowledge, or a common scheme or plan. Van Deveer v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 509 , 269 N.E.2d 865 ; Zimmerman v. State (1921), 190 Ind. 537 , 130 N.E. 235 . ‘It is the probative value of such evidence to prove the crime charged that makes the evidence admissible and not the fact that it proves or tends to prove the defendant guilty of other crimes.’ Smith v. State (1939), 215 Ind. 629 , 21 N.E.2d 709 . These rules apply without regard to whether the challenged evidence relates to conduct occurring prior or subsequent to the offense charged. United States v. Hampton (1972), 7th Cir., 457 F.2d 299 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 , 93 S.Ct. 136 , 34 L.Ed.2d 101 ; Grimes v. State (1972), [258] Ind. [257], 280 N.E.2d 575 .” (Emphasis supplied.) See: Schnee v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 661, 662 , 262 N.E.2d 186, 187 ; Watts v. State (1950), 229 Ind. 80 , 95 N.E.2d 570 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 159 Ind. App. 657 - Samuels v. State · 162 Ind. App. 511 - Bell v. State

2. ““Conceding that he could find no authority, Fenwick asserts that the instruction should have been given because it is a correct statement of the law and because the jury has a right to know about the law concerning the sentencing of a defendant. “We fail to appreciate the thrust of Fenwick’s argument. To begin with, the crime charged — commission of crime while armed with deadly weapon — calls for a determinate sentence, not an indeterminate one, and the jury was so instructed. Furthermore, the jurors were instructed re-regarding the various lesser included offenses of which Fen-wick could have been convicted, including their respective penalties most of which allowed for indeterminate sentences.” (Our emphasis.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 168 Ind. App. 252 - Seay v. State