Volume 16 — Ohio State Reports

<p>A guaranty of the fulfillment of a contract, written below the contract, and executed at the same time, subjects the guarantor as an original contractor, and a suit may be sustained against both parties jointly, or against either severally. An averment in the declaration, of “value received,” found in such contract, is a sufficient averment of consideration.</p>

This is a writ of error, reserved in Licking county, brought to reverse the judgment of the court of common pleas of that county. The facts of the case, showing the questions involved, are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

This is an action of assumpsit, reserved in Muskingum county, and comes into the Supreme Court by appeal, from the court of common pleas. The action is assumpsit. The suit was commenced in the common pleas on December-8, 1841. The declaration was filed on April 25, 1842. The plaintiff counts against the defendant: Í. A®'maker of a due bill. 2. As indorser of a promissory note. 3. As guarantor of a promissory note. 4.

<p>*This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Meigs county.</p> <p>The action below was ejectment. The facts of the case, and the questions presented for the consideration of the court, are disclosed in the following bill of exceptions</p> <p>Be it remembered that, on the trial of this cause,-the plaintiff having given in evidence the record of a judgment rendered in the court of common pleas of Meigs county at the October term, 1842, in favor of Hampton,' Smith & Co., against the defendant, an execution issued thereon, and levied upon lands by the following description : “A part of fraction 3, in town 2, and range 13, in section 9, in the Ohio Company’s purchase; beginning about fifty-eight rods east of the southwest corner of said fraction, at the southeast corner of a tract owned by Lewis S. Nye; thence north, twenty-three degrees west, eighty-eight rods; thence east ninety-three rods; thence south eighty-four rods, to the south line of said fraction; thence west about twenty-seven rods, to Fugate’s corner; thence north sixteen rods; thence west twenty rods; thence south sixteen rods, to the south line of said fraction; thence west twenty rods, to the place of beginning, containing forty acres, more or less,” with a return of sale to the lessor of the plaintiff, and confirmation thereof, and a deed from the sheriff, pursuant to said levy. The defendant then called Thomas Smith, who was the sheriff who made the levy and sale, who testified that, after receiving the execution, he went to the recorder’s office to get a description of the real estate of Thomas J. Spiller; that he took the same to M. Heckard, Esq., a sui'veyor, to calculate the length of lines, so as to embrace forty acres off the west end of Spiller’s tract, lying in the fraction ; that Heekard made such calculation, and he then went on the land of Spiller, in the west end of said fraction, and made a levy, in accordance with the lines given to him by Mr. Heckard, so as to embrace forty acres; that before making the levy, learning that Fugate owned a tract of about two acres in *said fraction, he went to the recorder’s office to ascertain whether said Fugate’s tract would fall within the forty acres or not; that the Fugate tract is, in fact, described in the records as being seventy rods from the southeast corner of Lewis S. Nye’s land, but that, at the time of taking said description from the records, he read twenty, instead of seventy, which would bring, said Fugate’s tract within the forty acres; and, accordingly, in making the levy he referred to Fugate’s corner, with a view of running round the Fugate tract, and excepting it ont of the levy, supposing it would come within said forty acres; that at the time of the levy the Fugate tract was uninclosed, and the location of it was unknown to him, except as he had ascertained from the records, and that he was entirely mistaken as to its location, it being, in fact, as he has since ascertained, seventy rods from the aforesaid corner of Lewis S. Nye, and without the forty acres which he intended to levy upon; and it having been further proved that to extend the second line called for by the levy, so that a line running from thence south to the fraction lino would intersect said fraction line twenty-seven rods ■ east of Fugate’s southeast corner (as that corner has since been found to exist), said second line would be one hundred and forty-nine rods and forty-eight hundredths in length, instead of ninety-three rods, as called for in the levy, and the tract embraced would contain sixty-four acres; and it having been further proved that by running said second line ninety-three rods, as called for in the levy, thence south to the fraction line, thence west to the place of beginning, so as to exclude the land claimed by the defendant, the tract embraced within said lines will contain forty-one acres; and it having been further proved that the southeast corner of Fugate’s tract was marked by a small stake at the time of the levy, although the same was not seen by the sheriff, or its location known to him at the time of the levy, and the parol evidence hereinbefore recited having been permitted to go to the jury, subject to any exceptions as to its competency, and the counsel for tho plaintiff having objected to all of the same, ^except that which proved that there was such a corner as Fugate’s corner, and that there was a stake standing at the same, the counsel for'the defendant thereupon moved the court to instruct the jury:</p> <p>1. That if they were satisfied, from the evidence, that Fugate’s corner was inserted in the levy, under a mistake as to its location, and is, in fact, inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the other points, courses, ,and distances called for, they may reject said Fugate’s corner altogether, and be governed by the other courses, distances, and objects called for in the levy and deed; and that it is competent to prove such mistake by parol.