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← 16 Ill. 2d 577 - Pennington v. McLean

16 Ill. 2d 577 - Pennington v. McLean’s Empirical Analysis

1959

Citation profile

53
cited by 53 later decisions
2
states following
May 2014
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 50 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 53 later decisions — most recently May 2014 · most notably 31 Ill. 2d 69 - Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp. (1964), 35 Ill. App. 3d 703 - Dezort v. Village of Hinsdale (1976)

3 federal appellate · 50 state decisions

2601959196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Oswald · 5 Ill. 2d 153 - Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lanes, Inc. · Dee v. City of Peru · Blumb v. Getz · Thomas v. Buchanan

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““That provision has been construed as neither imposing an absolute liability upon the party approaching from the nonpreferential highway, nor conferring an absolute right of way regardless of all circumstances on the party traveling on the preferential highway. [Citations.] Thus, a person approaching a preferred highway is not required to stop, either at the stop sign or at the intersection line, long enough to permit any car that he observes on the highway to pass, regardless of its distance from the intersection. [Citations.] The statute requires only that the motorist confronted by a stop sign may, exercising reasonable care, proceed across the intersection after he has stopped and yielded the right of way to such vehicles on the through highway as constitute an ‘immediate hazard/ [Citations.] The Illinois decisions, however, do not provide a precise formula for determining whether a particular vehicle has conformed to set standards; that question must be determined by the jury [Citations.], and involves considerations as to relative speeds and distances of the vehicles from the intersection. [Citations.]””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The Illinois decisions, however, do not provide a precise formula for determining whether a particular vehicle has conformed to set standards; that question must be determined by the jury (citations), and involves considerations as to relative speeds and distances of the vehicles from the intersection.” ( 16 Ill. 2d 577, 583 , 158 N.E.2d 624, 627 .)”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “"[A] person approaching a preferred highway is not required to stop * * * long enough to permit any car that he observes on the highway to pass, regardless of its distance from the intersection. [Citation.] The statute requires only that the motorist confronted by a stop sign may, exercising reasonable care, proceed across the intersection after he has stopped and yielded the right of way to such vehicles on the through highway as constitute an `immediate hazard.' [Citations.] The Illinois decisions, however, do not provide a precise formula for determining whether a particular vehicle has conformed to set standards; that question must be determined by the jury [citations], and involves considerations as to relative speeds and distances of the vehicles from the intersection."”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.