Volume 16 — Puerto Rico Reports

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Jurisdiction — Municipal Courts — District Courts, and Supreme Court.— When the value of the thing involved in a civil suit does not exceed $500 the municipal courts have original jurisdiction and the district courts appellate jurisdiction; and when the value thereof exceeds $300, without fruits or interest, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from a judgment rendered by the district court on appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal Taken by Notary Authenticating Deed — Party in Interest. — The act governing appeals from decisions of registrars of property, approved March 1, 1902, authorizes appeals to be taken by the interested parties only, from decisions of registrars of property, as established thereby, since that act, by its section 10, repealed all sections of the Mortgage Law in conflict with its provisions; and as notaries authenticating public instruments are not parties in interest, according to the provisions of section six of the Mortgage Law, they are, therefore, without the necessary capacity to take appeals from the decisions of registrars of property relating to instruments executed before them.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Libel—Statement of the Case — Approval Thereof. — A statement of the case not approved by the trial judge lacks authenticity and cannot, therefore, be considered on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Statement of -the Case — Preparation Thereof — Orders Granting Extensions. — It is unnecessary to include in the reeord orders granting extensions for the presentation of the statement of facts, bill of exceptions, or statement of the case; neither is it necessary to include the amendments-proposed by the contending parties, nor the order of the judge approving or rejecting such amendments; but when a statement of the case or of the facts has been presented with amendments, and the court determines that it-contains the matter necessary to be included in the bill of exceptions, statement of facts, or statement of the case, a copy thereof should be made,, incorporating therein the amendments authorized by the court in a new document containing the approval and certificate of the judge, in accordance with the statutes.</p> <p>Id. — Statement of the Case — Complaint Sufficient — Judgment in Accordance witi-i Law. — The statement of the case hergin presented having no legal effect whatever, and the complaint being sufficient and the judgment in accordance with law, and it not appearing that the trial court committed any fundamental error whatsoever, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Cagnas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal prom Decision oe Registrar Taken After the Expiration cf the Time Allowed by Law.. — Where an appeal is not taken from the classification made by a registrar of property within the time provided for by law, the appeal must be dismissed.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Bond.—The writ of oerUorari will not issue when the only question raised in the aqiplication is the determination of the nature of a contract constituting a bond, because such is not a matter of procedure.</p>

<p>Servitude of Waters — Evidence—Burden op Proop. — Tie burden is on the plaintiff to prove the allegations made in the complaint, and his action must fail' if no evidence be given on either side.</p> <p>Id. — Ejectment.—The present ease is quite analogous to one of ejectment and is governed by the principle that the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the claim made by the defendant in possession.</p> <p>Id. — Preponderance op Evidence. — In civil cases a mere preponderance of evidence is sufficient whereon to base a judgment for the party in whose favor it turns.</p> <p>Id. — By preponderance of the evidence is not meant a majority of the witnesses testifying in the ease, but an excess in the weight of evidence considering the testimony of the witnesses, the documental proof, and all the facts and circumstances attending the transaction.</p> <p>Id. — Consideration op the Evidence by the Trial Court — Conflicting Evidence. — In jury trials, as in trials by the court alone, the verdict of the jury or the decision of a judge, based upon the conflicting evidence weighed and reconciled by the judge or the jury, will not be disturbed, unless it appears from the record that such verdict or decision was the result of partiality, prejudice, or passion, or is for other reasons manifestly unjust.</p> <p>Id. — Private Waters. — The waters of the quebrada Cahitas cannot he held to be public waters, because it is shown by the evidence that they have been used and considered as private waters since the year 1855.</p> <p>Id. — Partition oe Waters.- — The plaintiff having failed to prove his right to the use of the waters of the quebrada Cahitas, and it having been admitted by the defendants that plaintiff was entitled to the use of a third of the said waters, and the defendants being the owners of two of the three parcels of land crossed by the said quebrada, and the plaintiff being the owner of one of the said parcels of land, and the right to the use of said waters having been determined by an agreement in the year 1887 by the owners of the said lands, at which time they were in the possession of the parties to said agreement, upon whose rights the parties to this suit base their claims, the distribution and use of said waters made by the judgment appealed from is proper and it must be affirmed.</p>

<p>Acknowledgment of Natural Child — Declaration of Filiation by Judgment by Default. — The plaintiff A having been declared the natural child of B by a judgment by default against the unknown heirs of the latter, prayed for and obtained a judicial declaration in his favor as the sole and universal heir of said B; B;s nieces, having been judicially declared his heirs, asked for a reconsideration of the declaration made in favor of A, and took an appeal from the decision of the trial court denying their application. Held: That the appellants should have brought a direct proceeding to annul the judgment of filiation in favor of A, or should have asked for leave to intervene in the action of filiation wherein the judgment was rendered, and therefore the judgment appealed from was affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Intervention. — Any person may, before the trial, intervene in an action or proceeding who has an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.</p> <p>Id. — -Interest.—The interest mentioned in the Code, which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties, must be in-the matter in litigation and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. The amount of the interest is immaterial; nor does it matter whether or not the intervenor may protect his interest in some other way. The interest must be made to appear from the intervenor’s pleadings.</p> <p>Rights Pending Determination. — Where the right claimed by the intervenor has not been finally determined, he should not be prevented from intervening in a proceeding which will either directly or indirectly affect -such right.</p>

<p>CURING Defects in Record — Showing that Judgment is Final. — When a document is presented at the registry to cure a defect in a previous title, the. registrar must confine his action to a classification of the document, to determine whether or not the defect previously recorded in the deed may be cured, but he must not attempt to determine the validity or the nullity of the instrument theretofore recorded, since this is exclusively within the power-of the courts, as has been held repeatedly by the General Directorate of Registries.</p> <p>Id. — Manner of Curing Defects. — In accordance with section five of the law governing appeals from decisions of registrars of property, approved March 1, 1902, the fact that a defect is cured must be shown by a marginal note-entered in the record subject to the defect.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>’The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>New Trial — Appeal—Failure to File Bribe — Dismissal.—In this appeal from', an order overruling a motion for a new trial, the appellants filed a brief-in which they set forth matters not involved in this appeal but which are' treated of in the judgment. Held: That the case is in the same condition as if no brief had been filed, and as the provisions of rule 42 have not been complied with, the appeal must be dismissed.</p> <p>In. — Newly Discovered Evidence — Reasonable Diligence. — Where a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence does not allege that reasonable cliligenee lias been exercised to discover such evidence, it will be deemed insufficient,</p> <p>Id. — Effect of Newly Discovered Evidence. — A motion for a new trial is also insufficient which fails to allege that the newly discovered evidence would have changed the result of the trial.</p>

<p>Law of the Case — Judicial Decision of Identical Question — Motion foe a New Trial. — íhe judgment rendered by the district court in this case was affirmed on appeal. After the appeal was decided the district court overruled a motion for a new trial in the same case which had been pending for some time. The questions presented in the motion for a new trial were the same as those involved in the decision of this court in the appeal from the judgment, and under these circumstances the prior judgment of this court has become the law of the case.</p>

<p>Appeal — Statement op the Case Not Approved by Judge. — A statement of the ease which does not bear the signature and certificate of the trial judge • is without legal value.</p> <p>Agricultural Loan's — Jurisdiction op District Courts. — A creditor secured by the pledge of a coffee crop to be gathered is not compelled by the law of agricultural loans of March 10, 1904, to first resort to the municipal court to secure the sale of the goods serving as security before availing himself of the ordinary suit before the district court.</p>

<p>Disbarment proceedings.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated' in the opinion.</p>

<p>Contempt op Municipal Court — Certiorari—Jurisdiction op District Courts. — • There is no doubt that district courts have jurisdiction to review on certiorari the judgment of a municipal court in a case of contempt, and an appeal'lies from the judgment of the district court to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Certiorari — Purpose op Remedy. — The writ of certiorari can only be resorted to for the purpose of reviewing questions of procedure or of jurisdiction, but not for any other purpose where an appeal would serve..</p> <p>Id. — Review op Judgment: — Nor can the "writ of certiorari be resorted to for the purpose of reviewing judgments on their merits, but to determine whether they have been icndered under the rules governing the jurisdiction of judges,, or whether or not the proceedings prescribed by law have been followed.</p> <p>Id. — Admission and Exclusión oí? Evidence — Sufficiencv oe Evidence. — Generally the admission or exclusion of evidence cannot be revised on certiorari,. nor can the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment of the trial, court.</p> <p>Contempt — Offensive Publication' — Circulation op Newspaper within the. Territorial Jurisdiction op the Court. — It is unnecessary to allege and prove in contempt proceedings that the contemptuous article was circulated within the judicial district of the court.</p> <p>Id. — Unsworn Complaint. — It is not an essential requisite that a complaint be-sworn to in order to commence contempt proceedings, because section 146 of the Revised Statutes does not require such an affidavit.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction op Judge. — The judge, about whom a contemptuous article is published, has jurisdiction of the contempt proceedings and to decide a-motion for a change of venue on account of alleged prejudice against the accused.</p> <p>Id. — Exclusion op Expert Testimony — Discretion op Court. — The exclusion of the testimony of experts is discretional with the trial judge if he is satisfied that they are not qualified to testify as experts.</p> <p>Evidence — Statement op the Case — Stenographic Notes.- — -Where there is-no .statement of the ease this court cannot review the evidence introduced at the trial. The stenographic notes, although duly certified, cannot take the place of a statement of the case.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>MORTGAGE Proceeding — Competent Court — District wi-ierein Property Is Situated — Submission.-—There is no doubt that, according to the provisions of article 170 of the regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law, the district court for the district within which the mortgaged property is situated has jurisdiction of the foreclosure proceedings, and submission to the contrary will not avail the parties.</p> <p>Recovery oe Mortgage — Ordinary Proceeding — Jurisdiction—Submission.— Even assuming that the Code of Civil Procedure were alone applicable in the premises, because the summary procedure of the Mortgage Law had not. been followed m this case, applying section 77 of that code it will be seen that the defendants had submitted to the District Court of Arecibo, since they applied for an extension of time within which to answer the complaint, when their first step snould have been to have had the trial held in the court which they deemed proper.</p> <p>Submission — Jurisdiction-—Agreement to Submit to a Particular Court.— Although the parties executing a deed of loan elected the city of San Juan and agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of its courts for the decision of all matters arising out of the contract, this is not an insuperable obstacle to their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of another court, as occurs in the present case.</p> <p>Citation oe Defendant — Personal Appearance. — The fact that an extension of time is applied for by the defendants within which to answer the amended complaint shows that they accepted service of notice, and they cannot now successfully allege that they were not summoned and that a copy of the amended complaint was hot delivered to them, because the voluntary appearance of a defendant in such a case is. equivalent to personal service of notice and delivery of a copy of the complaint.</p> <p>Extension of Time within Which to Answer Complaint — Refusal—Discretion of TI-JE COURT. — It is not an abuse of judicial discretion -to refuse to grant an extension of time within which to answer the complaint, where the motion for such an extension is based on the sole reason of press of professional business of an attorney, and it is the province of the judge to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of such a reason.</p> <p>Recovery oe Mortgage — Ganancial Property — Husband Dependant. — In an action for the recovery of a mortgage on real property belonging to the conjugal partnership, where the mortgage was constituted with the consent of both spouses, it is sufficient to bring an action against the husband as the legal representative of the conjugal partnership, and it is unnecessary to make the wife a party defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Contempt Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Heies — Partition- of--Property — Declaration of I-Ieirs.' — Deeds of partition of property in themselves only show that the undivided property held in. com-moil no longer exists, • but in no wise shows what the rights of the participants are; and for this reason it has been held that such documents are hot recordable unless accompanied by the will or the judicial declaration of heirs.</p> <p>Revised Civil Code — When same went into Effect — Rights of Successors— Law Applicable. — The Revised Civil Code having gone into effect on July 1, 1902, according to the certificate of the Secretary of Porto Rico found at the beginning of the Revised Statutes and Codes of Porto Rico, the partition of the inheritance left by the predecessor at his death on April 25, 1902, must be governed by the former Civil Code in force at that date.</p> <p>Widow — Hereditary Rights — Law Applicable. — Although the right of a widow in the partition of the property of her deceased husband, during the time that the former Civil Code was in force, appears for the first time defined in the Revised Civil Code, where the ancestor had legitimate children who participated with the widow in his inheritance, who may be prejudiced by the hereditary rights of the widow established for the first time in the Revised Civil Code, in accordance with the exception contained in the first of the transitory provisions of this Code, the partition must be governed by the former Civil Code.</p> <p>Classification cf Title — Powers of Registrar — Judicial Approval of Partition. — Although the partition and division shall have been judicially approved, this would not be an obstacle to the classification thereof by the registrar before recording the same, as in the ease of obligations and declarations embodied in other public and authentic documents.</p> <p>Hereditary Rights' — Previous Record in the Name of Ancestor. — In case A should die without descendants after his father, B, in order to record the inheritance in the name of the heir of A, his mother, C, it is necessary first to record the property in the name of the deceased A, before it can be recorded in the name of his mother, C, thereby following the provisions of the Mortgage Law and its Regulations.</p> <p>Partition of Inheritance — Entry Thereof In Protocol. — The entry of partitions of inheritance in the protocol, required by the Act of Special Proceedings, approved March 9, 1905, has nothing to do with partitions made by deed executed before a notary and which for that reason are entered in the protocol of such notary before whom the participants executed the deed.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated iu tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Preliminary Injunction- — Oases in Which It Will Issue. — The writ of injunction should be issued with great caution and only where the reason and necessity therefor are clear.</p> <p>Id. — Irrigation Concessions — Undefined Eights. — The court after having examined the documentary evidence introduced at the trial held that the rights of the petitioners were not clear and defined, and for that reason the order appealed from should be reversed and the preliminary writ of injunction issued.</p> <p>Appeal — Statement of the Case — Defective Certificate. — The provisions of section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and sections 223 and 225 of the same Code relative to the approval and certification of the bill of exceptions and statement of the facts in a motion for a new trial, are applicable by analogy to any statement of the case. - (López v. American Railroad Co., decided June 28, 1906, 11 P. E. Bep., p. 148.)</p> <p>Id. — Defective Certificate — Agreement of Counsel. — Although the approval and certificate of the statement of the case herein presented are defective, inasmuch as the defect has been cured by agreement of counsel, wTho signed the transcript of the record, and no objection having been made thereto up to the hearing, such consent authorises this court to examine the statement of the case and consider the same in the decision of the appeal.</p>

