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16 Johns. 181

Sweet v. Palmer

New York Supreme Court

Decided May 15, 1819

New York Supreme Court · decided 1819-05-15

THIS was an action of debt on a bond executed by the defendants, to the sheriff of the county of Onondaga, conditioned that the defendant Erastus D. Palmer, who had been admitted to the liberties of the gaol, should remain a true and faithful prisoner.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1819-05-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently July 1899

5 state decisions

20181918201830184018501860187018801890decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Per Curiam.

¶1The evidence clearly shows fraud, and a trick on the part of the defendants ; and we rejoice that the rules of law are such as to prevent the success of their cunning.

¶2The certificate is certainly not binding as a technical release of the debt: and it is settled that, although a pre~ vious consent of the creditor, that the debtor may go off the liberties, will excuse the escape, and discharge the judgment ; yet, a subsequent assent, or agreement, that the debtor may remain off, is no discharge. The right of action for the escape having once accrued, nothing but a release or an agreement for valuable consideration can defeat the action» (Scott v. Peacock, 1 Salk. 271.)

¶3Here the license was after the escape ; and there is no consideration. The fair construction of the certificate is this : “ you have escaped, and I have a right to sue for it 5 but I agree to waive that right, provided you return as a prisoner to the limits, by nine o’clock to-morrow morning.’’ The defendant never returned to the limits, nor was any consideration received by the plaintiff. Besides, if, as in this case, the debtor procured the license by collusion and preconcerted fraud, it would be affrontful to justice, to tolerate such a defence.

¶4The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to judgment.

¶5Judgment for the plaintiff.

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