</p> <p>2. That if they find the call for Fugate’s corner to be entirely inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the courses and distances called for in the levy and deed, and if, by rejecting said Fugate’s corner, the courses, distances, and objects called for, will make' a consistent boundary, embracing the identical lands intended to be levied upon and sold, they may reject said Fugate’s corner altogether, and be governed by the other boundaries called for.</p> <p>3. That, although it is a general rulo, yet it is not an invariable one, that fixed objects, or monuments, called for in a deed, must control the courses and distances called for; but if any such object or monument is so repugnant to the other calls as to satisfy the jury that it was inserted in the levy and deed through mere inadvertency or mistake, they may reject such object or monument, and be governed by the other calls.</p> <p>4. That a fraction or section line is a definite call in a deed, and that the original surveyed line is meant and intended thereby, and that course and distance would have to yield thereto if in conflict; that where there is no call or monument named as to the termination of the line, the distance from an agreed starting-point is to be deemed the precise length of the boundary line.</p> <p>5. That where a tract of land is described in a deed as bounded by four lines, if the first three lines can be clearly *ascertained, by the description contained in the deed, they are to be taken as the true lines, and if the fbui’th line has a call that is inconsistent with itself, or is repugnant to the other lines, then such call should be rejected.</p> <p>6. That where the intention of the parties can bo discovered by the deed, the court -will carry that intention into effect, if it can be done consistently Avith the rules of law ; that a deed is an instrument to effect the intention of the parties thereto, and where the descriptive words are Avholly without ambiguity, and are followed by a clause repugnant, this clause must be rejected.</p> <p>7. That AA'here a description is given, which has not acquired a strict legal construction, or a boundary is referred to, Avhich is variable, parol evidence is admissible, in order to ascertain tho meaning and construction of the deed.</p> <p>8. That where land conveyed is described as running a certain distance by measurement, to an ascertained line, though without a visible boundary, such line is of itself a monument which will control the admeasurement, and fix the extent of land conveyed.</p> <p>Which motion the court overruled, and all which instru'etions the court refused to give, but instructed the jury:</p> <p>1. That if they find from the evidence, that Fugate’s corner, called for in the sheriff’s deed to the plaintiff, is; .in fact, in the south line of the said fraction, No. 3, and that the same it identified by any fixed monument, natural or artificial, such as a stake or marked tree,, that then such corner can not be rejected ; but that the lines which call for course and distance merely, without an object at their termini, must be so fun as to give effect to the call for Fugate’s corner.</p> <p>2. And that, in so modifying the calls for course and distance, the north lino of said tract, which calls to run east ninety-three poles, should be extended on the north line of the tract to a point due north of that point in the south line, which is twenty-seven rods oast of Fugate’s southeast corner; and from the terminus of such extended line, a line *should bo run south to the last-named point in said south line of the fraction, and thence west, following the call of the plaintiff’s deed to the place of beginning.</p> <p>And the court further instructed the jury that they must consider, as ruled out of the case, all that parol testimony hereinbefore recited, except that which tended to prove that there was such a corner as Fugate’s corner, and that there was a stake standing at the same.</p> <p>To alt which rulings and instructions by the court, the defendant, by his counsel, excepted; and jmays the court to sign and seal this, his bill of exceptions, and that the same may be made a part of the record in this cause.</p>

*This is a bill in chancery for partition, reserved in Fayette oounty. The papers show that survey No. 988, of 1,000 acres, was patented by the United' States to Hector McNcal, Joseph Watkins, and Robert Watkins, as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants; and the complainant claims the undivided third part of said survey, being the part belonging to McNeal, by virtue of a purchase at a tax sale of lands forfeited to the state, for non-payment of taxes, on July 8, 1833.

