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16 Ill. 300

Dyer v. Talcott

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided June 15, 1855

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1855-06-15

This was an action on the case, brought by the appellee, against the appellant, to recover for damages done to the steam tug Seneca, owned by the appellee, by reason of the unlawful obstruction of Chicago river, by the appellant, in placing across it a rope, and negligently suffering it to remain, upon which the tug ran afoul, causing injury to the tug, and detaining her from her business, in making repairs, etc. The cause was tried before J. M. Wilson, Judge, and a jury, at…

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1855-06-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently January 1946

8 state decisions

401855186018701880189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Catón, J.

¶1The court below undoubtedly erred in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the defendant below. That request was as follows: “ That the burthen of proof, in this action, is upon the plaintiff, to show, not only that the defendant was guilty of negligence, but that he, himself, was not guilty of negligence or carelessness.” In the case of The Aurora Branch Rail Road Company v. Grimes, 13 Ill. R. 585, this court had occasion to examine the question here presented with some care, and the rule there laid down is, that the burthen of proof is on the plaintiff, to show that he exercised due care and caution, or that his own negligence did not contribute to produce the injury complained of, as well as that the injury was produced by the negligence of the defendant, and that is the precise question involved in this instruction, and which the court refused to give. The authorities referred to in that case, fully sustain this position, and it is not deemed necessary to reexamine them here. We do not deem it advisable to enter into an examination of the evidence, to ascertain whether a custom was proved, as contended for, or whether negligence was proved on the part of the plaintiff or defendant, or whether the damages allowed by the jury were too high. Those are questions of fact, which must lie submitted to another jury, under the influence of proper instructions.

¶2The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.

¶3Judgment reversed.

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