¶1(dissenting). Schofield was arrested very promptly after the commission of the offenses with which he was charged. The victim of the rape gave clear and concise testimony and was not shaken on cross-examination. The evidence, as the majority opinion states, “was uncon-tradicted.”
¶2Schofield was represented by an attorney from the Massachusetts Defenders Committee who appears to have prepared thoroughly his case asserting lack of criminal responsibility, and to have obtained expert psychiatric witnesses of some standing. He advised the trial judge in a brief conference just before trial that he would have “just two witnesses, two psychiatrists,” and a tape, and that the case was to be jury-waived. There was discussion of problems about scheduling the expert medical witnesses on each side.
¶3After the disclosure mentioned in n.l, defense counsel indicated that Schofield “would be prepared to waive his right to a jury trial.” The trial judge indicated that he would like to have Schofield sit in the front row of the jury box during his inquiry so that the judge could “see his face.” Then ensued the colloquy reproduced in n. 1 of the majority opinion.
¶4I perceive nothing in Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 508-511 (1979), which requires a greater inquiry *207by a trial judge than was made in this case. This was not questioning of Schofield “as a mere matter of rote.” See the Ciummeicase at 510. The Ciummeiopinion states (at 509-510) that the court did “not intend to create a rigid pattern.” I view the language (at the top of 510) merely as suggestions of possible lines of inquiry “where a defendant needs a compendious reminder” of the extent of his rights. The judge saw Schofield and had opportunity to appraise his capacity to understand. I would suppose that the trial judge’s inquiry was sufficient to satisfy himself that the defendant was aware of his rights, that his decision was voluntary and not coerced, and especially that he had consulted with his attorney about his action.
¶5Here the attorney (see n.l) had already shown himself to be both perceptive and conscientious. A trial judge should be slow to second guess the trial tactics of a competent attorney.
¶6The majority opinion concedes that “in all other respects the trial was soundly managed and fair” but reverses and causes a new trial solely on the supposed inadequacy of the jury waiver colloquy. Not only does the colloquy seem to me wholly adequate, but the trial judge afforded Schofield’s counsel opportunity to suggest further inquiry. That no suggestions were made by counsel may not amount to a waiver. It certainly indicates, however, that the trial judge, acting conscientiously, was trying to afford full opportunity for any last minute change of position. To paraphrase the much more concise dissent of Judge Dumbauld in United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1980), I would affirm simpliciter.
¶7defense counsel, before Schofield waived trial by jury in person, brought to the attention of the trial judge that the victim had been called as a witness by another attorney from the Massachusetts Defenders Committee in another unrelated case in the same court. Schofield had been informed of this and did not object on any ground of conflict of interest. The judge correctly ruled that there was no impropriety.
¶8 Here Schofield, charged with a callous rape, had the opportunity for trial before a perceptive judge with an academic background. He and his counsel knew that the significant decision as to guilt must be made upon expert psychiatric testimony. See Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544 (1967). They each reasonably may have believed that (a) waiver of a jury might result in a more measured appraisal (than would be given by a jury) of the circumstances of the rape, and (b) a judge might be more receptive than a jury to expert evidence of the type which they expected to offer.