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in Mercer county. The facts of the case aré disclosed in the opinion of the court.'

<p>This is a bill in chancery for partition, reserved in the county of Clermont.</p> <p>The bill sets forth that William Brown, Qn May 5, 1835, died seized of the land in the bill described, and that he left a will, in which he devised the same premises to John Brown and Sally Brown his wife, equally in fee simple; that after the death of William Brown, the devisees took possession of the land and occupied it till the death of Sally Brown, which took place in the year 1836; that John Brown, the surviving husband, remained upon the land, appropriating the proceeds to his own use till Ms death, on March 1, 1845; that John and Sally Brown loft no children, and never had any born alive during the marriage; that Sally Brown left three sisters—RebeccaBurns, one of the complainants; Anna Crump, wife of Joseph Crump; and Jane Bishop, wife *of Richard Bishop—her only heirs at law; that on February 15, 1841, John Brown, by his will, devised the southern half of land to said Jane Cox, one of the defendants; that he appointed Alpheus Tribble and William B. Head executors thereof, and directed them to sell the northern half and apply the proceeds as therein specified; that two of the sisters of Sally Brown, Anna Crump and Jane Bishop, with their husbands, sold and conveyed all their interests in the land to Penn the complainant; that the said executors took possession of the northern half and rented it out; that Jane Cox took possession of the southern half and still retains the same. The bill claims that the rent of half the land occupied by John Brown after the death of his wife, and till his own death, must be paid by his executors; and that for the rent since hi's death, the defendants, Jane Cox, and Tribble and Head, executors, are liable. It is further charged that the defendants threaten to sell the land, and that they refuse to have it divided' or surrendered up, or to account for the rents and profits.</p> <p>Prayer, that the land be divided among the parties according to their several interests, and that an account be taken of the rents and profits since the death of Sally Brown, and that a decree be rendered against the defendants for the amount.</p> <p>Answers wore filed by the defendants and testimony taken, but nothing is presented, in either answers or testimony, changing materially the facts alleged in the bill.</p>

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Hamilton.

This is a bill in chancery, roserved in the county of Seneca. The bill charges in substance, that one John Strong and Henry Cronise, the respondent, made a bet upon the result of the election for governor in 1842, of lot No. 96, in Tiffin, in Seneca county. That Strong executed a deed of *said lot, with general covenant of warranty to the respondent, and delivered the game-to one Clark, as stake-holder.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county. The bill of exceptions shows the following state of facts: On November 14, 1845, Mary Jane Bodine, an unmarried woman, made complaint before a justice of the peace, against John Baxter, who was arrested, and the said Mary examined before the justice in his presence. Baxter gave bond, and the complaint was sent to the common pleas.

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Athens. The object of the bill is to reform a defective instrument, in form a mortgage, from Denman to White, to secure the ^payment of $4,000, recorded in January, 1844. The instrument has but one subscribing witness. A large number of judgment creditors of Denman are made defendants, all of whom claim by their answers a lien upon the promises described in the mortgage, and insist that it is superior to the mortgage lien.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Fayette county. *The original action was ejectment, and the cause was submittod to the court, instead of a jury, for trial. The plaintiff below gave in evidence on the trial a patent from the United States for the land in controversy.

This is a bill of review, reserved in the county of Delaware. The bill is filed to reverse a decree of the court of common pleas of that county.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Scioto county. The action in the court below was assumpsit, on a policy of insurance, and upon the trial before the court, on an agreed case,, the court found due to the plaintiff, now defendant in error, $1,556.20, whereupon the defendant below moved the court for a new trial, for the reason, first, that the court erred in finding for the plaintiff, and, second, in finding the amount.

This is a writ of error, directed to the Supreme Court of Ashtabula county. Tho original action was slander, for speaking words imputing to the defendant unchastity and bestiality. The general issue, denying the speaking of the words, was the defense relied on. A verdict was rendered for defendant, and judgment was entered at the August term, a. d. 1846.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county. The action below was for an assault and battery. It was commenced in the court of common pleas of Hamilton county, under the law “providing for the collection of claims against steamboats and other water-crafts, and authorizing proceedings against the same by name,” and was submitted to the jury on the plea of the general issue.