<p>Appealable Order — New Trial — Oases Originating in Municipal Courts.— Decisions of district courts denying motions for new trials, in cases originating in municipal courts, are not appealable to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Id. — Such orders are not to be considered judgments of district courts-rendered on appeal from a decision of an inferior court, according to subdivision two of section 295 of the Code of- Civil Procedure, which is the only provision of law authorizing appeals in cases arising in courts inferior to district courts.</p>

<p>Appeal — Transcript of Record — Documents Which Should Be Included Therein. — The transcript of record on appeal from a final judgment should contain only such documents as are required by sections 229 and 233 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Statement of the Case — Dorm of Approval. — The approval by the judge of a bill of exceptions or statement of'the case should be in the form of a .certificate to the effect- that the bill or statement is true and correct, and ordering that it be filed by the secretary and made a part of the record in accordance with section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Transcript of Record — Documentary Evidence. — It is an error to suppose that documentary evidence may be submitted- toi the consideration, ,of _ this court by including a copy thereof in the transcript of the record. All the , evidence introduced at the trial in the court below must be set out' in a statement of facts and verified by tlie trial judge, in order that this court may consider the same as a part of the record.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment Roll — Manner of Making Same. — The judgment roll should be made complete notwithstanding the right granted by section • 55 of the rules of this court to remedy a failure so to do, where it appears that due diligence has been exercised, if by an involuntary oversight some document which is absolutely necessary has been omitted.</p> <p>Id. — Defective Statement of the Case — Review of the Evidence. — All the evidence not having been presented to this court in due form, it is impossible to determine whether or not the trial judge erred, and it must be presumed that the judgment conforms to the law and the facts and it must therefore be affirmed.</p>

<p>New Tüial — Appeal—Newly Discovered Evidence — Statement oe the Case.— Where there is no statement of the case in the record of an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial, based on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and it not appearing from the record what were the facts proven at the trial, this court cannot review the motion for a new trial, and the fact that the motion is accompanied by affidavits relative to .the newly discovered evidence, is of no importance whatever.</p> <p>Id. — Court’s Discretion. — To grant or deny a motion for a new trial is within the discretionary powers of the trial court, and this court will not reverse such an order unless it is shown that there has been an abuse of this discretionary power.</p> <p>Id. — Requisites eor the Granting oe a New Trial. — To entitle a party to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear: (1) That the evidence and not merely its materiality be newly discovered; (2) That the evidence be not cumulative merely; (3) 'That it be such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the ease; (4) That the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced it at the trial; (5) That these facts he shown as the best evidence of which the ease admits.</p> <p>Id.-t-Discovery of New Evidence — Requisite.—Newly discovered evidence must . be important, and the affidavits presented must show that it could not have been discovered before and introduced at the trial, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the party seeking the new trial.</p> <p>Id. — Record on Appeal — Allegations—Consideration Thereof. — In order that this court may determine the materiality of newly discovered evidence, it is necessary that it have the allegations made in the case before it, and it cannot consider as a part of the record, documents presented after the transcript of the record has been completed.</p> <p>Id. — Reasonable Diligence. — In order that a motion for a new trial, based on the discovery of new evidence may be successful, it is necessary to show that the party seeking a new trial has exercised reasonable diligence to discover such evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Abuse of Discretion — Presumption.—It not having been shown that the trial court abused its discretionary powers, the presumption must be indulged that its decision conforms to the law and, therefore, it must be affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>MANDAMUS — Judment—Adequate Remedy. — Where a district judge, after sustaining a demurrer based on the ground of want of jurisdiction, refuses to render final judgment at the instance of the aggrieved party, on the ground that said decision is final, the writ of mandamus is the adequate remedy to compel the judge to perform an act which is one of his duties and attributes, which is to render final judgment in such a case.</p> <p>Id. — Unappealable Decision — Decision on Demurrer — Alleging Want ;oe Jurisdiction. — A demurrer based on the want of jurisdiction is not a final judgment because it does not in itself constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties in the action in which it is rendered, and no appeal lies therefrom to this court.</p> <p>Id. — Decision on Demurrer — Rights oe Aggrieved Party. — Where a decision is made upon a demurrer to the complaint, the defendant may ask permission to amend his complaint or he may ask that final judgment be rendered thereon, in order that he may take his appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Errors Alleged for the First Time on Appeal. — Errors which have not been alleged either in the trial court or in the pleadings cannot be alleged for the first time on appeal.</p> <p>Mortgage Notes — Presentation Thereof. — The Mortgage Law contains no provision whatever regarding the presentation of mortgage notes upon the commencement of foreclosure proceedings, it being sufficient if they are presented, duly canceled, during the conduct of the proceedings.</p> <p>Foreclosure Proceedings — Unnecessary to Sue Wife. — The wife of a mortgage debtor is not necessarily a party to a foreclosure proceeding against the debtor for the recovery of a mortgage constituted upon the ganancial property, because her husband is the legal representative of the conjugal partnership.</p> <p>Id. — Demand—Service oe Notice oe Complaint. — Although it is true that a demand upon the debtor is necessary in order to commence mortgage foreclosure proceedings, service of notice of the complaint before the new Code of Civil Procedure went into effect was not a necessary requisite.</p> <p>Proof oe Test oe a Judicial Order — Declaration oe Judge Making Same.— The declaration of a judge making an order, whose written text has been mislaid, is the best evidence that may be presented to prove the text of the order, and oral testimony changing the terms of a written document is not evidence.</p> <p>Validity of an Order Signed by the Judges — Presumption.—The certificate of the secretary to show that an order, was signed by all of the judges warrants the presumption that one of them who was not a judge acted by legal substitution.</p> <p>Id. — Order Signed by Two Judges. — The signature of two of three judges, as the courts were formerly constituted, is sufficient to give validity to an order in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding.</p> <p>Publication — Correction oe Errors as to Daté in Return of Marshal.— Although the certificate of a marshal to prove publication of the notices contains errors as to the date, these errors may be corrected by an order of the court.</p> <p>Sale of Mortgaged Property — Unimportant Omissions in Publication.' — • Where a mortgaged property was assessed for the purpose of a public sale at $37,000 and it was sold for $500 in cash, the purchaser assuming the mortgage of $37,000, the property must be deemed to have been sold for more . than two-thirds of its assessed valuation, and the debtor‘was in nowise prejudiced by the fact that, in the published notices, it was announced that no offers would be accepted unless they covered two-thirds of the assessed valuation of the property.</p> <p>Rendering oe Accounts — Expiration of Time without Objection Thereto.— In this ease, some years having passed without the party to whom the ae- ' counts were rendered having made any objection whatever, it was held that his failure so to do constituted tacit approval of the accounts.</p> <p>Acts and Statements of Parties — Modification of a Written Contract.— The acts and statements of the contracting parties are admissible in evidence to show that, by mutual agreement the original contract was changed.</p> <p>Satisfaction of Mortgage Debts — Application of Amounts to the Payment of Accounts Current. — The creditor is not bound to apply payments first to the satisfaction of a mortgage debt, but he may apply the same to the payment of accounts current, made the subject of an express agreement.</p> <p>Mortgage Proceeding — Acts of Assignees of a Mortgage Debtor. — Where the assignees of a mortgage debtor and owner according to the registry of property, tacitly accepts the record in the registry of the title of adjudication of the mortgaged property to the purchaser at a public sale, such acceptance binds the assigning debtor.</p> <p>Id. — Ficticious Assignment. — Evidence tending to show the ficticious character of an assignment uras properly excluded by the trial court.</p> <p>Owner According to the Registry — -Private Agreements with Predecessor.— A person who enters into a contract with the person who, from the registry, appears to be the owner of the thing involved, cannot be prejudiced by secret agreements between the owner of record and his predecessor.</p> <p>ExclusioN op Evidence — Object Thereof. — Objections to the exclusion of evidence must show the purpose of the introduction thereof.</p> <p>Id. — Decision of Principal Questions in Litigation. — Where a suit is decided on the main questions involved in a case against the party prejudiced by the exclusion of evidence upon subsidiary points, such as damages and losses, such exclusion does not constitute an error prejudicial to his rights.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District 'Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Bond — Subrogation of Surety. — In accordance with the provisions of section 1740 of the Revised Civil Code, the principal on a note is bound to reimburse his surety for the amount paid by him because the surety is subro-gated by the payment to all the rights which the creditor had with respect to the debtor.</p> <p>Id. — Debtor’s Defense — Receipt of Amount of Doan by Debtor. — The debtor, having acknowledged that he received the full amount of the loan through his surety, it is immaterial that the amount owed was received by the debtor through his surety in different installments because, although the money was in the possession of the surety, the debtor used it and it was for his benefit that the loan was made, and the principal debtor is bound to pay his surety the principal and interest paid by him without the necessity of any liquidation thereof whatsoever.</p> <p>Id. — Proof of Payment by Surety — Obligation of the Debtor. — The surety having proved the faet that he made the payment, by the presentation of the canceled promissory note, the defendant debtor cannot escape compliance with the obligation, unless he proves that it has been satisfied and the burden is upon him so to prove, in accordance with the provisions of section 1182 of the Revised Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Findings of the Trial Court upon the Evidence. — The trial court having credited the statements of the plaintiff rather than those of the defendant, this court must accept its findings upon the evidence, unless it is shown that the judge was actuated by passion, prejudice or partiality.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Rape—Admission of Evidence — Effect of Evidence — Introduced. — The admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence does not depend on whether or not it will produce a certain effect, but it is sufficient in order that it may be admissible that it tends to prove some of the controverted facts.</p> <p>Id. — Sufficiency of the Evidence — Admissibility Thereof. — The admission of evidence to the consideration of the jury is a question for the determination of a court of law, and has nothing to do with the sufficiency thereof to prove the facts alleged in the complaint.</p> <p>Id. — Hypothetical Questions Based on Proven Pacts. — Hypothetical questions based on a supposed state of faets, not proved at the trial, are inadmissible in evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Prejudicial Errors. — In accordance -with the Act of March 30, 1904, errors committed by the trial court, which do not tend to prejudice the rights of the parties, do not constitute ground for the reversal of the judgment appealed from.</p> <p>Id. — Error in Admission op Evidence — Hypothetical Questions. — In accordance with the foregoing doctrine, the court held, in the case at bar, that the error committed by the trial court, in admitting a hypothetical question based on facts not previously proven, did not prejudice the rights of the accused and, therefore, cannot serve as a ground for the reversal of the judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Objections to Questions Answered. — Objections to the admission of questions already answered by the witness at the time the objection is made, must be overruled, and the proper procedure in such a case is to move to strike the answer from the record, when the question is really irrelevant.</p> <p>Id. — Reputation op Oppended Female as to Chastity. — In accordance with the most recent jurisprudence, the acts and the reputation of the offended female, either before or after the date upon which the crime of rape was0 committed, as proof of the improbability of the absence of consent, and resistance on the part of the woman, are admissible in evidence.</p> <p>Ip. — Carnal Intercourse op Aggrieved Party With Other Persons. — In cases' of rape, committed by the use of force and violence, it is proper to cross-examine the aggreived party for the purpose of showing that she had submitted to carnal intercourse with other persons at different places, both before and after the date of the commission of the alleged crime of rape, to show by such facts that, in all probability, the prosecuting witness gave her consent to the commission of the act.</p> <p>Id. — Rape op Prostitute — Carnal Intercourse op Oppended Party. — Although it is true that the crime of rape may be committed upon a prostitute, nevertheless, it is a matter of general information and a dictate of common sense that, in such a case, there is much less likelihood of resistance being offered, than where a pure and spotless virgin is assailed by a ravisher.</p> <p>Id. — Rape by ti-ie Use op Narcotic. — The jurisprudence established by the decisions in eases of rape committed by the use of force is not applicable where the crime is committed by the use of a narcotic, because in this case, no force is employed but there is an absence of consent on the part of the offended female.</p> <p>Id. — Definition op Rape.' — The definition of rape is the carnal knowledge by a man of a woman without her consent, and this may be accomplished under paragraph three of section 255 of the Penal Code of Porto Rico, where she is prevented from resisting by any intoxicant, narcotic or anaesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of the accused.</p> <p>Id. — A woman under such circumstances is in exactly the same position in which a girl under 14 years of age is placed by the law. She is incapable of giving consent and, as she cannot make resistance, no resistance is required on her part.</p> <p>Id. — Rape by Use op Narcotic — Evidence Concerning the Reputation op Aggrieved Party. — Where rape is committed by the use of drugs or narcotics, inasmuch as the prosecutrix is incapacitated from .offering resistance or from giving consent, evidence tending to show the lewd reputation of the prosecutrix and her indulgence in carnal intercourse, either before or after the date of the crime, is inadmissible in evidence, inasmuch as such evidence is only admissible as a defense on the part of the accused, when it tends to show the nonprobability of resistance, on the part of the prose-cutrix, in cases of rape committed by the use of force and violence.</p> <p>Id. — Instructions to the Jury — Yeracity of 'Witnesses — Involuntary Mistakes. — The court instructed the jury as follows: “It is not sufficient, in order to consider a witness as false, that he has not told the truth in everything; if he has not spoken the truth in reference to some essential particular, you may consider his evidence, as a whole, as untrustworthy but, if you find that he was mistaken in some detail, in some unimportant thing, you may consider his evidence.” The court held that this instruction conforms to the law and is not contrary to the provisions of section 162- of the Law of Evidence, enacted in 1905, because it is a generally accepted doctrine that, while an unintentional mistake of fact in regard to some unimportant detail may and often does affect the general credit of a -witness making it to some degree more or less, still there may be no sufficient cause for disregarding his testimony in respect to other material matters.</p> <p>Id. — Sufficiency of Instructions — Consideration Thereof as a Whole. — The instructions of the court to the jury must be considered as a whole and, when so considered, if they are sufficiently ample to state fully the law applicable to the case, it makes no difference if they are deficient in one respect provided they are made clear by a later explanation.</p> <p>Id. — Instructions Requested by Counsel for Accused. — Although as a general rule, it is preferable either directly to accept or reject the instructions offered by counsel for the accused, nevertheless the court may qualify the instructions so offered, if clearly stated, and the qualifications are such as not to destroy the effect of the legal proposition properly propounded.</p> <p>Id. — Corroboration of Testimony of Prosecutrix. — Although the law in force at the time this trial was held did not require that the testimony of the prosecutrix be corroborated by any other evidence, nevertheless it wag the duty of the court to warn the jury of the danger of convicting the accused on the testimony of a woman alleged to have been ravished.</p> <p>Id. — Modification of Instructions Asked for by Counsel for the Accused. — • 'It is not error for the court to qualify the instructions asked for by the defendant where such qualifications do not alter the meaning thereof, mislead the jury, prejudice the rights of the accused, nor deprive him of any means of defense*.</p> <p>Id. — Complaint of Prosecutrix. — One of the instructions asked for by counsel for the defense and refused by the court was the following: ‘ ‘ The court instructs the jury that, in a case of rape, it is the duty of the fiscal to show, before a conviction can be had, that the injured female complained of the act immediately after its commission, or as soon as she had the opportunity to do so; that, in this ease, it has not been shown that such complaint was made by the female in question.” This court held that the instrue- ‘ tion was properly refused because the court could not have given it without committing error, since it would have been equivalent to a withdrawal of the ease from the jury and an order peremptorily to acquit the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Contradictory Testimony of Witnesses — Consideration Thereof by the Jury.- — Where the testimony of witnesses is contradictory, it is the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and reconcile the conflict, and this court will not disturb the findings of the jury upon the evidence, unless it is shown that it was influenced by partiality, passion or prejudice.</p> <p>Id. — New Trial — New^y Discovered Evidence. — Motions for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, are generally regarded with suspicion and disfavor by the courts.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence to Impeach a Witness eor the Prosecution. — When a motion for a new trial is based on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and when, from the affidavits presented, it is deduced that they are irrelevant or merely have a tendency to impeach a witness for the prosecution, the motion should be denied.</p> <p>Id. — Facts Occurring Aeter the Trial. — When most of the affidavits in support of a motion for a new trial relate to facts occurring after the trial and incarceration of the defendant, and to visits made by the prosecutrix and her brother to the jail, and to the making of a contract between them and the appellant, such affidavits cannot be regarded as newly discovered evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Discretion oe Court. — The granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is always a matter for the discretion of the trial court and, unless it is shown that the judge abused his discretion, this court will not reverse his action.</p> <p>Id. — New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence — Requirements.—To entitle a party to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear: 1. That the evidence, and not merely its materiality, be newly discovered; 2. That the evidence be not cumulative merely; 3. That it is such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the case; 4. That the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced it at the trial; and 5. That these facts be shown by the best evidence of which the case permits.</p> <p>Id. — Reversal oe Judgment Appealed erom — Unimportant Error. — In accordance with the Act of March 30, 1904, this court will not reverse the judgment by reason of errors committed by the trial court, unless such errors are material and tend to prejudice the rights of either of the parties. This provision applies to criminal as well as to civil cases.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Rape—Manner op Proving Charge — Hostile Witness for the Prosecution. — The fiscal cannot prove the charges made in an information by the testimony of witnesses offered to impeach the testimony of a witness for the prosecution who has denied the essential facts in the case.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence to Impeach Veracity of Witness. — The testimony of witnesses offered to impeach the veracity of a witness for the prosecution cannot produce the effect of direct evidence to show the commission of the crime.</p> <p>Id. — Rights of Accused — Cross-Examination of Witnesses for the Prosecution. — The 'testimony- of witnesses, whom the accused is not given an opportunity to cross-examine, is not admissible in evidence for the prosecution.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence for Prosecution — Testimony Tending to Impeach the Veracity of Witness. — An attempt' to prove the facts charged in an information by the testimony ■ of witnesses offered to impeach the veracity of hostile witnesses for the prosecution, constitutes a violation of section 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which grants the accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.</p> <p>Id. — Hostile Witnesses — Impeaching Veracity Thereof. — The purpose of section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to prevent the State from being surprised, and permit it to contradict or neutralize the testimony of a witness who is wholly or partially adverse.</p> <p>Id. — Rape—Age of Aggrieved Party — Expert Testimony. — Although where the testimony of a physician, in regard -to the age of the injured female, is based on a physical examination, it must be accepted with great caution; nevertheless, it is not error for the judge, who having had an opportunity to see her when she personally appeared before the court, to judge that she had not yet reached the age of consent.</p>

