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159 Tex. 500

324 S.W.2d 167

1 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 478

Luttes v. State

Texas Supreme Court

Decided June 18, 1958

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1958-06-18

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“ONE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FOR APPELLEE ON THE JURY FINDING THAT APPELLANT RECEIVED NO COMPEN-SABLE DAMAGE, AS SUCH FINDING IS AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT AND PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. TWO THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FOR APPELLEE ON THE JURY FINDING THAT APPELLANT RECEIVED NO COMPEN-SABLE DAMAGE, AS THE EVIDENCE IS FACTUALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT SUCH FINDING.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Clardy v. Dresser Industries, Inc.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1958-06-18

How this case has been cited

Cited by 102 later decisions — most recently July 2015 · most notably Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation (1970), Broussard v. Moon (1968)

7 federal appellate · 93 state decisions

3701958196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Mr. Justice Smith,

¶1dissenting.

¶2In the dissenting opinion dated December 10, 1958, the question of the shoreline was discussed. The shoreline question was discussed by me only because the majority passed upon the question. The motions for rehearing have this day been overruled. I now desire to point out more specifically and to reiterate that the entire discussion and holding relative to the shoreline by the majority is unnecessary to a decision in this case, and, therefore, is pure dicta, and has no place in the opinion or judgment to be rendered by this Court or the Court of Civil Appeals. The majority make no contention that the shoreline question is controlling. The Court of Civil Appeals has been instructed by the majority to affirm the judgment of the trial court, if it rules that the particular findings of the trial court are not so against the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. The affirmance would be in favor of the State. The Court of Civil Appeals cannot under any circumstances take into consideration the dicta expressed by the majority in determining the preponderance of the evidence question. Of course,.I still contend that the only proper judgment was one affirming the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals awarding title to the 4086.61 acres to the State of Texas.

¶3*550The writ of error was improvidently granted. It should have been refused, no reversible error, but, since .it was granted and an opinion has been written by the majority, I deemed it necessary to discuss the shoreline question in my dissent of December 10,1958. However, in the event of the Court of Civil Appeals, upon further consideration, should sustain petitioners’ contention that the finding on the basic issue in this' case is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and remands the case to the District Court for a new trial, it is my contention that the majority opinion does nothing more than hold that the question of determining the shoreline is one of fact, and that the location of the shoreline may be determined from the evidence to be the beach area up to the vegetation line. The majority in its opinion on motion for rehearing retreated from its original opinion wherein it held that the shoreline was to be determined by exclusive resort to tide gauges. If I understand the opinion on motion for rehearing it simply means that the tide gauge is to be only one of the methods of determining the location of the shoreline.

¶4Opinion delivered May 6, 1959.

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