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16 Cal. 152

Reeves v. Howe

California Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1860

California Supreme Court · decided 1860-07-01

The complaint was substantially against all the defendants as makers of the note—the specific allegation, as to Hayward, being, that for the consideration expressed in the note, he guaranteed its payment, “ and thereby became liable with said other defendants to pay said note. The demurrer was, that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Demurrer overruled; answer filed; judgment for plaintiff. Defendant, Hayward, appeals.

Relies on Riggs v. Waldo · Jones v. Post

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1860-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently February 1932

4 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Baldwin, J. delivered the opinion of the Court

¶1Cope, J. concurring.

¶2*153The question in this case is the legal obligation imported by an instrument in this form: “ Sixty days from date, for value received we jointly promise to pay F. Reeves, or order, the sum of four hundred dollars, etc. Oct. 1858. (Signed) E. B. Howe, J. E. Mayo.” Indorsed, I guarantee the collection of the within note when due. (Signed) A. Hayward.” The defendant, Hayward, was sued, together with the makers, and judgment had against him without further proof than the paper, and that the indorsement was made cotemporaneously with the signing of the note. The question is, whether this engagement of Hayward is an original obligation to pay the money on the maturity of the note. Obviously, this indorsement is not his promissory note, for a promissory note is a direct engagement by the payor to pay his own debt; whereas, this is an engagement to pay the debt of another. The engagement is in aid of, and collateral to the original liability of the principal, or party for whom the guarantee is given. (Hall v. Farmer, 5 Denio, 487; Munson v. Durham, 3 Hill, 591; Story on Prom. Notes, sec. 457.)

¶3It is not necessary to inquire whether this guarantee is void, because it does not express the consideration. (See, however, 6 Cal. 102; 7 Id. 32.) It is enough for the purposes of this decision to hold that appellant was guarantor and not a promissor, and therefore that he was entitled to notice, before he could be charged on his contract. (Riggs v. Waldo, 2 Cal. 486; Pierce v. Kennedy, 5 Id. 128; Geiger v. Clark, 13 Id.; Lightstone v. Louis et al. 4 Id. 277.) The demurrer should have been sustained.

¶4Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

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