<p>Life Insurance — Action to Recoves Amount of Policy — Sufficiency of Complaint — Demurrer.—From the complaint filed in this ease it appears that José Estévez Torres, together with his wife, Asunción Burgos, made application for mutual life insurance in the sum of $1,000, to the New York Life Insurance Co.; that for such insurance he paid the agent of the said company in this city the sum of $5; that the application was acknowledged by the president of the company, stating that it was receiving careful consideration and that he hoped to be able to issue a policy thereon; that the policy was issued while both applicants were still living and forwarded to the agent of the company, and that the agent presented the policy to José Estévez, but refused to deliver the same and receive the full amount of the premium for the insurance, because of the fact that Asunción Burgos had died 24 hours before the presentation of the policy. Seld: That these facts: are sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the recovery of the amount of the policy, because they show the existence of a valid contract of insurance upon the life of the plaintiff, and the necessary requisites of the contract are present, which are the consent of the contracting parties, the definite object of the contract, and the consideration therefor.</p> <p>Id. — Total Payment oe Eirst Premium — Delivery oe Polioy to the Insured.— The Code of Commerce contains no provision governing contracts for life insurance which require as an essential condition to the perfection of the contract that the whole of the first premium shall be paid and that the policy be delivered to the insured.</p> <p>Id. — Although the full payment of the first premium and the delivery of the policy to the insured are conditions which may be agreed upon as a requisite, to the perfection of the contract of insurance, it does not aqipear that in this case any such agreement was made, and this court cannot presume the existence thereof to the prejudice of the plaintiff and for the benefit of the defendant, but must confine itself to the facts set forth in the complaint, in the consideration and decision of the demurrer.</p> <p>Id. — Allegations oe Complaint — Omission oe Pacts Favorable to Defendant. — Where the plaintiff in his complaint omits facts which might prejudice his case and be favorable to that of the defendant, it is the duty of' the defendant to allege such facts as a defense in his answer, and then only, and from the evidence taken at the trial, a decision may be reached in. accordance with the law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan, Section Two.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Crime Against the Public 'Revenues — Sufficiency of the Information. — The appellant, not having presented any bill of exceptions or statement of facts, alleged on appeal that-the information was insufficient. Held: That although the words "which payment be ordered and received as a part of his salary, as secretary-comptroller, for the month of June, 1908/ ’ employed in the information, cause a doubt to arise, the doubt disappears when it is considered that it is set forth in the information that the issuance and payment was not legal and that the accused, a municipal official, charged with the duty of transferring or disbursing public funds or moneys belonging to the municipality of San Germán upon warrants at the time and place mentioned and acting as secretary-comptroller, "knowingly, illegally, maliciously and fraudulently, and without legal authority therefor, appropriated to his own use and private benefit a part of the said municipal funds — that is to say, $19.50.”</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Execution op Judgment — Expropriation Proceedings — Reversal op Judgment — Powers op- Inferior Court. — Where the judgment of a district court-in expropriation proceedings has been reversed by this court, the district: court has no power to suspend the judgment rendered by this court and permit a railroad company to continue in the illegal possession of the land which it was sought to expropriate, depriving the owner of the possession: thereof, while the proceedings were being had, before the Executive Council and the courts, to expropriate the land and acquire the ownership thereof, or a servitude upon the same.</p> <p>Id. — Powers op District Courts and op the Supreme Court — Suspension of-Judgments.' — A district court has the power to suspend execution of its: judgments, when it is duly shown that there are sufficient grounds therefor, by reason of something that has been offered during the course of the: proceedings or after the rendition of judgment, and the Supreme Court also has the power to suspend execution of its own judgments, in cases. • where it is proper so to do, for the same reasons.</p> <p>Expropriation — Appeal—Rights op Party in Eavor op Whom Judgment is Rendered. — Where expropriation proceedings are brought by a railroad company against the owner of real estate and judgment is rendered therein expropriating the land, and the appellate court reverses the judgment, with instructions to the trial court to proceed in accordance with the terms of the law providing for the condemnation of private property, approved March. 12, 1908, the successful litigant has a right to have the possession of the-land, of which he has been deprived by the railroad company, immediately restored, and the railroad company has a right to proceed to expropriate the-land by means of another proceeding properly commenced and prosecuted to-termination, in accordance with the act aforesaid.</p> <p>Id. — Duties op Trial Court. — In this particular case the court held that the district court should have ordered the marshal to put the owner of the-land in immediate possesion thereof, leaving the question of damages sustained by him on account of the wrongful acts of the railroad company to-be settled in future-proceedings.</p> <p>Id. — Rights op Owner — Public Utility. — All considerations of public utility and convenience must yield to the rights of the proprietor until these rights, are sustained or extinguished, in strict accordance with the law of the-land.</p>