This is an action of assumpsit, reserved in Wayne county. The declaration is in assumpsit. The first count seeks to recover the amount of certain notes put in circulation by the defendants, as an unauthorized banking association under the act of 1816, entitled an act to prohibit the issuing or circulation of unauthorized bank paper.

This is an original motion, filed in this court. The object of the motion is to stay further proceedings upon a judgment at law, and on an original decree in chancery, both entered in the Supreme Court of Lucas county, in favor of the defendants, against the plaintiffs, until a hearing can be had in a bill already filed in the Supreme Court of Lucas county, for the purpose of reviewing the aforesaid original decree.

This is a bill of review, reserved in the county of Erie. The material facts are these: Hall and wife executed a mortgage upon a certain lot of ground in Sandusky city, to Oran Follett, who assigned the same to complainant, to secure the payment of two promissory notes given for the payment of $698.

This is a case in chancery, reserved in Seneca county The papers are voluminous, hut all the facts bearing upon the points decided, are set forth in the opinion of the court.

<p>Wliere a certificate in bankruptcy is interposed as a defense to a pre-existing debt, it may be invalidated by proving fraud in its procurement.</p>

This is a writ of error, directed to the superior court of Cincinnati. *Tho original action was ejectment for the premises in controversy, commenced by the defendant in error in the superior court of Cincinnati. On trial to a jury, a verdict was returned for tho plaintiff below. Upon the return of the verdict, the defendant below moved for a new trial, which was overruled by the court, and judgment entered for the then plaintiff.

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Delaware.

This is a bill of review, reserved in the county of Lucasj brought to revei’se a decree rendered in bank, at its January term, 1846.

This is a, writ of error directed to the superior court of the city of Cincinnati. The action in the court below was assumpsit. The declaration was upon a policy of insurance, dated March 14, 1844, for one year, on two-thirds of the steamboat Mound City, in the sum of $3,500, the valuation being $10,000.

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Licking.

This is a writ of error, directed to the Supreme Court of the 'County of Ross. The original action was commenced in the court of common .pleas of Ross county. It was an action of assumpsit, brought to recover the amount of a $1,200 draft which had been transmitted by the Bank of Virginia to the Bank of Chillieothe for collection.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county.

This is a writ of error directed to the court of common pleas of Lucas county. The original action was assumpsit, under the law authorizing suits against steamboats and other water-crafts by name. It was tried by the court, the intervention of a jury being waived, and judgment rendered in favor of the defendant. Whereupon a bill of exceptions was tendered by the plaintiff, and allowed by the court.

This is a writ of error directed to the superior court of Cincinnati. The writ is sued out to reverse a judgment of that court rendered in a special action on the case, brought by the defendants in error, to recover damages for tbe taking of their property, by the plaintiffs in error, and appropriating the same to their own use.

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in Mercer county. The bill states that William A. Huston, the father of complainants, died intestate, seized of real estate in Mercer and ^Shelby counties, which descended to them as his children and only heirs. At the April term, 1827, of the common pleas of Mercer county, the administrator of Huston’s estate filed a petition for leave to sell so much of the real estate as might be required to pay the debts.

This is a bill of review, reserved in Cuyahoga county. The bill was originally filed in the court of common pleas of that county, to reverse a decree of that court. It comes into this court by appeal from the court of common pleas, where it was dismissed.

This is a writ of error, reserved in Butler county. The original action was commenced by the defendant in error before a justice of the peace, and appealed to the court of common pleas. In the latter court the defendant in error declared against the plaintiff in assumpsit for goods sold, money had and received, etc. To the declaration the then defendant filed a plea of the general issue, and gave notice of special matter relied on by way of defense.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Lake county. From the bill of exceptions, these facts appear:' In 1801, and( from thence till the time of his death, Aaron Olmsted, of East Hartford, Connecticut, ancestor of the lessors of the demandants, was seized in fee of 30,000 acres of land, in the north part of Ohio, of which the demanded premises was part.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Stark county. The original action was assumpsit, commenced by John Harris against Somers, the plaintiff in error. The declaration contains but odo count, and that is for money had and received. To this declaration there was a plea of non assumpsit.

