Volume 159 — New York Reports

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The holding over was unavoidable and in no manner the fault of the tenant. It could not be avoided, and for it defendants are not liable as hold-over tenants for another year, as held by the court below.

Appeal, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, made May 4, 1898, reversing that part of an order of a Special Term which allowed and approved the payment by the mortgage receiver, Lafayette B. Gleason, to Edward Wins-low Paige, attorney for the sequestration receiver, William Y. - Reynolds, of the sum of $4,770.22, and overruled the exceptions of the plaintiff to such payment; and also from an order made…

Motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered March 17, 1899, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiffs entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.

<p>1. Municipal Corporations — Duty as to Condition of Streets. While 'it is the duty of a municipal corporation to use reasonable care to keep its streets in a safe condition to drive upon, it has the right to devote the sides of the streets to other useful public purposes, provided it leaves an unobstructed driveway of ample width for the passage of teams.</p> <p>2. Grass Plots and Shade Trees in Streets—Protection from Travel. Grass plots and shade trees on the sides of streets serve a useful public purpose, consistent with the object for which streets are made, and their maintenance and protection, by reasonable means, from the encroachment of travel, are within the right of the municipal corporation.</p> <p>3. Private Driveways to Abutting Premises. A municipal corporation may, under reasonable regulations and conditions, permit private driveways to be built from the lands of abutting owners to the driveway of the street, and when they pass near trees or grass plots may protect the latter and confine travel to the driveways by curbing or other suitable barrier.</p> <p>4. Lawful Obstruction of Street by Stone to Protect Grass Plot at Private Driveway. The maintenance, at the end of a grass plot in an uncurbed village street between the sidewalk and the street-driveway and at the edge of a private driveway to the abutting premises, of a stone, to protect the grass plot and a tree thereon from being driven upon, and to confine travel to the driveways, but leaving them of ample width for the passage of teams, does not render the municipal corporation responsible for a personal injury sustained through the collision of a vehicle with the stone, even when the stone was covered with snow.</p>

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Chapter 664 of the Laws of 1892 is constitutional. (Taber v. Bd. Suprs., 131 N. Y. 438.) Acts of the legislature of this character have been passed upon by the courts of this state, and judicially recognized as binding upon the localities to which they relate. (People ex rel. v. Town Auditors, 53 Barb. 555 ; 38 How.

Also, appeal from an order of the same Appellate Division, entered January 12, 1898, made after the-transmission to the county clerk of its remittitur of the said order of reversal, and while the appeal from that order was pending in the Court of Appeals, amending nunc pro tunc the order of reversal by inserting the words'on a question of fact” after the words “ Ordered that the said final order and the said' judgment be and the same hereby are reversed.” The nature of the…

Appeal, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered November 15, 1898, reversing an order of the Special Term which denied an application for a writ of peremptory mandamus, and granting the writ. The facts, so far as material, and the question certified for review, are stated in the opinion.

Appeal, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered November 16, 1898, reversing an interlocutory judgment of the Special Term overruling a demurrer to the amended complaint. The substance of the complaint and. the grounds of the demurrer are set forth in the opinion. The questions certified for review are as follows: “ 1.

affirming a judgment entered upon the decision of the court after a trial at Special Term. This action was brought to recover the damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, as the owner of a dwelling house known as Bo. 28 Hanson place, in the city of Brooklyn, on account of a continuous nuisance committed by the defendant, a railroad corporation, upon its own premises directly at the rear of the plaintiff’s, and to restrain the further commission thereof.

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of th<£ Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered November 22, 1898, reversing an order of the Special Term granting an alternative writ of mandamus.</p>