<p>Pleadings — Nature Thereof — Title Thereof — Nature in View of Contents of Same. — The title under which, an attorney heads -his pleading is a matter of no importance whatever, because the nature or character thereof depends entirely upon its contents, and not upon its title.</p> <p>Beconvention — Oounteroomplaint.—Where the pleader calls his plea a reeon-vention, as this term is not used in our Code of Civil Procedure, we would regard it as a countercomplaint.</p> <p>Id. — Difference Between a Oounteroomplaint and a Beconvention. — This court, after considering the difference between a reconvention and a counter-complaint, held that, even supposing that the district court erred in regarding as a countereomplaint what the defendant called a reconversion, the error is of no importance in this appeal.</p> <p>Striking out Pleadings — Answer to Oounteroomplaint — Time Within Which Same Must be Piled. — The Code of Civil Procedure contains no provision whatever fixing the time within which to file an. answer to a cross complaint, although section 115 provides that it must be delivered upon the parties affected thereby that they may demur or answer thereto as if to the original complaint. It might possibly be held that by analogy the time within which answer should be made to the cross complaint should be limited to ten days.</p> <p>.Id. — Answer to a Gross Complaint Piled During Trial — Pailure to Enter Default. — The default of the plaintiff, because of his failure to answer the cross complaint in due time, not having been entered, the district court should not have stricken out the answer, because the general rule is that pleas may be filed at any time until default is taken.</p> <p>Jd. — Piling Pleas After Expiration of Time 'Therefor — Discretion of the Court. — It is discretionary with the trial court to permit the filing of pleas after the expiration of the time provided therefor upon a showing of sufficient reason therefor, and although, as a general rule, it is presumed that such discretionary powers have been duly exercised, nevertheless, in this particular case, as the answer to the cross complaint was improperly stricken out, the court should have allowed its reinstatement.</p> <p>Demurrer to Complaint — Time Within Which Same Must be Piled. — In accordance with section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a demurrer to the complaint, on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, may be filed at any time.</p> <p>■Judgment in Default — Entry of Default of a Cross Defendant. — The provisions of section 194 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which require the entry of the default of a defendant before judgment in default can be rendered against him, are-not applicable to a defendant in a cross complaint who has failed to answer the cross complaint.</p> <p>.Judgment in Default — Inclusion Thereof in Judgment upon the Merits of the Case — Judicial Proceedings. — The rules of procedure must be strictly followed, and, therefore, it is error for a court to include a judgment, which it has been sought to obtain by default, in a final judgment rendered on the merits of the case.</p> <p>‘Corporations — Liability for Debts of Pormer Owners — Evidence of Legal Belation. — It not having been proved by the evidence that any legal connection or relation existed between the plaintiff corporation and the former owners and organizers thereof, no judgment can be rendered against the plaintiff corporation for the debts and acts which it has not assumed and for which it is not shown that it is responsible.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — -Erroneous Proceedings. — Want of jurisdiction should not he confounded with improper procedure, because if the court has jurisdiction of the' parties and of the subject matter, it has jurisdiction to determine the questions raised for its consideration.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagflez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in. the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of G-uayama.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CRIMINAL Law — Arson—Sufficiency of Verdict. — A verdict drawn in the following words: "We, the jury, through the undersigned foreman, find the defendants, Carlos Maria Aseneio, guilty in the second degree, and Francisco Vélez not guilty of the crime of arson,” although it is defective in that it is not clear, the defect is not of such a nature as to render the document null and void, because on examination of the whole verdict together it is seen that the jury found Carlos Maria Aseneio guilty of the crime of arson in the second degree.</p> <p>Id. — Sufficiency of Evidence to Sustain Verdict Finding the Defendant Guilty. — From an examination of the evidence taken at the trial, the conclusion is reached that the fire was not accidental, but intentional, and that the verdict of the jury finding the defendant guilty is supported by the evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Testimony of Witnesses — Objections Made Without Stating Grounds Therefor. — When a party makes objection to the admission of evidence during the trial, he must state his grounds at the time the objection is made. Objections of a general character are not sufficient. A party should point out during the trial the exact part of the evidence to which he objects, as otherwise this court cannot consider the same.</p> <p>Id. — Admission of Evidence — Failure to Make Objection. — It is a well established principle of law that any probatory testimony may be considered by the court, unless objection is made to the admission thereof. Unless the right to object is exorcised, it will be deemed to have been waived.</p> <p>Id.— Consensus Tci.lit Errorem. — The foregoing doctrine is an application of the maxim consensus tollit orrerem.</p> <p>Id. — Testimony of Witness to Prove Voluntary Confession of Accused. — The testimony of a witness is admissible in evidence where he relates a conversation between the accused and his father as follows: "There is no remedy; we are lost; they have caught us;” because such evidence tends to prove a voluntary confession made by the accused.</p>

<p>Action to Recover Remuneration for Services — Admission of Evidence — Contract Entered Into by Dependant and a Third Person Not a Party to ti-ie Suit. — The defendant having specifically alleged in his answer to the complaint that he had not contracted directly with the plaintiff for the services the value of which it is sought to recover, but that his dealings ■were with another party whom he had paid for his services and who had utilized the services of the plaintiff, the- court held that such an allegation in the answer to the complaint, if properly qiroved, constituted a good defense, and it not having been stricken out, it was not error for the trial court to admit evidence in regard to the contract entered into by the plaintiff and a third person, because of the relation which it seemed to establish between the contract and the plaintiff.</p> <p>Admission op Direct and Indirect Evidence. — The trial court has the power to admit either direct or indirect evidence which proves or refutes the allegations contained in the complaint.</p> <p>Admission op Evidence — Rules Governing Admission op Evidence in Proceedings Had Before a Court op Law. — In civil cases tried before a court of law without a jury a "wider latitude is allowed in the admission of evidence than would be permitted in jury trials, and courts are not subject to the strict rules of evidence that govern the admission of evidence in trials before a jury.</p> <p>Original Complaint Amended — Introduction Thereof in Evidence. — An original complaint which has been amended is not admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the allegations therein contained.</p> <p>Id. — Introduction op Original Complaint to Impeach ti-ie Veracity op a Witness. — Where the object in introducing in evidence an original complaint, which has been amended, is to attack the credibility of plaintiff’s own testimony, it is admissible for that purpose.</p> <p>Admission op Evidence — Pertinent Question. — It is not error to admit in evidence a question which is pertinent from any point of view.</p> <p>Objection to Evidence — Failure to Enter Exception. — The reading of a document as evidence being impertinent, such evidence must be objected to, and if the court rules adversely, an exception should be entered and the ruling of " the trial court thereon should be alleged as an error in the appellate court.</p> <p>Reversal of Judgment — Errors Not Material. — Even though errors may have been committed,,# they are not material they do not constitute a cause that would justify the reversal of the judgment appealed from.</p> <p>Trial Before Court of Law — Admission of Impertinent Evidence. — Although a court may err in the exclusion of evidence, it rarely occurs that the admission of impertinent evidence is a prejudicial error, because the court has the power, up to the last moment, of disregarding impertinent testimony, and may render its judgment on the essential facts which have been proven.</p> <p>Id. — Presumption.—Where nothing to the contrary appears in the record the presumption is that the court disregarded any impertinent testimony that may have been given and, therefore, that it did not err in rendering its judgment.</p> <p>Defendant's Evidence — Refusal of Court to Allow Introduction Thereof.— Even supposing that the court errs in refusing, after the evidence for the plaintiff is in, to permit the defendant from introducing his evidence, such an error is not prejudicial to the plaintiff, nor does it deprive him of any substantial right, and he will not be heard to complain on that account.</p> <p>Argument of Counsel for Plaintiff — Refusal of Court to 1-Iear Same — Discretionary 'Power of Trial Judge. — The trial court may, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, after the evidence of the plaintiff is in, refuse to allow plaintiff’s counsel to make an oral argument, and the judge may have a well-founded reason for not desiring to hear any oral pleadings, and unless it is shown that there has been an abuse of this discretionary power, this court must presume that it has been wisely exercised.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Contagious Diseases of Animals — Destruction of I-Iorse Suffering from Glanders — Action to Recover Damages. — It not having been shown by the evidence that the defendant supervisor of health acted illegally or negligently, but that, on the contrary, acting upon the report of the veterinary and-with the haste required in such cases in compliance with the duties imposed upon him by the Law of July 1, 3907, relating to contagious diseases of animals, ordered the destruction of a horse suffering from glanders, an action for damages brought by the plaintiff, alleging that the horse was illegally killed, cannot be successfully prosecuted.</p> <p>Id.- — Order of Supervisor of Health to Kill a I-Iorse Suffering from Glanders — Sufficient Notice. — It having been shown in the case at bar that the veterinary inspector verbally notified the person in whose possession he found the horse that the animal would be killed, and also having notified plaintiff's brother, whom he believed in good faith to be the legal owner of the horse, such notice must be deemed sufficient, inasmuch as the law does not require any special form of notice.</p> <p>Id. — Procedure Followed by Veterinary Inspector — Conflicting Evidence as to the Observance cf Scientific Rules. — Although the evidence shows that the veterinary inspector did not proceed with the proper care and did not follow all the scientific rules for the application of the Mallein test, inasmuch as the evidence in regard to whether or not the horse was suffering from glanders, and as to whether or not the other horse died as the result of negligence on the part of the defendants and in consequence of the experiment made upon him is conflicting and was considered by the court, as may be seen from the judgment, was decided in the affirmative in the first case and in the negative in the second case, and it not having been shown that in so doing the court was actuated either by passion, prejudice, or partiality, this court would not be justified in reversing the judgment appealed from.</p> <p>Id.- — Admission of Evidence — Notice to ti-ie Brother of the Owner of the I-Iorse in the Belief that I-Ie 'Was ti-ie Owner. — It was not error for the court to make a ruling allowing the veterinary inspector to testify, in spite of the objection of the plaintiff, that he had notified the brother of the man who owned the horse of the order to kill the animal, because he believed in good faith that his brother was the owner; but even supposing that the ruling was erroneous, the judgment appealed from would not be reversed on that account, because it would be sufficient to show, as it was shown, that the inspector had notified the person in possession of the animal, in compliance with, the law.</p>

<p>Appeal from, the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Application for a Writ of Certiorari.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Statement of Facts — Identification of Oral Evidence — Lack of Identification of Documentary Evidence. — In tlie case at bar the statement of facts closes as follows: “I certify that the foregoing transcript is a true, exact and faithful copy of the testimony of the witnesses given during the course of the trial of the action, the title of which appears above, and which is to be filed in the office of the secretary of this court together with the record of the cause.” From the terms of the foregoing certificate it appears that the evidence of the witnesses heard at the trial is duly identified and included in the statement of the case; but the same cannot be said with regard to the documentary evidence, for,• although evidence of this character is inserted therein, the judge does not certify that it was introduced at the trial; wherefore, it cannot have any wider legal scope than it would have had, if it had come in the record outside tlie statement of facts and certified to only by the secretary of the court, or by the attorneys who took part in the action.</p> <p>Motion foe Nonsuit — Exclusion of Documentary Evidence — Lack of Identification of Documentary Evidence. — As neither the statement of the case nor the bill of exceptions has been certified to, so as to identify all the evidence presented by the plaintiff when the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case, this court cannot affirm that the court below erred in denying said motion.</p> <p>Error in Considering Evidence — Lack of a Duly Approved Statement of Facts. — This court cannot enter upon a discussion as to whether an error has been committed by tlie court belorv in considering the evidence, when there is no way of ascertaining in an authentic manner the result of all the evidence heard at the trial, through the lack of a statement of facts duly approved by the judge, and not confined, as in this case, to the testimony of rvitnesses, but including also the documentary evidence.</p> <p>Considering ti-ie Evidence as a Wi-iolb — Indivisibility Thereof. — When there are different elements of evidence which, taken together, have served as a basis upon which the judge has formed his conclusion as to the controverted facts, it is impossible for the appellate court to consider the different elements separately, "by taking some of them into account and disregarding others, for it must always he presumed that the findings of tlie trial court on the evidence are correct, until the contrary is shown, and this showing to the contrary must appear from all of the evidence introduced and not from some of the facts alone.</p>

