Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

16 Johns. 152

Trimble v. Thorne

New York Supreme Court

Decided May 15, 1819

New York Supreme Court · decided 1819-05-15

THIS was an action of assumpsit, on a promissory note, made by James Cunningham, dated the 20th of October, 1813, for 800 dollars, payable, with interest, six months after date, at the bank of Orange county, to the defendant, who endorsed it to the plaintiff. The cause was tried before Mr. J. Spencer, at the Orange circuit, in September, 1817.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1819-05-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently May 1935 · most notably Shutts v. . Fingar (1885), Maddox v. Duncan (1898)

23 state decisions

401819182018301840185018601870188018901900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Spencer, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶1The several cases of Duryee v. Denniston, Miller v. Hackley, (5 Johns. Rep. 248. 382.) Crain v. Colwell, (8 Johns. Rep. 384.) and Agan & M‘Manus, (11 Johns. Rep. 180.) decide, that if an endorser of a bill or note, who has not had regular notice of non-payment, by the acceptor or maker, with full knowledge of that fact, makes a subsequent promise to pay, it is a waiver of the want of notice, and he is liable ; but it must be shown by the plaintiff, affirmatively and clearly, that the defendant knew, when he made the subsequent promise, that he had not received regular notice. The Court never intended, in the various cases which have come before them, on this point, to leave it to' be inferred from the mere fact of the subsequent promise, that regular notice had been given, or was intended to be waived. In the case of Beekman, survivor of Walsh v. Connelly, (a)recently before us, we held, that the proof of a promise to pay, merely, without its appearing, also, that the party knew he had not received regular no’tice, did not dispense with the proof of regular notice. An endorser may believe that due notice has been given, inasmuch as notices need not be personally served, and under an ignorance of the facts, consider himself liable when he is not. It is no hardship on the,holder of a bill or note, to require of him proof of regular notice; but if a party, with a full knowledge of all the facts, voluntarily promises to pay, and waives his\ right to notice, he will be held to his promise,

¶2i We do not think the case of Pain v. Packard applies; for the endorser, though in the nature of a surety, is answerable upon an independent contract, and it is his duty to take up the bill when dishonoured.

¶3Judgment of nonsuit.

¶4Argued in January Term, 1818, but not reported.

/16/johns/152 · .json · Public domain