<p>A recognizance to appear and answer to a criminal charge, taken by a single judge, must be returned to the court of common pleas of the county, and a memorandum thereof entered on the minutes of said court to make it matter of record.</p> <p>A declaration upon such recognizance will be bad unless it-aver that such return and memorandum were mado.</p> <p>Such recognizance can not be declared upon as a common-law bond.</p>

This is a motion to set aside a nonsuit and grant a new trial, in a case reserved in Ross county. The action is ejectment, to recover 244 acres of land, part of Nathaniel Massie’s survey (No. 5,011), patented to said Massie in 1809. Before the Supreme Court in Ross county, the plaintiff gave the evidence following: 1. Tho survey and patent to said Massie. 2. That Massie died intestate in 1818, leaving children and heirs. 3.

<p>This is a writ of certiorari, directed to the court of common pleas of Ross county.</p> <p>*The object of the writ is to reverse an order of that court, made when sitting as a court of chancery, at the June term, 1847, confirming the sale of land under a decree for the sale of mortgaged premises.</p> <p>The decree was rendered at the April term, 1843. Yarious writs of sale were issued, and appr aisements and re-appraisements were had, from the date of the decree until the sale, a period of more than four years.</p> <p>While these proceedings were in progress, the defendant died, on December 24, 1846.</p> <p>Tho only error alleged against the confirmation of tho sale is, that it was made after the death of Kern, without a bill of revivor to make his representatives parties.</p>

This is a motion for a new trial, reserved in Summit county. The facts of the case, sufficient to present the point decided, appear in the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error, reserved in the county of Franklin. *The original action was assumpsit, and was tried in the court of common pleas of that county. The case was tried by the court, without the intervention of the jury upon an agreed statement of facts, and judgment rendered-for the defendants. The agreed statement, including the copy of the note, is as follows : . “April 16, 1846. “ $600.

This -is a writ of error, directed to the Supreme Court of Lucas county. The original action was ejectment, commenced in the court of common pleas of that county, by Emery’s Lessee against Showers. On the trial in that court, the plaintiff gave in evidence certain deeds showing legal title to the lands in controversy in himself. He then offered, in evidence, a contract by which he agreed to exchange the premises for certain other lands of the defendant.

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Portage county. The action below was assumpsit, brought by Clark against ^Pomeroy, the administrator of Button, upon three promissory notes, made by Button, on June 9, 1836, for $583.33J each, payable to Clark in six, twelv e, and eighteen months. The declaration is in the usual form. The defendant pleaded non assumpsit, and gave notice of special matter.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Harrison county. The original action was debt, prosecuted by the defendant in error to recover the amount due on a note under seal and on an account stated. The debt set forth in the precipe and affidavit was $938.78, and the damages $700.

This is a writ of certiorari, directed to the court of common pleas of Pike county. Cartwright, the plaintiff in this proceeding, sued Sole in the court of common pleas of Pike county, and on the trial of the cause was nonsuited. He then sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Court, and the latter court reversed the judgment of the common pleas, with costs, and remanded the cause for further proceedings.

This is a bill of review, reserved in tho county of Lorain. The facts essential to an understanding of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>The party holding the affirmative of an issue is entitled to open and close the evidence and argument. If anything remains to be proven affirmatively by a plaintiff, he must always open.</p> <p>In cases where the testimony upon any particular issue leaves it doubtful whether the affirmative of that issue is sustained, it is a safe and proper oourse for the jury to find against the party holding the affirmative.</p> <p>In an action upon a policy of insurance, if it shall appear that any matter in reference to a description of the property, and which would increase the risk, is not made known by the insured, such concealment will avoid the policy. It is otherwise if the matter concealed could in no way increase the risk.</p> <p>■The court is not hound to instruct the jury upon hypothetical propositions: which are in no shape connected with the issues joined between the-parties.</p>

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in Hamilton county. The case was submitted to the court upon bill, answers, replications, exhibits, and testimony. In the view taken of it by the court, it turned wholly upon questions of fact, which are stated in the opinion of the court. None of the legal questions argued by counsel having been decided by the court, their arguments are not reported.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county.' The original action was assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff *as trustee, etc., against the defendant, upon a promissory note, made by .the defendant for twenty dollars, and discounted at the Mechanics and Traders’ Bank of Cincinnati. The declaration is special.

These three cases were reserved in Hamilton county, and arise under the act regulating writs of quo warranto. The three cases depend upon the same pleadings, and were submitted to the court upon such of the issues as set up the statute of limitations as a bar to the information. From the information it appears that the Lane Seminary was incorporated by an act of the legislature, passed February 11, 1832.