<p>Transfer of Case — Court of Competent Jurisdiction — Plage Where ti-ie Property is Situated. — The district court of the place where the property is situated has jurisdiction of an action to compel compliance with a contract relating to such property.</p> <p>Id. — Affidavit of Merits — Defendant Who Appears but Does not Answer the Complaint nor Demur Thereto. — When a defendant appears but does not answer the complaint nor demur thereto, nor file an affidavit of merits, but merely a statement that he has a good defense and resides in another district, the case falls within the purview of section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for the trial of an action in the court where it is commenced.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Rape—Testimony of a Child. — When a child 7 years old, after having been-examined by the judge, is allowed to testify, the presumption is, nothing to the contrary being shown, that the examination was in due form.</p> <p>Id. — Testimony of the Prosecutrix — Corroboration Thereof by that of a' Child 7 Tears of Abe. — The testimony of a child 7 years of age which, word for word, corroborates that of its mother, the offended party, is sufficient to bring the ease within the provision of the law requiring the testimony of the prosecutrix to be supported.</p> <p>Id. — Bes Gestae — Scope Thereof — Hearsay Evidence. — The principle of res gestae is applicable to testimony relating to the condition in which the witness found his household when he returned home; but the provision of the Law of Evidence admitting hearsay evidence as part of the res gestae cannot extend to statements made to him three hours after the occurrence.</p> <p>Id. — Trial by a Court of Law — Admission of Inadmissible Evidence of a Cumulative Character. — Where the cause is tried by a court without the intervention of a jury, the admission of evidence open to objection, and of a merely cumulative character, such as the admission, in the present case, of what the mother and the child told the witness, does not constitute a material error.</p> <p>Id. — Motion for a New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence — Seasonable Diligence. — In motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence it is necessary to show that such evidence could not be obtained before, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence.</p> <p>Id: — Discretion of the Court — Affidavits Contradicting the Defense of the Accused. — Motions for a new trial are addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and when, as in the present instance, the affidavits filed in support thereof contradict the defense of alili alleged by the defendant, the’court commits no abuse of discretion in overruling the motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Classification of Documents — Execution of Judgment by Default — Powers of Registrar. — A judgment by default should recite facts sufficient to show that the defendant was in default, and for what reason, whether for failure to appear, or to plead, or otherwise. It must appear by the judgment of the court that the defendant had the notice which the law requires, and that the facts were proved which gave the court jurisdiction and show the liability of the defendant for the debt or penalty.</p> <p>Id. — Deed of Sale by Virtue of Judgment by Default. — The grounds for an entry of default not appearing from the judgment nor from the deed of sale executed by the marshal of a court in compliance therewith, the registrar, in classifying said deed, has power to record the same with the curable defects that it does not show the manner in which the summons was served upon the defendants, for the purposes of section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nor whether said defendant had submitted- to the jurisdiction of the municipal court, inasmuch as such defects affect the capacity of one of the makers of the deed, which capacity the registrar must determine from what appears in the document.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of tlie Registrar of Property of San Germán.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Declaration op Ownership op a House Standing on a Lot Belonging to the Municipality. — The judgment of a district court declaring that two houses "belonging to the petitioner and situated on lots owned by the municipality are not recordable, because the soil being the principal property and the buildings situated thereon only appurtenances, the houses cannot be admitted to record unless the lots have been previously recorded.</p> <p>Judgment in Proceedings to Establish Ownership — Power op the Registrar to Deny Record on Ground op Insuppiciency op Evidence. — A registrar lias no authority to refuse to record a judgment declaring ownership, on the ground that the time during which the predecessor in interest possessed the property is not stated in the possessory proceedings had before a court of competent jurisdiction rendering judgment upon the evidence adduced before it.</p>

<p>Suit j?or Personal Damages — Employers ’ Liability. — To prosecute successfully a suit for personal damages under the Employers' Liability Act, it is absolutely necessary to show that the plaintiff was in the employ of the defend ant, and not of a third party or independent contractor, as in the present case.</p> <p>Defect in the Ways, Works, or Machinery. — Another essential requisite to the success of a suit for personal damages under the Employers' Liability Act, is to prove that there was some defect in the ways, works, or machinery furnished by the defendant with which to perform the labor required.</p> <p>Id. — In conformity with the foregoing doctrine, inasmuch as no such allegation was made in this complaint, nor any evidence produced tending to show such defect, nor claim whatever that the building where the plaintiff worked was in any way defective, judgment could not possibly have been rendered in favor of the plaintiff in this ease.</p> <p>Id. — Attendance on the Injured Person por Account op the Dependant— Estoppel. — The fact that the defendant company had paid the plaintiff a small sum of money and taken care of him during his sickness, furnishing him with medical attendance, assistance of nurses, medicines and food, constitutes no acknowledgment of any liability ■ whatsoever on its part for the injuries received by the plaintiff, such acts lacking the essential elements of estoppel.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Humaeao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Collection of Municipal Licenses and Taxes. — Upon an examination of the complaint in this ease, it appears sufficient, because the facts therein alleged constitute a violation of section 81 of the Municipal Law, approved March 8, 1906.</p> <p>Id. — Alternative Imprisonment — Payment ce Pine. — A judgment condemning a company for violation of section 81 of the Municipal Law, approved March 8, 1906, to pay a fine of $15 and costs, or in default thereof, to undergo one day of imprisonment for every dollar defaulted, should he modified so as to make the payment of the fine compulsory for the obligation to pay constitutes a lien, according to the provisions of section 325 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Imposition op a Pine Upon a Company. — According to section 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where a fine is imposed upon a company, it may be collected by virtue of the order imposing it, by the officer of the court, out of its real or personal property.</p>

<p>Action cf Ejectment against the Peoitle of Pcrto Rico — Power to Be Sued without Its Consent — Principle Applicable to the United States. — According to the constant jurisprudence of tlie Supreme Court of the United States, there is no doubt that The People of the United States, The People of the States of the Union, and The People of some of the organii ed or incorporated Territories, enjoy the privilege of immunity from suit without their consent.</p> <p>Id. — Sovereignty cf Porto Rico during the Spanish Domination. — Throughout the Spanish domination, even down to its closing period, when the autonomic regime was established, Porto Rico could be considered neither as a sovereign nor a quasi-sovereign. The sovereign was never Porto Rico, but always Spain.</p> <p>Id. — Treaty of Paris — Cession of Porto Rico to the United States. — By virtue of the Treaty of Paris the sovereignty of Spain over Porto Rico passed, through cession, to the United States.</p> <p>Id. — Foraker Act — Political Constitution of Porto Rioo. — Upon studying the Foraker Act in its entirety, the conclusion is reached that although . Congress did not constitute Porto Rico as an independent sovereign (nation), nor as a sovereign incorporated into the American Union (state), certain it is that it invested Porto Rico with many of the attributes which characterize sovereignty.</p> <p>Id. — Privilege of Not Being Sued without Its Consent. — Among the attributes conferred upon Porto Rico by the Congress of the United States, the privilege of not being sued without its consent is not included,</p> <p>Id. — Construction of Law — Power to Sue and Be Sued. — The words “power to sue and be sued/' have always had an invariable signification.</p> <p>Id. — Private, Municipal and Public Corporations. — The words “power to sue and be sued/' besides being applied to private corporations, were used with reference to municipal and other public corporations.</p> <p>Id. — Use oe Those Words by Congress. — The Congress of the United States also made use of the words “power to sue and be sued," when legislating for the District of Columbia, when fixing the powers of corporations, and when creating national banks.</p> <p>Id. — Body Politic. — The words “body politic" and “body corporate” are used indistinctly under the same title in legal treatises, with reference alike to municipal corporations and states.</p> <p>Id. — Meaning oe the Word “Power." — The word “power," as generally understood, implies ‘ ‘responsibility.''</p> <p>Td. — Construction oe Law — Application oe Two Different Bules. — There cannot be two different rules of construction for determining the scope of words whose signification has been invariable for centuries.</p> <p>Id. — Intention of Congress. — Had the intention of Congress been to endow Porto Kico with the attribute of .sovereignty consisting in the prerogative of immunity from suit without its consent, either it would have refrained from using the words “with power to sue and be sued," as in the case of Hawaii, or it would have said “with power to sue and 'consent' to be sued."</p> <p>Oversight of Congress. — The presence of the words “with power to sue and be sued, ’ ’ in our Organic Act, cannot be ascribed to an oversight of Congress, but, on the contrary, it may be presumed that in employing them it had in mind the obligations contracted in the Treaty of Paris.</p>

<p>Vidual Usufructuary Portion in an Intestate Succession — Dormer Laws.— Befoie 3 888, when the Spanish Civil Code went into effect, law 7, Title IIT, Partida 6, of the Siete Partidas, provided that a widow should receive a fourth part of the estate, not to exceed a certain amount, and it also provided that she should receive nothing at all if she had enough of her own upon which she could live honestly.</p> <p>Id. — Laws in Force in Porto Rico until 1902. — The Spanish Civil Code, which was in force in Porto Rico until 1902, made a difference between testate succession and intestate succession, laying down the rules which should govern each of them. That Code said nothing about the rights of the widower when there were offspring or ancestors of the decedent.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Spain. — The Supreme Court of Spain has never passed upon this question with reference to the rights of the widower in the intestate succession, concurrently with descendants or ascendants.</p> <p>Id. — Laws in Force in Porto Rico from 1902 to 3905. — From 3 902, when the Civil Code of Porto Rico was passed, the Spanish Civil Code being thereby repealed, to March 9, 3905, when the act referring to forced heirs was ai>-proved, section 821 of aforesaid Code was in force, and although placed in the part of the Code relating to testate successions, it fixes the rights of the widower with respect to the intestate succession. By virtue of the aforesaid Act of March 9, 1905, the provisions of the Spanish Code, which relate to testate successions, were reenacted.</p> <p>Id. — Effect of the Act of March 9, 1905. — The provisions of the Spanish Civil Code relating to testate successions having been reenacted by the aforesaid act, which makes no reference to intestate successions, the question again arises as to the rights of the widower who is now placed in a worse position than he was before, because section 953 of the Spanish Civil Code which recognired the rights of the widower along with those of brothers or nephews, was repealed by the present Code and was not restored by the Act of March 9, 1905.</p> <p>Id. — Acs of March 9, 1905 — Casus Omissus. — We are thus driven to the conclusion, whether it happened by an oversight or otherwise, that the legislature, in fixing the rights of the widower, did not prefer him to, or eonsider him along with, parents, children, brothers or nephews, but limited itself to defining in section 920 that “in default of brothers and nephews or their children, whether of whole or half blood, the surviving spouse shall succeed to all the property of the deced.ent. ”</p> <p>Language of the Law. — The words used in the law are unmistakable, and however inconsistent they may seem, it is not for the court to substitute its will for that of the Legislature, bearing in mind that the Legislature had the Xiower to determine who should be the forced heirs and who should succeed in the ease of intestacy.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Sale of Property Belonging to the Surviving Spouse — Declaration of the ITeirs of the Deceased Spouse. — A surviving spouse having sold property acquired during her marriage with the deceased spouse, but belonging exclusively to her, the declaration made by the heirs of the deceased spouse in a deed of repudiation of inheritance, presented at the registry, wherein they accept the aforesaid character of the property sold, is sufficient for the purposes of the record of such sale in the registry.</p> <p>In. — Deed of Bepudiation of Inheritance — Classification of Titles — Deposition of the I-Ieirs of the Deceased Spouse. — Upon presenting at the registry of property a deed of repudiation of inheritance, executed by the heirs of a deceased spouse, which also contains their declaration to the effect that certain property acquired by the surviving spouse during her marriage, belonged to her exclusively, in order that the sale thereof by the surviving spouse might be recorded, the registrar should confine himself, for the classification of the document, to an examination of the validity of the declaration made by the heirs and not to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the repudiation of the inheritance.</p> <p>Id. — Intervention of the Creditors of the Deceased Spouse Who Had Been Declared a Bankrupt. — It is not necessary that the creditors of the deceased spouse, who had been declared a bankrupt, should intervene in a deed oi sale of property acquired by the surviving spouse during her marriage, but belonging exclusively to her, since there is no evidence that the creditors had seized or sought to seife the property; and possibly their action had extinguished, or such rights as they might have possessed, had prescribed.</p> <p>Id. — Declaration Made by the Bather on Behalf of His Children. — A deed of repudiation of inheritance and recognition of rights, executed by the father on behalf of his children, acknowledging that they had no share in the alienated estate, having been presented at the registry, it is not necessary that he should make the declaration in his own right, as in the aforesaid deed he implicitly acknowledges also that personally he had no right therein.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlxe District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Judgment Appealed prom Affirmed — Grounds Upon Which Decision of Trial Court is Based. — An appellate court is not confined to the grounds upon which the trial court bases its decision, but may affirm the judgment appealed from on other and different grounds than those stated by the trial court.</p> <p>Id. — Just Judgment — Erroneous Grounds. — When this court reaches the conclusion that a judgment is just and proper, it is unnecessary for it to refer . to the grounds upon which the opinion of the trial court may have been based, because even where such grounds are not well established, the judgment will be properly affirmed if sustained by the pleadings and the evidence, and by the facts and the law.</p> <p>Notaries Public — Office of Notary Acquired for Valuable Consideration— Treaty of Paris. — The provisions of the Treaty of Paris, in regard to the property rights of private individuals, do not refer to public or quasi-public officers whose duties and functions it is .incumbent upon the Government to regulate and inspect for the benefit of the public even where such officers are permitted, in the discharge of their duties, to receive emoluments and remuneration for the services whieh they render.</p> <p>Treaty of Paris — Meaning of the Words “Property of Private Individual." — The words “property of private individuals," employed in the Treaty of Paris, have reference to private property in general of a definite value and capable of being transferred by one person to another.</p> <p>Tb. — Treaty of Paris — Sovereignty of the United States — Quasi-Publio Offices. — It is inconceivable that the United States, in agreeing in the Treaty of Paris, that the property or rights of private persons should not be impaired, intended to acknowledge or felt bound to acknowledge that certain offices or employments of a quasi-public character, filled by officials connected with the administration of justice, could be alienated in perpetuity, or to limit ■ its sovereign power to such an extent that a system so entirely foreign to the ideas of the American people and incompatible with the spirit of its institutions, could not be abolished in accordance with the terms of the treaty.</p> <p>Id. — Treaty of Paris — Poraker Act — Act of Congress Subsequent to Treaty. — It must be presumed that Congress did not intend to modify the Treaty of Paris in enacting the Organic Law, but if that law should be considered incompatible with the treaty, the law would prevail, because a law enacted by Congress and approved after a treaty has been ratified must be complied with and enforced notwithstanding any prior provision of the treaty in regard to the same matter.</p> <p>Td. — Alienation of Office — Effect of the Change of Sovereignty. — The possessor of any office conveyed in perpetuity, discharging the duties of such office upon the change of sovereignty of Spain in Porto Rico, continued in possession thereof subject to the sovereignty of the United States, and its power to abolish the same whenever it might be found proper so to do.</p> <p>Id. — Military Government in Porto Eico — Ratification or its Acts by Congress. — Congress acknowledged the validity of the orders of the military government in Porto Eico, abolishing the office of solicitor, in enacting the Poraker Law providing that the laws and ordinances in force in Porto Eico should continue in force except where modified or repealed by military orders.</p> <p>Td. — Abolition or Offices Conveyed.' — The abolition of an office conveyed in perpetuity does not impair any constitutional right nor deprive any one of his property.</p> <p>Id.' — Abolition of Notarial Districts. — The law of the Legislative Assembly of Porto Eico, enacted January 31, 1901, abolishing the notarial districts and declaring the notarial profession open to every one alike, subject to the provisions of that law, did not deprive the old notaries of their right.to practice their profession, nor did it give them any cause of action to recover damages therefor.</p>

<p>Judgment and Complaint Inoongkuent — Action por Recovery op Property.— Where from the allegations of the complaint it appears that the action brought is for the recovery of property, the court has no power to change it, into an action for possession inoongruent to the allegations contained in the complaint.</p> <p>Id. — Action for Recovery — Declaration of Ownership — Judgment Ambiguous and Obscure. — A judgment rendered in an action for recovery of property, wherein the court in refusing to render any decision in regard to the recovery, holds that matters shall be restored to their previous condition, and limiting its judgment to an order directing the marshal to remove or cause to be removed a certain line of marks, posts, or a fence set up by the defendants upon one of the boundaries of the property in litigation, is defective in that it is ambiguous and obscure, inasmuch as the act of removing the posts or fence does not necessarily involve the restitution of possession to the plaintiH.</p> <p>Action for Recovery — Description of Property in Litigation. — In accordance with the provisions of section 125 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary to give a description in the complaint of the property involved in litigation.</p> <p>Decision Upon Questions Raised in th-e Proceedings. — In accordance with sections 1S8 and 192 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment must be a final determination of the rights of the parties, and the questions raised must be decided.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Action eor Acknowledgment — Prescription.—It having ■been alleged and proved herein that the plaintiff was born September 29, 1850, and that the action for acknowledgment was not filed until the month of June, 1909, the alleged natural father having died in 1900, the action is barred by prescription, in accordance with the opinion of this court delivered in the cases of &ual v. Bonafoux, decided June 25, 1909, and Puente v. Amsterdam, decided June 17, 1910.</p>

<p>Natural Child — How Status of Acknowledged Natural Child Must Be Shown. — Certificate of Baptism. — The status of natural children must be founded upon the voluntary acknowledgment of the father and legally proved,' or, in ease of his failure or refusal so to do, it must appear from a judgment so declaring, a mere certificate of baptism not being sufficient to prove it.</p> <p>Id. — Spanish Civil Code. — In accordance with the provisions of section 131 of the Spanish Civil Code for the year 1888, extended to P.orto Rico in 1889, where a natural child has been acknowledged in a certificate of birth, will, or any other public instrument, it is unnecessary for him to resort to the courts, because his status is clearly established.</p> <p>Id. — Revised Civil Code — Cases in 'Which Bather Is Bound to Acknowledge Natural Child — Action to Obtain Such Acknowledgment. — The Revised Civil Code provides that an illegitimate child may be acknowledged either by his father and mother jointly or by one of them alone, and section 189 states the cases in which the father is bound to acknowledge his child, and there is no doubt that in such eases, where a father fails or refuses to acknowledge his child in a solemn form, the child, if he desires to show his status in due form, must bring an action for that purpose in a competent court, within the time provided for by law.</p> <p>Id. — Act Establishing Special Legal Proceedings. — Only where a natural child has been voluntarily and solemnly acknowledged by his father, or has secured a final judgment acknowledging him as such, may he avail himself of the provisions of the Law of Special Legal Proceedings to secure the declaration of heirship in his favor in intestate proceedings.</p>

<p>Expropriation — Jurisdiction op District Courts — Situation op Property and Residence op Dependants in a Dipperent District prom that in Wiiici-i Action Is Brought. — District courts as courts of general jurisdiction are competent to. take cognizance of expropriation proceedings, even where the property which it is sought to expropriate is situated in a different district from the one in which the proceedings are brought, and even where the defendants reside in another district.</p> <p>Id.' — Voluntary Appearance op Dependants. — The mere voluntary appearance of defendants in a district court of a different district from the one in which they reside, without seeking the transfer of the suit, constitutes a submission to the jurisdiction of- such court, and they cannot successfully demur to the jurisdiction thereof.</p> <p>Writ op Inhibition — Order Reviewablb on Appeal. — In accordance with section 3 of the Act of'March 10, 1904, relating to writs of inhibition, the writ will not issue against an inferior court the decision of which is reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, even where the order itself is not appealable.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Partition op Inheritance — Conflicting Interests — Appointment oe Guardian Ad Litem for Minors. — The appointment of a brother as guardian ad litem of the minor heirs is null and void, because his interests in the partition of the inheritance are in conflict with theirs, and the provisions of section 230 of the Revised Civil Code are applicable by analogy to sueh cases.</p> <p>Id. — Judicial Appointment op Guardian Ad Litem por Minors Null and Void. — -The appointment by judicial authority of a brother as the guardian ad Ulom of minors is null and void, because his interests are in conflict with theirs, and the fact that the appointment was made by judicial authority does not alter this fact. A deed of partition of property executed by such a guardian ad litem is not recordable in the registry.</p> <p>Id. — Judicial Approval — Partition Null and Void. — A deed of partition of inheritance executed by a guardian ad litem whose appointment is null and void by reason of the fact that his interests are in conflict with those of the persons whom he represents, is not validated by the mere fact that it was judicially approved, because the legal effect of such approval is merely to make the transaction more solemn and authentic, and neither implies nor requires an examination into the validity thereof by the court; and, therefore, it does not possess the same efficacy as a judicial order or decision rendered after an examination and consideration of the facts presented.</p> <p>Id. — Vidual Si-iare — Distribution op Property. — A partition of inheritance is not null and void merely because the property was divided into equal parts between the children and the widow, and even supposing that it were defective on that account, the minor heirs would not be prejudiced, but the widow herself.</p> <p>Id. — 'Prctocolization of Instruments of Partition. — Where a partition of inheritance is made before a notary and is therefore entered in the protocol of the notary before whom the instrument is executed, it is unnecessary to- ' cause the same to be again entered in the protocol in order to comply with the provisions of the act relating to special legal proceedings, approved March 9, 1905, inasmuch as that law refers to instruments arising from judicial or extra judicial testate or intestate proceedings.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Demurrer Based on Ground that Plaintiff Has no Cause of Action — Recovery of Money — Bond Furnished by the Liquidator of a Commercial, Partnership. — Where a loan is secured by a guarantor in Ms capacity of' liquidator of a commercial partnership, and a suit is brought against him personally, together with the debtor, for the recovery of the amount of the-loan, and the objection being raised in the appellate court for the first time that plaintiff had no cause of action against the guarantor, the objection must be sustained because the suit was not brought against Mm in the capacity in which he guaranteed the payment of the debt, but against Mm personally.</p> <p>Extinguishment oe Obligations — Payment.'—In order that the extinguishment, of an obligation by payment may be successfully alleged, it must be clearly proven, and the courts will not assume that payment has been made merely because the creditor has allowed seven years to expire without bringing a suit for the recovery thereof.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District .Court of San Jnan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Claims Made by Notaries — Legislative Committee — Compliance With Duty. — Tlie Legislative Committee designated by the Act of March 5, 1905, having presented its report to the Legislative Assembly in regard to the claim of notaries, complied with the duty imposed upon it by said law, and it cannot be alleged that it failed to comply with its duty on account of the fact that the committee reported that the claims were without any legal basis whatever.</p> <p>Id.' — Legislative Committee — Matters of a Legislative Character — Judicial Authority. — The judicial authorities cannot by means of the writ of mandamus compel an official appointed by the Legislature to render a report in any particular sense, because such matters are beyond the province of judicial authority.</p> <p>Id. — Relations Between Defendants and Petitioners. — Where no relation exists imposing a duty or. obligation upon defendant in respect to petitioners, the writ of mandamus will not issue to compel the defendant to perform a particular act.</p>

<p>Eight to Personal Property. — In accordance with section 1 of tlie Act of March 14, 1907, page 308, the question as to who has the best right to personal property under attachment may be decided in proceedings for the trial of the right to personal property provided for in said act.</p> <p>Id. — Congruence oe Judgment — Duties oe Court. — Where the ownership of a sum of money is claimed by the plaintiff in a complaint in intervention, the judge must decide the question whether or not the money belongs to the . plaintiff.</p> <p>Id. — Kescission oe Deed oe Sale — Eight oe Ownership to Money Which Proceeded From the Rescission oe a Contract. — M. E., together with her husband, A. B., on April 24, 1909, brought an action, against D. G. G. to recover $3,500, and, to secure the effectiveness of the judgment, attached the sum of $2,000 which the defendant was to receive from M. E. and her husband, as a consequence of the rescission of a deed of sale to a house. E. B. O. filed a complaint in intervention and alleged and proved that by public deed executed January 8, 1909, the defendant, D. G. G., and his wife sold him the house involved, and agreed that in case M. E. and her husband succeeded in obtaining the rescission of the sale made to the defendant, D. G. G., the plaintiff in intervention, S. P, C., should receive the sum of $2,000 above-mentioned, and that the sale made by M. E. and her husband to D. G. G. having been rescinded and, as a consequence thereof, the sale made by D. G. G. to the plaintiff in intervention having been likewise rescinded, he, and not the plaintiff, M. E. and her husband, were the real owners of the property attached. The Supreme Court, in view of these facts and the provisions of section 1825, paragraph 3, letter A, of the Eevised Civil Code, decided the case in favor of the plaintiff in intervention.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CRIMINAL Law-COCKFIGHTING-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT — PREMEDITATION.The defendants herein having- been charged with the commission of the crime-defined and punished in section 5 of the Act of March 10, 1904, prohibiting-cockfighting, and it having been alleged in the complaint that they voluntarily and maliciously committed such act, such an imputation in this class, of eases necessarily implies premeditation on the part of the accused.</p> <p>Id. — Statutory Construction — Laws to Prevent Cruelty to Animals. — Acts, having for their object the prevention of cruelty to animals should be construed so as to effectuate the legislative intention, and attain the practical; object of the laws, so far as the rules of construction may warrant, without involving absurd consequences.</p> <p>Id. — Complaint—Requirements to be Complied With. — The indictment, in- ■ formation, or complaint must describe the offense with reasonable certainty; the complaint must be sufficient to apprise the defendant of that with which he is charged and enable him to plead a conviction or an acquittal in-bar of another prosecution for the same offense. Charging the offense in the statutory language, or language substantially equivalent thereto, will ordinarily be deemed sufficient.</p> <p>Id — Misdemeanor—Absence of Accused — Postponement of Trial. — Where the-care is set and the trial begun with the consent of the parties, if the accused in a misdemeanor ease voluntarily absents himself, his absence is not aground for the postponement of the trial, even where his counsel offers him. as a witness, if he has not previously offered him as such, and without demonstrating or attempting to show the importance of his testimony.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Bill op Exceptions — Statement op the Case. — A day-having been set for the hearing of this appeal, the appellant, through his- attorney, filed a motion requesting that he be permitted to present a bill of exceptions and a statement of the case; but as his motion was not accompanied either by the bill of exceptions or the statement of the case, and it not being-intimated that these documents existed and had already been approved by the - trial judge; or were being prepared with his consent, and counsel for the defendant not having sworn that the latter had a good defense, the Supreme-Court, taking into account the provisions of section 295 of the Code of Criminal Proeeduie and of section 17 of the rules approved by the district courts, as also the doctrine established in Brown v. Prewett, 94 Cal., 502r and People v. Almcndares, 136 Cal, 660, denied the motion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Sale of Lottery Tickets — Verbal Motion to Dismiss an Appeal. — Motions to dismiss appeals should be made in writing and filed with the secretary in time to be put upon the motion docket and heard at some call of the same on a Monday prior to the day set for the hearing on appeal.</p> <p>Appealable Orders — Setting Aside an Information. — According to section 348, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an ‘appeal may be taken by The People from an order setting aside an information.</p> <p>Id. — Sale of Lottery Tickets — Sufficiency of the Complaint. — A complaint charging the defendant with the offense of selling lottery tickets through two agents, without giving the names of the agents, but substantially following the language of the section of the Code which punishes that offense, is sufficient to serve as a ground for the prosecution.</p> <p>Pacts Required to be Stated in Complaint. — It is generally sufficient to describe the offense in the words of the statute where all the ingredients of the offense are stated with legal .certainty, and as repeatedly held by this, court the same strictness is not required in complaints presented in the in- ' ferior courts, charging misdemeanors, as in informations in district courts, charging felonies.</p> <p>Id. — Defects of a Complaint — Appeal—Waiver.—It is held by the weight of authority that when no objections have been made by a defendant to a complaint filed against him in a lower court, and, being convicted, he appeals to the Supreme Court, such appeal constitutes a waiver of informalities or irregularities in the proceedings below, when they do not affect the jurisdiction.</p>

<p>Appeal — Habeas Corpus. — The writ of hateas corpus cannot serve the purpose of an appeal.</p> <p>Palse Representation — Complaint.—A complaint charging the defendant with having represented himself to be a marshal and obtained $3 from the prosecuting witness by offering to quiet a prosecution against the latter, is sufficient to charge him with the crime of false representation.</p> <p>Warrant oe Arrest. — A warrant of arrest which complies with the formalities required by section 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and delivered to the officer who is to have the custody of the prisoner, is sufficient to justify the latter’s imprisonment.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Dominion Title — Jurisdiction—Court Competent to Take Cognizance — Declaration oe Ownership. — Applications for a declaration of ownership or dominion title must be filed in the district court of the district -within which the property is situated, or within which the principal part is situated, if it lies within two different districts.</p> <p>Id. — Submission oe Applicant. — The jurisdiction conferred by the law upon the judge of the district within which the property is situated is exclusive, and the submission of the applicant in a proceeding of this nature is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a court other than the- one belonging to the district.</p> <p>Id. — Record oe Ownership. — A declaration of ownership made by a court without jurisdiction of the matter, because not of the district where the property lies, is not recordable.</p>

<p>Election — Lists oe Voters — Registration.—The election law provides for the preparation of lists of voters wherein the names of all electors qualified to vote shall appear, and any qualified voter not included therein must assert his rights in strict conformity with the procedure and time prescribed in-said law.</p> <p>Id.- — Challenge and Elimination oe Voters — Remedy.—When a registered voter' is challenged, the Executive Council shall make an investigation and may-order his elimination whenever in its judgment the facts warrant, and the voter so eliminated has a right to appeal to the competent municipal court, which, after the legal proceedings, shall finally decide as to his qualifications.</p> <p>Id. — In this case the petitioner was challenged as an elector and ordered to be excluded by the Executive Council; from this decision he appealed to the proper municipal court, which at that time was vacant; the person appointed to fill said vacancy took possession of the office on September 14, and considering that there was no time to summon witnesses and hear the ease on September 15 — the last day fixed by the law for the hearing of these appeals— he refused to take cognizance thereof. Held: That the fixing of September 15, under the circumstances of this case, must be considered merely as directory, and the appeal having been taken in due time, the hearing should have been had, and the appeal considered and decided on its merits.</p> <p>Id. — Mandamus.—In the case to which the above paragraph refers, the writ of mandamus was the adequate remedy to compel the the municipal court to hear, - consider and decide the appeal before it, which had been taken in due time.</p> <p>Id. — Ordinary Remedy. — With reference to the same case, the writ of mandamus will not issue to compel the Executive Council or the supervisor of elections' to include in the lists the excluded petitioner or voter, for there being' an-ordinary and adequate lemedy, it should have been pursued to the end, removing any obstacle found in the way by exercising the remedies the law provides.</p> <p>Id. — Only in ease the municipal court had recognized the right of the voter under the proper procedure, and had rendered judgment in his favor, and required the Executive Council and the supervisor of elections to comply therewith, and they had refused to do so, would the writ of mandamus have issued to compel them to comply with the duty imposed by the law.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Hearing—Lack op Notice. — Where it is sought by certiorari to annul a decision rendered by the trial court on an incidental issue in a case, because of lack of notice from the adverse party, the writ will not issue if the decision is reviewatle on appeal from the final judgment when pronounced.</p> <p>In. — Lack op Notice — Hearing.—The failure to serve notice on the attorney of the applicant for a writ of certiorari is not sufficient for the purpose of an nulling the hearing of an incidental issue, especially when the affidavits presented do not show that the attorney had an office in San Juan, it appearing, on the contrary, from the affidavits, that he was habitually in the office of another attorney, where notice of the hearing about to be held was served.</p>

<p>Mortgage Constituted on Dipperent Properties — Record.—A mortgage constituted on different properties, subject to the same obligation, is not recordable in eases where the sum which each property shall secure has not been stated.</p> <p>Id. — Waiver op His Rights by the Debtor. — Although the-requirement referred to in the preceding paragraph was established for the benefit of the debtor, as it is in the nature of a prohibitory provision, it cannot be waived and the debtor, therefore, cannot agree with the creditor that each and every one of the properties shall be held to secure the whole amount of the debt, thereby eluding the fulfillment of the aforesaid requirement.</p>

<p>Effectiveness oe Judgments — Paternal Authority. — The “act to secure the effectiveness of judgments,” approved March 1, 1903, applies to all obligations, whether arising out of a contract or a tort.</p> <p>Id. — Paternal Authority. — In an action based on the exercise of paternal authority in which the plaintiff demands the delivery of his children by virtue of said right, a decree may issue to secure the effectiveness of the judgment to be rendered, and requiring the defendant, the grandmother of the children, to give a bond to comply -with all the orders made by the court, and not to remove the children out of the jurisdiction of the court, while the suit should be pending.</p>

<p>'RECORD op Titles — Previous Record op the Right op the Person Conveying— Liability op Registrars. — To record or enter instruments transferring or encumbering tbe ownership or possession of real property or property rights, the interest of the person conveying it, or in whose name the transfer or encumbrance is made, must be previously recorded. Registrars shall refuse to record such instruments where this requisite has not been complied with, they being directly responsible for the damage they may cause third parties by the violation thereof.</p> <p>Id. — Certificates op Sale Issued , by Collectors op Internal Revenue. — The foregoing doctrine, which is a provision of section 20 of the Mortgage Law, cannot be understood as repealed by sections 351 and 352 of the Political 'Code, as amended by the Act of March 14, 1907, the provisions of the latter ’being perfectly compatible with those of the former, and must be interpreted :as meaning that the registrar shall record the certificates of sale issued by the collectors, subject, however, to the provisions of the Mortgage Law, in which It is provided when and how the records shall be made.</p>

<p>PARTITION OF AN ESTATE-JUDICIAL APPROVAL-MODIFICATIONS PROPOSED BY THE Court. — According to section 73 of the law relating to special legal proceedings, approved March 9, 3906, district courts have power to modify the partition of an inheritance presented for its approval, and the parties interested should then prepare a new partition with the modifications proposed by the court for its final approval.</p> <p>Id. — Legal Modifications Demanded by the Court. — The words “legal modifications, ” used in section 73 of the law of special legal proceedings, as amended by the Act of March 8, 1906,. do not mean that the modifications demanded by the court in a partition of inheritance are expressly ordered by definite precepts of the law, but that such modifications are based upon the law and made the better to comply with the purposes of the law.</p> <p>Minors’ Portion — Things Indivisible or Depreciated by Division. — To the minors there should be adjudicated, within the bounds of equality, the property which is least exposed to difficulties or litigation; and the provisions of section 1029 of the Revised Civil Code should be resorted to only when the general rule established by section 1028 of the same Code cannot be followed.</p>

<p>Appeah from a decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeag from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ApplioatioN for the writ of mandamus.</p>

<p>Appeal — Verdict Contrary to the Law and the Evidence. — Where a verdict is objected to on the ground that it is contrary to the law and the evidence, if the evidence should appear sufficient to justify the verdict and there should be no reason whatsoever to hold that it is contrary to the law, and if there is no other consideration to justify the reversal of the judgment appealed from, it should be affirmed.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Sworn Petition. — Petitions for the writ of mandamus must be sworn to by the petitioner, but an affidavit of the party to the effect that the facts are known to him-to be true of his own knowledge and by information and belief, without specifying which facts the petitioner knows of his own knowledge to be true and which from information and belief, is defective, and for this reason alone the application may be denied.</p> <p>Id. — The writ of mandamus confers no new authority, and the party to be coerced must have the power to perform the act.</p> <p>Id. — Elections—Changes in the Lists oe Candidates. — The writ of mandamus will not issue to compel the Executive Council to make changes in the lists of candidates after October 11, since the law provides that no changes shall be made therein for any purpose whatsoever after that date.</p> <p>Id. — After October 11 the elimination of a candidate from the ballots cannot be obtained, but if in connection with the election of a candidate any fraud has been committed, or any other illegal act has been performed which might render the election null and void, it must be contested under the procedure prescribed by the law.</p> <p>Id. — Rights Acquired by Other Persons. — The writ of mandamus will not issue when the right of the petitioner, not being as clear as the law and the jurisprudence demand, the decision of the court might affect rights acquired by other persons who have not been afforded an opportunity to defend themselves.</p>

