Anderson v. Hande’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Every estate in lands which shall hereafter be granted, conveyed or devised to one, although other words heretofore necessary at common law to transfer an estate in fee simple be not added, shall be deemed a fee simple, if a less estate be not limited by express words or do not appear to have been granted, conveyed or devised by construction or operation of law.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner · Estate of Harrison P. Shedd, Deceased First National Bank of Arizona, Phoenix v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

2. ““Peter Anderson, the survivor, could not grant, bargain, sell, and convey the property during his lifetime, according to the express terms of the will, if he acquired only a life estate.” [Emphasis supplied.]”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner · Estate of Harrison P. Shedd, Deceased First National Bank of Arizona, Phoenix v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

3. “The instrument, considered as a whole, may be, and it is, both a mutual or reciprocal will of the parties, and a separate will of the survivor. That part of the instrument preceding the `fourth' paragraph of the conditions of trust deals with the community property making testamentary disposition of the said property. That part of the instrument preceding the terms of the trust is in form an absolute deed from the husband to the wife, and from the wife to the husband. The property purported to be conveyed by the husband to the wife is different in description from the property purported to be conveyed by the wife to the husband, but a general description of `all personal property and other real estate owned by' each party at the time of his or her death is added to the specific description of the real property in each instance, and, all property owned being conceded to be community property, the difference in description is immaterial to the disposition of this case. The conveyance is declared to have been made `for the disposition of all their property that they or either of them may own at the date of their death.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Estate of Harrison P. Shedd, Deceased First National Bank of Arizona, Phoenix v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue