16 Cal. 3d 834 - Williams v. Horvath’s Empirical Analysis
1976
Citation profile
30 federal appellate · 6 district · 290 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 375 later decisions — most recently May 2019 · most notably 39 Cal. 3d 159 - Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985), Fuchilla v. Layman (1988)
30 federal appellate · 6 district · 290 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Monroe v. Pape · Moor v. County of Alameda · Perez. v. Campbell · 69 Cal. 2d 782 - Johnson v. State of California · 55 Cal. 2d 211 - Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 375 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]he intent of the [Tort Claims Act] is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1976).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““Similarly, the California remedy of recourse to the Tort Claims Act need not be first sought before a plaintiff is free to invoke the Civil Rights Act. While there may be considerable overlap between the two statutes in given circumstances, the purposes underlying them are distinct. The state scheme, as noted at the outset, was conceived to strictly limit governmental liability; the federal legislation, by contrast, was designed to ensure an adequate remedy for violations of civil rights. The 100-day claim provision of section 911.2 is a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action under state law. [Citations omitted.] As aptly described in Illerbrun v. Conrad (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 521, 524 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 27, 29 ], the filing of a claim for damages ‘is more than a procedural requirement, it is a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendants, in short, an integral part of plaintiff’s cause of action.’ And while it may be constitutionally permissible for the Legislature to place this substantive impediment in the path of a state cause of action, it is clear that the supremacy clause will not permit a like abrogation of the perquisites of a federal civil rights litigant. “Accordingly, we hold that the claim provision of section 911.2 is inoperative in an action brought under section 1983. Thus the fact that plaintiffs in the case at bar did not allege compliance with this provision is irrelevant to their claim under the Civil Rights Act. . .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.