Mr. Justice BlEase
¶1
(dissenting) : I do not agree with all the conclusions of Mr. Justice Cothran in his dissenting opinion, but I am of opinion that the order of the Circuit Judge should be reversed. The demurrer admitted the facts alleged in the complaint, and that pleading set up, according to my view, a cause of action, which should be heard in the lower Court.
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Case posture Posture Before RAMAGE, J., Richland, February, 1930. Affirmed.Action by S. Augustus Hall in behalf of himself and others against John G. Richards, Governor, and others. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, the plaintiff appeals.
The demurrer, order sustaining demurrer, and exceptions, directed to be reported, were as follows:
NOTICE OF DEMURRER To D.W. Robinson, Esq., attorney for plaintiff above named:
Please take notice that the undersigned, as attorneys representing the defendants in the above-entitled action, hereby enter demurrer to all of the allegations set forth in the complaint in this action on the ground that the same do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against either or all of the defendants above named, and for this purpose, will move on Tuesday, the 21st day of January, 1930, before Hon. C.J. Ramage, presiding Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, at Richland County Courthouse, at 10 o'clock a. m. on said date, or as soon thereafter as counsel
can be heard, for an order dismissing the complaint herein on the following grounds:
1. In that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, as no right, claim, or demand is asserted therein showing a remedy to which the plaintiff is entitled.
2. In that the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because, even if the allegations of the complaint are true that under the existing law, and more particularly under the provisions of Act No. 297, passed by the General Assembly at its 1929 session, approved by the Governor on the 14th day of March, A.D. 1929 (36 St. at Large, page 670), authorizing certain of the defendants in this action, and more particularly the Governor and the State Treasurer, to provide for the sale of certificates of indebtedness as authorized in said Act, that in keeping with such authority, the said officials have made a contract for the making, engraving and delivery of such certificates of indebtedness, and these defendants allege that said contract is legal and proper in every respect.
3. These defendants would show to the Court that the complaint herein does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action on the further ground that it is customary, proper, necessary, and legal in the issuance of bonds, or certificates of indebtedness by the State government or any political subdivisions thereof, for many details to be taken into consideration in working out a proper plan for engraving, issuing, and disposing of such obligations, and it is absolutely necessary, for the proper protection of the State, for discretion to be allowed to such officers in providing the type and kind of obligations to be issued, the type and character of its physical makeup, the size and kind of paper to be used, the manner in which the bonds shall be kept and held for the protection of the State until duly signed, issued, and delivered, and these defendants assert that, not only under the laws of the State of South Carolina,
but following that discretion which would always be permitted by the Courts to officials in acting on a transaction such as is referred to in the complaint, that a proper and reasonable discretion was observed by these defendants, and the contract made, as alleged in the complaint, should be approved in every respect as for the best interest of the State of South Carolina, and the complaint in this action should be dismissed.
ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER
This suit is brought in behalf of plaintiff as a taxpayer against the Governor, State Treasurer, Joint Committee on Printing, State Highway Commission, and R.L. Bryan Company. The defendants have all filed answers in the cause and thereafter served notice of demurrer in the usual time on the grounds that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
After full hearing, I am of opinion that the demurrer should be sustained and the complaint dismissed. At the outset, let me state that this proceeding does not involve public printing as contemplated by Sections 46 et seq. , of Volume 3, Code of Laws of South Carolina 1922, which sections create the Printing Committee and define its powers and duties. The matter referred to in the complaint involves a technical piece of engraving work, wherein the good name of the State is attached to obligations great in number and which must pass into the commercial world as virtual currency, for they are obligations payable to bearer and will extend over a long period of years, and the protection of the State in a transaction of this kind must have first consideration, as I feel has been given to it in the Act No. 297, passed by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, at its 1929 session.
The plaintiff contends and alleges in Paragraph 15 of the complaint that the defendants, the Governor and State
Treasurer, had no right or authority to let or award a contract to an engraving company, even to the lowest responsible bidder, and that the contract should have been awarded through the Joint Committee on Printing. The defendants contend in their demurrer that specific authority is granted under the Act No. 297 above mentioned, authorizing the defendants, and more particularly the Governor and State Treasurer, to provide for the engraving and issuing of the certificates of indebtedness referred to in said Act. They further contend that, even if the authority granted in said Act was only remotely referred to therein, that of necessity in a transaction of this character, wide discretion must be allowed by the Courts to the Executive Department of government to properly protect the State in making the contract for this type and kind of work.