<p>Appeal — Evidence—Contradictory Testimony — Verdict.—Where the testimony of witnesses is contradictory, the appellate court will not annul the verdict of the jury, unless it be shown that in the consideration of the evidence it was actuated by passion, prejudice, or partiality, or that it committed an injustice of such a nature that ,tlie appellate court would be obliged to interfere.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated.iu the opinion.</p>

<p>^Record — Property not Described — Incurable Defect. — The absence of a description of the estate in a deed of renewal of mortgage, as provided by articles 9, 21, 30 and 146 of the Mortgage Law, although a- description thereof appears in the mortgage deed previously recorded and reference thereto is made in the deed of renewal, without embodying it therein, constitutes an incurable defect which prevents the record of the document in the registry of property.</p>

<p>-Cancellation of Mortgage — Order of Cancellation — Incurable Defect.— Where a mortgage has been recorded in the registry in favor of a particular-person, and an order has issued for the cancellation thereof by virtue of an action instituted against the succession of the mortgage creditor, if it is not shown nho are the persons constituting such succession, or by what title they succeed their predecessor in interest, the order will be deemed to contain an-, incurable defect precluding its admission to record in the registry.</p>

<p>Cancellation — Mentions oe Common Credits. — When a mortgaged estate has been ¿judicially sold and the execution first mortgage creditor paid, the fact that no surplus remains- to apply to the other credits subsequently recorded does not justify the cancellation of the mentions of common credits made in the registry, which credits are not among those enumerated in article 125 of the Mortgage Law, and such cancellation would constitute a violation of article 82 of the said law, inasmuch as the express or implied consent of the creditor does not appear, nor can it be supposed that he has intervened in the proceedings as mortgage creditors are allowed to do under articles 171 and 172 of the Regulations for tlie execution of the aforesaid law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>PRESCRIPTION — Acquisition op Ownership — Extinction op Actions. — Where the ownership of property is acquired by prescription the legal consequence is that all the actions which the person claiming the ownership thereof might have had with regard to the property are likewise extinguished.</p> <p>Appeal — Eights op the Appellant — Questions Raised by the Respondent.— Where an appeal is taken by the defendant, the appellate court can discuss and decide only such questions as are raised by the appellant, as it is a well-established rule that courts of appeal will examine only the errors pointed out by the appellant, and that the errors alleged by the respondent to have been committed by the trial court will not be taken into consideration.</p>

<p>Costs — Construction of Statutes. — It is a general rule that the laws regulating the taxation of costs in courts of justice must be strictly construed, and a party cannot demand from his opponent the payment of costs unless there be a law conferring- upon him the right to do so.</p> <p>Id- — Attorneys ' Pees — Amount of the Thing Claimed. — Where the costs are allowed to a party in a suit wherein the amount involved exceeds $500 he will also have a right to attorneys' fees; but the value of the thing in litigation must appear of record.</p> <p>If- — Where Amount Involved Does Not Appear. — In an action for filiation, such as the one exercised herein, if the value of the estate of the deceased predecessor in interest should exceed $500, there may be some reason for demanding attorneys' fees, but if no statement as to the value of the property appears in the record, no presumption can be indulged in favor of the allowance of such fees as costs of the action.</p> <p>Id. — Period for Piling Memorandum of Costs — Pees for Services Rendered in Supreme Court. — The memorandum of costs must be filed within 10 days after the final judgment has been rendered, and under no circumstances can district courts allow attorneys' fees to one of the parties for services rendered in the Supreme Court, the latter being the only court that could, allow such fees, provided there be a provision of law expressly authorising it so to do.</p> <p>Id. — Not only is there no provision authorizing the Supreme Court to allow attorneys’ fees to one of the parties for services rendered therein, but, rather, the eontiary would seem to be established by the provisions of section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Party Defendant — Documents from the Archives of ti-ie Municipality. — The alcalde of a municipality cannot properly be made' the defendant in the application for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the issuance of certified copies of certain documents on file in the archives of the municipality, inasmuch as the custody of such documents is entrusted to the municipal secretary.</p> <p>Id. — Demand Must First be Made on Defendant — I-Iis Refusal. — Tn order that an application for the writ of mandamus may be considered, it is necessary that, before the application is filed,' the defendant shall have been requested to perform the act which it is sought to compel him to execute and that he shall have refused so to do; and where, from the application, it appears that this course has not been followed, it will be deemed to be premature and must be denied.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan. Motion to strike out appellant’s brief.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property ■ of Caguas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appbai — Aggravated Assault and Battery — Punishment.—The crime of aggravated assault and battery cannot be punished in accordance with section 5 of the Act of March 10, 1904, defining and punishing said crime, but in accordance with section 8 thereof; and in case of appeal,' the Supreme Court has the power to modify the punishment imposed so that it shall come within the purview of said section 8.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Begistrar of Property of San Germán.</p>

<p>Recovery op Property — Ownership—Possession.—Where the allegations of the . complaint and the evidence submitted by the plaintiff tend to show that the action brought is for the recovery of property, the question to be decided as the result of such action is, to whom the property sought to be recovered belongs, and not who is in possession thereof; and the absence of any pro- . nouncement determining the question of ownership is sufficient reason to justify the reversal of the judgment appealed from.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment—Description op Property. — Where the aetion brought is one to recover possession, the judgment will be of no effect if, as in the case at bar, the property whose possession is ordered to be restored is not described in the judgment, there being no basis upon which' to proceed to the execution thereof.</p> <p>Id. — Identity op Property — Acts op Despoliation. — In an action to -recover possession the plaintiff must clearly establish the identity of the estate of which he has been despoiled by the defendant, as also the act of violence charged whereby the latter deprived the former of its possession.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Consent op the People op Porto Rico to be Sued. — It is held by the Supreme Court of Porto Rico that The People of Porto Rico may be sued without its consent.</p>

<p>Appeal — Contradictory Evidence. — Where the evidence is conflicting the findings of the trial court thereon will not -be disturbed by the appellate court.</p> <p>Record — Heirs—Third Persons — Recorded Titles. — A record entered m favor of the heirs cannot impair the right of ownership of the property recorded which may have been acquired by another person directly from the predecessor in interest, although he may not have recorded his title; but, should the heirs assign their rights to a third person who has his title recorded, such record is effective as against the right of the person who acquired directly-from their predecessor in interest inasmuch as his unrecorded title cannot: prevail against the recorded title of the new possessor.</p> <p>In. — Ownership—Possession.—A record of possession is not sufficient in itself to prove the right of ownership, for it is entered without prejudice to a third person having'a better right, and, should the possessor's right to the ownership of the recorded property be disputed, to prove this ownership he must present other evidence showing that he acquired it in one of the ways which the law recognizes.</p> <p>Negligence — Failure oe Parties to Depend Eights. — Where a party neglects to defend his rights and fails to exercise such actions as the law allows him to enforce the same, he must suffer the consequences of his own negligence.</p>

<p>Community Property — Dissolution and Liquidation op tub Conjugal Partnership — Obligations Contracted by the Wipe. — Until the dissolution of ■the conjugal partnership and its consequent liquidation, the wife does not ■ acquire any interest therein that may be attached or executed by reason of obligations of a private character other than those for which she can bind the conjugal partnership under section 1323 of the Civil Code.</p>

<p>Attorney Suspended erom the Practice oe His Proeession — Appearance and Deeense in Person. — An attorney who has been suspended from the practice of 'his profession has a perfect right to appear before any court in defense of his own rights notwithstanding the suspension, and no authorization is necessary therefor, especially where it does not appear that such right has been denied him.</p>

<p>Appeal prom Decision oe Registrar oe Property Aeter Expiration of Time Allowed by Law. — Where an appeal is taken from a decision of the registrar of property by the party in interest after the expiration of the time allowed by law, the appeal must be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from a, decision of the Registrar of Property of San Jnan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Judgments in Criminal Cases — I-Iow Same Should be Rendered. — -The manner of compliance with judgments in criminal eases cannot be left to the election of the accused, and for that reason such judgments should not be rendered in an alternative form condemning the defendant to pay a fine, or, in case of failure to pay the fine, to serve a term of imprisonment; and, when the judgment is rendered by a district court, it should specify that, in case of the failure of the defendant to pay the‘fine, he shall serve a term of imprisonment to be designated, which shall not exceed one day of imprisonment for each dollar of the fine remaining unpaid, and in no case shall the imprisonment be greater than that provided for by law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Survey — Nixing oe Boundaries. — In determining and fixing the boundaries of a property, the dividing line indicated by natural objects must be accepted in preference to such as may result from mathematical calculations, and as a natural boundary of the property involved in the case at bar exists, the same being a row of trees which has for a long time been considered as the real boundary line between the two properties, and a preponderance of the evidence being in favor of this contention, it was not error for the trial court to designate the same as the boundary line between the two properties referred to.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Effectiveness of Judgment — Pinal Judgment — Execution of Judgment.— When a final judgment has been rendered there is no need of deciding upon the execution of an order in due time made to secure the effectiveness of the judgment, for in such case the course to pursue is to press the execution of the judgment under the procedure prescribed by law.</p> <p>Appeal — Dismissal.—An appeal taken from an order substantially the reproduction of a previous one, likewise appealable, but not appealed from in due time, should be dismissed because, were it to be considered, the decision thereon would necessarily affect the other previous order which became final through operation of the law.</p>

<p>Transfer of Oases — Place of Trial. — Actions, the purpose of which is to determine any right or interest in real property, must be tried in the plaee where the real property is situated. The court, nevertheless, has the power to change the place of trial, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — In accordance with the foregoing doctrine, it having teen sought m the case at bar to dissolve an attachment levied on plaintiff’s property and to free the same from all liability in respect to the execution of a judgment which the defendant obtained against the plaintiff and which the latter claims to have satisfied and theretofore delivered, the action must be tried in the district wherein the property involved in the suit is situated and not the district; in which the defendant resides.</p>

<p>Appear from a decision of the Begistrar of Property of San Germán.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>OertioRARI — Grounds not Alleged bt Petitioner. — It is a questionable practice in certiorari cases generally, though possibly circumstances may exist when it would be justified, for the court to refuse the relief sought on one ground and grant it on entirely different grounds not presented by the applicant and on which the record is silent.</p> <p>Id. — Judicial Proceedings — Presumption of Legality Thereof. — Judicial proceedings are presumed to be correct until the contrary is proven, and where it appears from a record under review in certiorari proceedings that the inferior court,- after consideration, decided a motion filed by one of the parties, it will be presumed that the petitioner duly notified the other party of the motion, or that the latter waived his right to assail the proceeding by reason of any irregularity therein.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Judgments in Criminal Cases — Alternative Imprisonment eor Failure to-Pay Fine. — Judgments rendered in criminal .eases must fix the extent of the alternative imprisonment imposed upon the defendant for failure to pay the fine, and provide that such imprisonment shall not exceed one day for each, dollar remaining unpaid.</p>

<p>Judgments in Criminal Cases — Alternative Imprisonment eor, Failure to Pay Pine. — Judgments rendered in criminal cases must fix the extent of the alternative imprisonment imposed upon the defendant for failure to pay the fine, and provide that said imprisonment shall not exceed one day for each dollar remaining unpaid.</p>

<p>Record — Ownership—Prior Record in Favor of Another Person. — The ownership of an estate of 40.35 cuerdas in favor of the apjmllant having been declared proven, upon presentation of the declaration of ownership to the registrar the latter refused to admit it to record, because the same estate appeared recorded in favor of other persons, although with an area of 42 •cuerdas and different boundaries. An appeal having been taken from this decision it was Held: (a) That the differences observed do not constitute sufficient evidence to hold that the question is really one of two distinct estates, and reverse the decision of the registrar based on article 20 of the Mortgage Law, and undoubtedly in the antecedents furnished by the registry; (5) That although the title has been classified and its admission to record refused, should it be presented anew, accompanied by ample proofs showing that two distinct estates are concerned, and the registrar should be convinced thereof, he may proceed to effect the record, his previous refusal not being an obstacle thereto.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal.—Before the Supreme Court will dismiss an appeal on the ground that it was taken by an attorney who had never appeared as the attorney of record, the papers submitted or the affidavit accompanying the motion must make such an allegation a certainty.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal prom Judgment op Municipal Court — Notice op Appeal. — According to the provisions of sections 296 and 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the notice of appeal must be served upon the attorney and not upon the party. This principle is not applicable to an appeal taken from the judgment of a municipal court.</p>

<p>Application for a writ of habeas corpus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>