16 Ariz. App. 463 - Baker v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I.C.A. § 714.37] It shall be unlawful for any person, with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend, to telephone another and use any obscene, lewd or profane language or suggest any lewd or lascivious act, or threaten to inflict injury or physical harm to the person or property of any person.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 27 Ariz. App. 722 - State v. Hagen · State v. Jaeger

2. ““The statute with which we are,here concerned is not an ‘obscenity’ statute. It is more analogous to that involved in the case of State v. Starsky, 106 Ariz. 329 , 475 P.2d 943 (1970). There the court had under consideration A.R.S. § 13-371, which made it a crime to disturb willfully and maliciously the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person by means of applying any violent, abusive or obscene epithets to another. In that case the term ‘obscene’ as used in the statute was attacked as being vague. The court, in upholding the statute, stated: “ ‘But we are not here faced with the complexities of the sexual connotation of “obscene” as used in obscenity statutes and applied to literature or the theater. Here the term is used to describe a type of “epithet”; in other words an obscene adjective, a vulgarity, a profanity or, in plain terms — “cuss words”. It would be inane to apply the constitutional standard of Roth, [Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , 77 S.Ct. 1304 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)] to determine if it appealed to prurient interests and even more ridiculous to seek in such activity a redeeming social value, much less any intellectual support for a protagonist’s argument.’ 106 Ariz. at 332 , 475 P.2d at 946 . “It would be equally inane to interpret the word ‘obscene’ in the context of the Roth standards when dealing with obscene phone calls. “We believe that we must take the normal everyday meaning of the word ‘obscene’, in other words: Lewd, impure, filthy, of”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 27 Ariz. App. 722 - State v. Hagen · State v. Jaeger

3. “The test is whether the inference upon which the presumption is based can be sustained by common experience and the circumstances of life. It is our observation that nowadays, obscene, lewd or profane language is not uncommonly used between individuals without any intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend. We accordingly do not believe that it is rational to assume that merely because a person uses obscene, lewd or profane language over the telephone one can conclude the person is doing so with the intent proscribed by the statute.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Dugan