The opinion of the Court is that these contentions should be sustained and the complaint dismissed because, after careful study of Sections 46-49, inclusive, of Volume 3, Code of Laws of South Carolina 1922, it does not appear that there is any requirement therein which would bring this particular work within the province of the Committee on Printing, but, even if this were so, it was openly and freely stated by counsel for plaintiff at the hearing that the full Committee on Printing, with one dissenting vote, had approved the contract made as alleged and set forth in the complaint.
But even if there were requirements in the sections of the Code above referred to, the Court feels that Section 21 of Article 3 of the Act No. 297, specifically repeals any inconsistent provisions of law to the extent of such inconsistency, and therefore, the matter here to be considered is covered entirely by the provisions of Act No. 297, known and referred to generally as The State Bond Act, which authorized specifically the issuance of these certificates of indebtedness under the plans provided for therein.
The plaintiff contends further, that, under Section 14 of Article 3 of the Act of 1929 (36 St. at Large, page 685) the Highway Commission is specifically limited to letting contracts less than $1,000.00 without advertising for same under rules and regulations to be made and published by the State Highway Commission. The Court does not consider this section as referring to the issuance of the certificates of indebtedness. It undoubtedly has reference only to the letting of contracts which affect highway construction or materials and machinery for the Highway Department, there being specific clauses in the bill which refer to the form and manner in the issuing of these obligations.
It is common knowledge, and so argued at the hearing, that the State Highway Commission has requested the Governor and State Treasurer to issue certificates of indebtedness under Article 1 of Act No. 297. In the last paragraph of Section 5 of this Article, we find it provides that the proceeds of a sale of these certificates may be used, among other purposes, for the purpose of paying expenses incident to the sale of said certificates, and the issuance of these certificates can only be made by the Governor and State Treasurer when called upon by the State Highway Commission to do so.
Bearing this in mind, we find in Section 1 of Article 3 of said Act, the following:
The certificates of indebtedness and notes shall be issued in such form and denomination and with such provisions as to time, place or places and medium of payment as may be determined by the Governor and the State Treasurer, subject to the provisions of this Act.
In Section 4 of Article 3, it is provided:
For the purpose of bringing about a successful sale of such certificates of indebtedness and notes issued in anticipation of the sale thereof, the State Highway Commission shall have the power to do all things ordinarily and customarily
done in connection with the sale of State or municipal bonds.
As the Highway Commission has called upon the Governor and State Treasurer to issue these certificates of indebtedness under the provisions of Article 1, all of which is common knowledge and admitted before me in argument, it was not only the province of, but necessarily required that the Governor and State Treasurer select the form of bonds, the type and kind of obligation to be issued as to size, weight, and kind of paper and protection to be afforded the State by the firm or corporation engraving such bonds, and many other details ordinarily and customarily required in connection with a sale of such obligation, and that such officials have carried out this duty and exercised their discretion is unquestioned by the Court. And, in fact, their acts and doings are hereby approved by the Court because the exercise of such a discretion by the Executive Department of the government should not be questioned by the Courts, even though, as alleged in the complaint, the price agreed upon was higher than offers submitted by others than the defendant, R.L. Bryan Company.
The Court is satisfied of this position because of the authority found in the Act No. 297, above mentioned, and because it is necessary for some official department of the government to protect the State in a large financial matter of the kind in question.
The Legislature undoubtedly intended this discretion to be ultimately vested in the Governor and State Treasurer, because from the sections of the Act above quoted, such is the clear interpretation thereof, and the State Highway Commission, as before mentioned, has undoubtedly co-operated towards this end in requesting the Governor and State Treasurer to decide upon the form of such bond and to do all things ordinarily and customarily necessary in connection with such a sale.
The complaint alleges in Paragraph 7 that a notice was sent out to certain engraving companies by the State Treasurer. The Court feels that this was proper in every respect, but such was not required by law, because, if to the officials mentioned in the Act it seemed proper. They could with all propriety have advertised for purchasers of the certificates of indebtedness to make their quotations based on furnishing the certificates of indebtedness ready for signature by the said officials and subject to their approval.
For many other reasons which the Court might cite, a discretion is necessary to be exercised in a transaction of this character. As stated, the Act in question, in the opinion of the Court, granted this power and discretion. And where discretion is granted or presumed to be granted to the Executive Department of the government by legislative enactment, the Court would not attempt to disturb the exercise of that discretion.
In McDowell v. Burnett , 92 S.C. 484 , 75 S.E. 873 , 878 , our Court says:
The presumption is that the chief Executive, in the exercise of the powers of his great office, acts with a view to the public interest, and therefore the Courts should give effect to his acts to the utmost extent that they are authorized by law.
See, in this connection, Lamar v. Croft , 73 S.C. 412 , 53 S.E. 540 ; Wyse v. Wolfe, Atty. Gen. , 129 S.C. 502 , 123 S.E. 818 ; Ekern v. McGovern , 154 Wis. 157 , 142 N.W. 595 , 46 L.R.A. (N.S.), 796; Hatfield v. Graham , 73 W. Va. 759 , 81 S.E. 533 , L.R.A., 1915-A, 181, Ann. Cas., 1917-C, 1; Ex parte Williams , 10 Okla. Cr. 344 , 136 P., 597 , 51 L.R.A. (N.S.), 671; Rice v. Draper, Governor , 207 Mass. 577 , 93 N.E. 821 , 32 L.R.A. (N.S.), 357.
It must be remembered here that there is no allegation of bad faith. The very fact that the contract made with the R.L. Bryan Company was at a higher price is a compelling
reason to believe that there must have been a good and sufficient cause in the minds of the State officials mentioned for making the contract in question. Some of these reasons are actually set forth in the complaint, to wit, a special type of engraving to appear upon the back of the bond and upon the back of the coupon. All these things are necessary when so many bearer evidences of indebtedness of the State are issued and sold to the public.
Recognizing to its fullest that the Executive Department of the government is to be sustained in all acts and doings wherever possible by the Courts, and that, unless clearly in violation of some law, every presumption should be resolved in favor of the Executive Department, the Court is clearly of the opinion that there was power and authority granted to the defendants to make the contract in question, and the same is hereby approved and the complaint ordered dismissed, with costs to the defendant.
EXCEPTIONS
The plaintiff excepts to the ruling and order of Circuit Judge Ramage of February 24, 1930, sustaining the demurrer herein upon the grounds:
1. That the Court erred in holding and ruling that the demurrer should be sustained and the complaint dismissed, because the demurrer should have been overruled. The Court should have issued an order sustaining the complaint, declaring the contract made by J.H. Scarborough, Treasurer, and John G. Richards, Governor, with R.L. Bryan Company, set forth in the complaint, null and void, because:
(a) The Constitution and the statutes of the State prescribe the manner and method in which, and a committee by which, said contract should have been made. It was not made in such manner and method and was not made or let by the Printing Committee, as prescribed by the Constitution and laws of this State.
(b) No public advertisement for bids was made, and the contract was not let on competitive bids, and was therefore null and void.
2. The Court erred in holding and ruling: This proceeding does not involve public printing as contemplated by Section 46, et seq. , of Volume 3 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1922, in that:
(a) The said statutes and section do prescribe the method and manner in which, not only all printing, but all engraving for the State, or any department thereof, shall be let, contracted for, and done.
(b) There is no other law prescribed for printing and engraving for any department of the State.
3. The Court erred in holding and ruling: The protection of the State in a transaction of this kind must have first consideration. and in giving the same as a reason for the ruling and holding of the Court, because: The State itself has prescribed in its Constitution and laws how all contracts for printing and engraving shall be let and safeguarded, and this method is certainly more apt to safeguard and protect the State.
4. The Court erred in holding and ruling that in the provisions of Sections 46-49 of Volume 3 of the Code, it does not appear that there is any requirement therein which would bring this particular work within the province of the Committee on printing, but even if this were so it was openly and freely stated by counsel for plaintiff at the hearing that the full Committee on Printing, with one dissenting vote, had approved the contract made as alleged and set forth in the complaint, in that:
(a) Sections 46-49 cover and embrace by their terms, purpose, and intention all the Public Printing, Binding, Lithographing, and Engraving for the State or any department of the State Government.
(b) The alleged ratification and approval by the Committee on Printing could have no force and effect because the
method in which it must let contracts is specifically prescribed, and its authority limited in regard thereto. This contract was not let in accordance with the express requirements of the statutory laws of the State and the limitations on the power of the Printing Committee.
5. The Court erred in ruling and holding that Section 21 of Article 3 of the Bond Act, 36 St., page 687, repeals or affects the Public Printing Act in anywise, because:
(a) The said section only purports by its language and purpose to repeal all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with this Act, and there is nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the bond Act and the requirements of the general statutes that all engraving shall be contracted for under and by the committee on public printing.