This is a writ of error to the court of common pleas of Clermont -county. The plaintiff in error was indicted for murder in the first degree, elected to be tried in the court of common pleas, and being tried in that court, was convicted of murder in the second degree, at the October term, 1846.

<p>This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pickaway ■county.</p>

*This is a bill in chancery reserved in Summit county. The bill is very voluminous, affecting a great variety of interests, and making upwai'd of one hundred persons and corporations-defendants.

This is a writ of error, directed to the Suprome Court of Lorain county. Tho object of this writ is to reverse the judgment of tho Supreme Court of Lorain county, affirming the judgment of the court of common pleas, which latter court had affirmed the judgment of a justice of the peace.

<p>When the facts are found in a decree, it will not be reversed on bill of review, because the court may have misjudged as to the weight of the evidence upon the particular matter in issue.</p> <p>Where an agent is unfaithful to the trust, and abuses the confidence reposed in him by his principal; where he misconducts himself in the business of his agency, he may be deprived of commission and compensation.</p>

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Butler. The facts arc substantially these : Phebe Ross obtained a divorce from her husband, Daniel Ross, in the Supreme Court in Butler county, in 1832.

This is 'a writ of error directed to the superior court of Cincinnati. The action below was assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff in •error, against the defendant, upon two bills of lading, the same in form, one of which is as follows: “ Shipped, in good order and well conditioned, by R. Mitchell ,& Co., for account of J. L. Wayne, on board the good steamboat General Pike, whereof is master, for the present voyage, Oapt.

This is a writ of error, brought to reverse the judgment of the court of common pleas of Greene county. The points in the case as disclosed in the bill of exceptions, sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

This is an action of replevin, reserved in Cuyahoga county. The defendant, as sheriff of Cuyahoga county, had levied *upon a quantity of wheat, the property in controversy, as the property of Hutchinson & Co. The plaintiff claims that it belonged to him.

This is a motion for a new trial, reserved in Lake county. The action was ejectment, and verdict was rendered for the defendant.

This is a writ of error to the court of common pleas of Lorain county. The original action was brought upon an appeal bond.

*This is a writ of error directed to the court of common pleas of Delaware county. The original action was commenced before a justice of the peace, and an appeal taken from his judgment to the court of common pleas, and in that, court the following proceedings were-had: The plaintiff declared on a note for the payment of twenty-five’ dollars, and added the common counts. The defendant pleaded: 1.

This is a writ of error directed to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county. The action below was debt. The defendant below pleaded: 1. The general issue; 2.

<p>When county lines are changed, and territory is detached from one county and is attached to another, the county acquiring the additional territory is not entitled to demand-from the other any portion of the funds in its treasury, under the act of 1820.</p>

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Lucas.

*This is a writ of certiorari directed to the court of common pleas of Clark county. The object of the writ is to review the proceedings of that court, in a matter originating under section 11 of the act incorporating the Little Miami Railroad Company.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Muskingum county. The defendant in error prosecuted an action of ejectment in the court of common pleas of Muskingum county against the plaintiff, who, in that case, was made defendant in place of the casual ejector. The cause came on for trial in said court of common pleas, at the November term, 1846, and was, by consent, submitted to the court instead of a jury.

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Athens. The object of the bill is to .quiet complainant’s title to the north half of section 19, and the whole of fraction 19, in township 6, range 12, in the Ohio Company’s purchase, and the execution of a contract for the sale of the same.

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Athens. The facts are in substance these: The complainants, at the July term, 1842, of the court of common pleas of Athens county, recovered judgments against Joseph and Benjamin P. Hewitt, amounting in the aggregate to $669.59, but neglected to make a levy upon lands of defendant, within the year subsequent to the rendition of the judgment.

This is a writ of error directed to the court of common pleas of Harrison county. The original action was debt upon a sealed bill or note. The bill or note is specially declared upon in the first count in the declaration, and this is followed by the common counts. The note upon which the action is founded, was given by the defendant to the plaintiff, on February 14, 1845, for $280.88, payable twelve months after date. To this declaration the defendant pleaded : 1.

