16 N.C. App. 527 - State v. Wiggins’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he evidence . . . showfed] that defendant was not actually present during the perpetration of the robbery but was in a house ten to fifteen blocks away. However, the actual distance of a person from the place where a crime is perpetrated is not always material in determining whether the person is constructively present. See for instance, State v. Chastain, 104 N.C. 900 , 10 S.E. 519 , where defendant was 150 yards from the scene, armed with a rifle which would be fatal at that distance, with intent to use it to back up his brother, the perpetrator, if required. A guard who has been posted to give warning, or the driver of a get-away car, may be constructively present at the scene of a crime although stationed a convenient distance away. One who procures or commands another to commit a felony, accompanies the actual perpetrator to the vicinity of the offense and, with the knowledge of the actual perpetrator, remains in that vicinity for the purpose of aiding and abetting in the offense and sufficiently close to the scene of the offense to render aid in its commission, if needed, or to provide a means by which the actual perpetrator may get away from the scene upon the completion of the offense, is a principal in the second degree and equally liable with the actual perpetrator. A person is deemed to be constructively present if he is near enough to render assistance if need be and to encourage the actual perpetration of the felony. There is no evidence in the record which wo”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Grainger

2. ““ ‘A principal in the first degree is the person who actually perpetrates the deed either by his own hand or through an innocent agent.’ (Emphasis added.) Any other who is actually or constructively present at the place of the crime either aiding, abetting, assisting or advising in its commission, or is present for that purpose, is a principal in the second degree. (Citations omitted.) In our law, however, ‘the distinction. between principals in the first and second degrees is a distinction without a difference;’ Both are principals and equally guilty. State v. Allison, 200 N.C. 190, 194 , 156 S.E. 547, 549 ; accord, State v. Gaines, 260 N.C. 228 , 132 S.E. 2d 485 ; State v. Peeden, 253 N.C. 562 , 117 S.E. 2d 398 . An accessory before the fact is one who was absent from the scene when the crime was committed but who procured, counseled, commanded on encouraged the principal to commit it. State v. Benton, 275 N.C. 378 , 167 S.E. 2d 775 ; State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42 , 120 S.E. 2d 580 ; Miller, supra, § 76; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 90 (1961). Thus, ordinarily, the only distinction between a principal and an accessory before the fact is that the latter was not present when the crime was actually committed.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 19 N.C. App. 632 - State v. Lyles