6. That his Honor erred in holding and ruling that the provisions of Article 1, § 5, of the Bond Act, 36 Stat., page 674, providing that the proceeds of the sale of the State Highway certificates shall be used for the purpose of meeting payments required by this Act to be made to or on behalf of counties or highway districts, or bridge districts, or for the purpose of paying expenses incident to the sale of said certificates of indebtedness or notes, or for the purpose of paying other expenses authorized by this Act to be paid out of such proceeds, is an authority as to letting contracts for engraving the bonds. The section only purports to provide for what purposes the proceeds of sale may be used. It does not refer to the method in which expenses therefor are to be or may be incurred. It does not in any wise conflict with the provisions of law applicable to contracts for engraving.
7. The Court erred in holding and ruling that Article 3, § 1, of the Act, 36 Stat., page 680, contains any authority to the Governor and treasurer to let contracts for the engraving of bonds, because:
(a) By its language, purpose, and intent, the Governor
and State Treasurer are authorized to determine the form and denomination.
(b) The denomination of the certificates of indebtedness is prescribed in Section 3 at the page, so that the only denomination which the Governor and Treasurer could prescribe would be as to notes.
(c) The prescribing of the form in no wise includes the printing or engraving thereof. And it further appears from the complaint itself, that the treasurer called on three engraving houses to submit forms, thus abdicating their own duty.
8. That the Court erred in ruling and holding that Article 3, § 4, of the Bond Act, 36 Stat., page 681, contained any authority for the printing or engraving to be let by the Governor and State Treasurer in the language quoted by the Judge, to wit, for the purpose of bringing about a successful sale of such certificates of indebtedness and notes issued in anticipation of the sale thereof, the State Highway Commission shall have the power to do all things ordinarily and customarily done in connection with the sale of State or municipal bonds, because:
(a) The State Highway Commission did not undertake to let the contract for printing and engraving.
(b) It had no authority to do so.
(c) No contract could be made or let by it for $1,000.00 or more, until after advertisement, as prescribed by Section 14 of Article 3, 36 Stat., page 685.
(d) And the State Highway Commission could not have authorized or approved the letting of any such contract by the Governor and Treasurer.
9. The Court erred in holding and ruling that, as the Governor and State Treasurer were called upon by the highway commission to issue these certificates of indebtedness, It was not only the province of but necessarily required that the Governor and State Treasurer select the form of bonds, the type and kind of obligation to be issued as to
size, weight, and kind of paper, and protection to be afforded the State by the firm or corporation engraving such bonds, etc., in that:
(a) It only required the State Treasurer and the Governor to select the form and denomination with provisions for the time, place, and medium of payment.
(b) It in no wise conflicted with the law of the State as to how the public printing and engraving * * * was to be done.
(c) The State Treasurer and Governor could not afford any more protection to the State than its committee on public printing and engraving, and than the letting of the contract in the manner prescribed by statutory laws.
10. The Court erred in holding and assigning as a reason for sustaining the demurrer: It is necessary for some official department of the government to protect the State in a large financial matter of the kind in question, because:
(a) The State has prescribed three different official departments, each of which were to act in this case, and each and all of which were to protect the State, to wit: First, the State Highway Commission in calling upon the Governor and State Treasurer to issue the certificates; second, the State Treasurer and the Governor, in prescribing the form, denomination, time, place, and medium of payment; third, the Committee on public printing and engraving, with large experience on this subject, could let the contract for printing and engraving after advertisements and competitive bids.
11. The Court erred in holding that the Legislature intended the discretion to be ultimately vested in the Governor and State Treasurer, not only to decide upon the form of the bonds, but to do all things ordinarily and customarily necessary in connection with such sales, because there is nothing in the Bond Act to show any purpose or intention to disregard or do away with the safeguards in reference to public printing and engraving prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the State.
12. The Court erred in holding and sustaining the demurrer, because it appears from the complaint, and is undenied that the State Treasurer and Governor let the alleged contract for engraving these bonds without advertising for competitive bids and to the highest one of those who were permitted to make bids on it, contrary to the settled public policy of the State of South Carolina, and the Court should have held such contract null and void.
13. There is no law authorizing the payment of any public funds for or on account of the contract which the Governor and State Treasurer undertook to make with R.L. Bryan Company, mentioned in the complaint, and the payment thereof will violate Article 3, § 30, and Article 17, § 5, of the Constitution of the State and the statutory laws of the State in regard to public printing and engraving and in regard to the expenditure of public moneys. Source: CourtListener