This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Sandusky county. The original action was replevin, commenced March 11, 1844, in the common pleas of Sandusky county, and afterward appealed to the Supremo Court.

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Hamilton county. The action was originally brought in the superior court of Cincinnati, and judgment rendered for the then plaintiff. It was then taken to the Supreme Court by writ of error, and the judgment of the superior court affirmed. This writ is prosecuted to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court, on the ground that that court erred in affirming the judgment of the superior court.

This is a writ of error to the court of common pleas of Gallia county. The original action was ejectment, commenced by the defendant in error in the court of common pleas of Gallia county, for the recovery of section 19, township 5, range 15, in the Ohio Company’s purchase, and in the county of Gallia. Upon the trial of the case, the plaintiff having introduced evidence to prove his title, rested.

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Knox. The object of the bill is to determine the priority of liens between a mortgagee of John Buckingham and sundry judgment creditors. Samuel Ross recovered a judgment against Buckingham *at the June term of the court of common pleas of Knox county, in the year 1838, and levied upon land, January 1, 1840. At the October term, 1839, several more judgments were taken and all levied within the year.

<p>This is a mandamus directed to the board of public works.</p> <p>The writ was issued pursuant to resolutions of the general assembly, adopted March 12, 1845. The resolutions, with their preamble, are as follows :</p> <p>“Whereas, doubts have been entertained whether riparian proprietors on the navigable rivers of the state, are, in good faith, entitled to remuneration from the state on account of deterioration of the value of their investments in hydraulic purposes on such rivers; to settle such doubts, and as a rule to guide the board of public works, and their appraisers in such cases, be it</p> <p>“1. Resolved, by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That owners of land on the banks of any rivers of the class described in the above preamble, who have erected dams across such rivers, and upon which dams for hydraulic purposes have been authorized by law, who have sustained damage to capital by them employed on such lands for hydraulic purposes, by reason of the abstraction of water from such river, by authority of law, in the construction or repair of any such public works of this state, or by backwater, *by the same authority, caused by the construction or repair of any such public works, are entitled to compensation from the state for such damage so far as such capital, by them so invested, is made of less value thereby.</p> <p>“ 2. Resolved, further, If any riparian proprietor, on such river, shall claim damages from the state, for loss of any supposed interest in, or to the use of, the water of such river, by abstraction of the water therefrom by authority of law as aforesaid, he may apply w the Supreme Court, when in session in any county, for a writ of mandamus, directed to the board of public works, which may be served on them, or any member of said board, and shall be returnable to the next term of the Supremo Court in bank, commanding them (if the said board,, by themselves or counsel, shall not show good cause to the contrary) to assess any damages which .such riparian proprietor may have sustained for loss of any supposed interest in, or to the use of, the water of such river, over and above his loss on the capital by him invested, on his lands on such river, for hydraulic purposes.</p> <p>“3. Resolved, further, If the court in bank shall determine in favor of such proprietor, then said court shall order said board to proceed and assess such damages, under the provisions of the act ‘providing for the internal improvement of the State of Ohio, by navigable canals,’ passed February 4, 1825.</p> <p>“4. Resolved, further, That the said court shall entertain but ono such application, and the governor shall be authorized to employ counsel to defend the rights of the state in such suit.”</p> <p>On July 11, 1846, the relato rs filed their relation for a mandamus, under the second of said resolutions; sotting forth, in substance, that they are seized in fee simple of the land on their bank of the Great Miami river, about one mile below the town of Sidney, in Shelby county; and were so seized of the same, at the time of the abstraction of the water of said river by the State of Ohio, as thereinafter stated; that there is upon said premises a water ^privilege, and that a dam was erected thereon by those under whom relators claim, about the year 1812; that said dam has been ever since continued, abutting upon said promises ; and that the same does not interrupt or impede the navigation of the Great Miami r’iver. And relators further state, that in the year 1843, the water of said Great Miami river was, by authority of law, by the State of Ohio, abstracted from said river above the premises of relators, and taken out of said river through the Sidney feeder of the Miami canal, for the purpose of supplying the Miami canal south of Dayton with water, to the groat injury of relators, etc.</p> <p>To this relation, the board of public works have answered, admitting the ownership of the land, as set forth by the relators, and the abstraction of the water of the river by authority of law, but denying the right of the relators to damages, for the alleged reason, “that the said river, as well at the point where the water is so abstracted, as also at the place where the said Walker & Fulton claim to own the banks thereof as such proprietors, is a navigable highway, and the waters thereof have been used by said Walker & Fulton for hydraulic purposes, by means of a dam not authorized by law, and which is, and has been, from its erection, an unlawful obstruction to the navigation of the river, and a pubic nuisance.”</p> <p>To this answer, the relators have filed their plea, averring that said dam was erected more than thirty years since,- in good faith, and has been so continued ; that said river is not, and never has boon, actxially navigable, or subject to any easement of navigation, at the point where said dam is erected; that said dam has never been an unlawful obstruction to the navigation of said river, and is not, and never has been, a public nuisance; and that, therefore, the waters of said river are not, at the point where said dam is • built, navigable waters, within the true intent and meaning of the ordinance of 1787.</p> <p>The plea further insists on the custom, for more than twenty years,' t'o build dams on tho Great Miami river both above *and below the dam of relators, without reference to the easement of navigation, and on the acquiescence of the public in the exorcise of this right; and that, in good faith, the relators have by prescription such right.</p> <p>The plea also insists that the State of Ohio has fully recognized the rights of relators by the acquiescence of the Miami Navigation Board, a corporation created by the general assembly, for regulating the navigation of said river and its tributaries, and also by the state herself having built two dams below said relators’ dam, without slope or lock, for navigation ; and that, in good faith, the state is thus estopped from denying the rights of relators in the premises.</p> <p>To this plea there is a demurer.</p>

This is a bill of review, reserved in the county of Fairfield. The bill is brought to reverse a decree of the Supreme Court of Fairfield county, rendered at the November term, 1846. The bill in the original case was filed by the present complainants; was answered by McCracken, one of the defendants; demurred to by the others, and, on hearing, dismissed. The allegations in the original bill were that prior to January 1, 1842, the complainants and the defendant, Geo.

This is a bill in chancery reserved in the county of Madison. The bill is filed to settle the title to a part of a 640-acre tract of land in Madison county, covered by two patents, one issued to the complainant, the other to Joseph Harness, under whom the defendants claim.

This is a ease reserved in the county of Hamilton. It is an appeal from the decision of the court of common *pleas, confirming a sale of land made under a decree in chancery. On November 27, 1840, the bill of foreclosure upon which the decree was based was filed against the defendants, reciting a mortgage of the date of December 1, 1832, made by Fox and Miller to John 0.

This is an action of ejectment reserved in Hamilton county. The case comes before the court upon an agreed statement of facts. The plaintiff’s chaiu of title is as follows: 1. Title and possession in Israel Ludlow. 2. Deed of the administrators of Israel Ludlow to Joseph Tan Horne, signed and sealed in presence of two witnesses; dated March 25, 1807; acknowledged June 23, 1807, before John Ma-hard, J. P.; and recorded October 24, 1809.

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in tho county of Hamilton. This bill was filed in the superior court of Cincinnati, on July 12, 1842. The prayer is for an injunction to restrain the collection of a special tax, levied by the city council, upon two stores and part of a lot fronting thirty-three feet on Lower Market street, near the corner of Sycamore and said Lower Market street, and for general relief.

This is a bill in chancery, reserved in Franklin county. The bill is filed by a portion of the congregation known as the “ German Lutheran Reformed Congregation of St. Paul’s Church, Columbus,” against the pastor and other members of the congregation. This congregation had been' connected with the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Ohio until a short time previous to the filing of the bill, when that connection was dissolved by the.vote of a .majority of the congregation.

These three cases were reserved in the county of Franklin. They are appeals from the decisions of the auditor of state, and come into the Supreme Court under the provisions of the act for levying taxes passed March 2, 1846, and the amendatory act passed Februaiy 8, 1847.

This is a writ of error to the court of common picas of Ross county. The original action was ejectment for 121 acres of land. On the trial, the plaintiff below having shown title and rested, the defendant below offered a deed of the said Margaret and her husband, Jacob Shane, to the said Wm.

These four cases in chancery were reserved in Hamilton county.' They are all of the same character, being petitions for dower. The defense in each case is the same, to wit: that the respectivo petitioners are barred of their right of dower, in consequence of having united with their husbands in deeds convoying the premises in which dower is demanded.